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The Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS) was born from a simple but 
powerful conviction: in this part of the world special initiatives are required to create 
and maintain an environment where we can generate and engage with conceptual 
frameworks and knowledge that may guide us in tracking and co-shaping global 
academic developments and that will allow us to address the ‘big’ questions and 
issues South Africa and the African continent face, also in a global context.
STIAS has been moulded in the tradition of Institutes for Advanced Study across the 
globe. It distinguished itself by encompassing all disciplines from the natural to the 
social sciences and humanities (with a particular emphasis on research grounded 
in multi-disciplinarity), by maintaining a focus on the African and South African 
context, and by striving towards contemporary relevance, also by actively creating 
avenues for communicating the results of its research projects to a wider public.
The STIAS series publications, of which this is the eleventh volume, are thus aimed 
at a broad public which will naturally vary with specific research themes. Straddling 
the academic world and the forum of an engaging public is a challenge that STIAS 
accepts; we trust that each STIAS publication reflects the ‘creative space for the 
mind’ in which it is rooted, stimulates public interest and debate, and contributes to 
informed decision making at various levels of our society.
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AN INTRODUCTION
Nina G. Jablonski
The Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS), with the support of the 
Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation, commenced work on seven theme-based 
projects beginning in 2013, including the ambitious and wide-ranging theme of 
‘Being Human Today’. The Effects of Race (EoR) Project arose in the context of 
‘being human today’ because race-thinking and racism continue to frame the lives 
and define the nature of the human condition for most people in the world. Issues 
surrounding the meaning and effects of race are prominent in South Africa and 
the USA with their histories of segregation and they are emerging or re-emerging 
in many countries experiencing influxes of new immigrants. The EoR Project was 
conceived as an initiative at the forefront of creative and explicitly transdisciplinary 
scholarship that would be informed by insights from the social and biological 
sciences and the humanities. The EoR Project was also envisioned as scholarly with 
a pragmatic focus, with the aim of creating new scholarship to inform public policy. 
A ‘core group’ of EoR Project members, composed of senior scholars from diverse 
fields, was formed. The roster of EoR Project core group members comprised 
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sociologists, educators, a psychologist, a lawyer, theologian, a geographer and a 
writer. 
As the EoR Project took shape, core group members voiced the need for further 
research and reflection on ‘race’, especially in the context of contesting visions for 
a democratic South Africa. They discussed the importance of catalysing innovative 
and imaginative approaches to ‘finding race’ and dealing with the ‘everydayness 
of race’, in order that the ‘reality’ of race can be eroded. The primary goal of the 
EoR Project evolved to being one of informing social change by challenging and 
undermining existing notions of racial difference. Recognising the tremendous and 
challenging breadth of this undertaking, the core group decided that it would be 
beneficial to hold its own discussions and to sponsor ‘group projects’, which would 
be conducted by individuals or teams of, primarily, junior investigators. A request 
for proposals was issued in late 2013 and five group projects were commissioned 
in mid-2014. Three of the group projects focused on the design of educational 
interventions aimed at curbing race-thinking and racism in South African schools 
and universities and two on specific aspects of the history of race-thinking in 
South Africa. 
The core group decided to meet at STIAS every year for a period of at least two 
weeks and discuss a specific theme. The theme for the 2015 discussion was 
‘racial templates’, a concept that was clearly articulated and often repeated by the 
late South African scholar and revolutionary, Neville Alexander. In a 2009 essay 
entitled, ‘Countering the racial habitus in post-apartheid South Africa’, Alexander 
wrote:
The state, or more generally, the ruling classes, in any society have the 
paradigmatic prerogative of setting the template on which social identities, 
including racial identities, are based. Subaltern groups and layers of such 
societies necessarily contest or accept these identities over time. In South 
Africa, recent examples of this kind of contestation are the categories of 
‘Bantu’ and ‘Coloured’. We must remember, however, that even though they 
are constructed, social identities seem to have a primordial validity for most 
individuals, precisely because they are not aware of the historical, social 
and political ways in which their identities have been constructed. This is, 
ultimately, the psychological explanation for the well-known tenacity of such 
identities. (Alexander, 2009)
Recognising the ‘primordial validity’ and ‘tenacity’ of racial templates, EoR 
Project core group members decided to use this theme as the focus for their 2015 
discussions. They recognised the sinister power of racial templates to be formed 
early in life and to unfold and ramify over the years to have profound consequences 
for individual motivation, ideation and aspirations. Even in the absence of strong 
governmental forces or formal education, racial identities form and become 
An Introduction |      3
durable aspects of personality. The members undertook to explore the nature 
and ramifications of this phenomenon and the means by which the processes of 
template formation could be altered – even in the private spaces of minds and 
homes – as part of the process of ‘being human’. 
Before the core group gathered at STIAS in July 2015, members were asked to 
prepare manuscripts or outlines of manuscripts on the theme of racial templates. 
The backgrounds and research interests of the members are heterogeneous and the 
theme of racial templates resonated distinctly with each person and struck different 
chords. Alexander’s formulation of ‘racial templates’, in the end, was a spark, not 
a nucleus. Alexander’s own construction of racial templates ignited wide-ranging 
discussions and even wider-ranging essays. It was, in fact, the tension created by 
discussion of the concept and nature of racial templates that inspired members to 
think deeply about the origins and myriad ramifications of race categories, race 
labelling and racialised identity formation.
One of the most important, but invisible, aspects of this collection is the nature of 
the academic atmosphere and discourse that helped produce the contributions in 
their current forms. The discussions of draft papers conducted in 2015 at STIAS 
were uplifting and intellectually productive because of the careful attention and 
high respect that core group members accorded one another with. As members 
became more familiar and comfortable with one another, the discussion became 
increasingly creative, penetrating and insightful and it was peppered with beneficial 
bouts of humour. The chapters of this volume reflect the diversity of scholarly 
interests and perspectives of core group member and the richness of the feedback 
they shared with one another and took home from the STIAS discussions.
The essays constitute diverse reflections on the creation of racialised identities and 
the instantiation of race-thinking. The South African authors in the group (Erasmus, 
Manganyi, Maré and Ndebele) bring with them lifetimes experiencing ‘race’ in 
all its senses, forms, dimensions and their considerations of the mechanisms and 
consequences of race formation in South Africa are the heart of this volume. Their 
essays, along with that of Therborn, constitute the first part of this volume, ‘Race in 
Racialised South Africa’. 
The first chapter in this section is a sweeping personal reflection by Chabani 
Manganyi that draws heavily on his experiences as a psychologist. Manganyi 
uses the tools and vocabularies of psychology to examine racism as a ‘disease’ for 
which there may be a ‘cure’. His critical review probes the deepest origins of race-
thinking and summons bodies of literature which summarise attitudes toward ‘the 
other’. He identifies the critical role played in South Africa and elsewhere by the 
empowerment of the act of racial classification and the development of durable 
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and unfortunately resilient associations of race labels with human value. Manganyi 
traces the history of racial categorisation and racism in South Africa to the present 
day, emphasising the role played by government leaders in the continuing spread 
of the disease of racism. Concluding that racism is not inevitable, he leads us to 
the brink of finding cures for the disease, ultimately through education and the 
elimination of unequal, racially based access to resources and opportunities. 
Following on from this lead, Göran Therborn explores in his essay the phenomena 
of racism and race formation within his well-established theoretical framework of 
the three kinds or dimensions of human inequality. He situates racism as a form 
of existential inequality that – like sexism and patriarchy – affects individuals 
by denying full personhood. He explores inequality from a ‘micro’ perspective 
and reveals how racial inequality affects the formation of individual capabilities 
and self-concepts. In discussing how unequal categories, including race, can 
be equalised, he trains his sights directly on South Africa. In a penetrating 
exploration of the stark choices faced by South Africa, Therborn exposes the rarely 
discussed conflict between categorical equalisation of races and the persistence of 
economic inequality.
The next essay, by Zimitri Erasmus, on race and its articulation with concepts of 
the human, examines how anti-racism articulates with the concept of common 
humanity and thus indirectly explores the notion of whether a common humanity 
is the ultimate racial template. This essay is steeped in the South African discourse 
of racialised identity even though it does not reference South Africa directly. 
Erasmus’s rich and wide-ranging exposition does not tread the well-worn path of 
canonical literature on racism from the social sciences, but explores concepts of 
humanity espoused by humanists who have dealt explicitly with racism, including 
Frantz Fanon, Steven Biko and Sylvia Wynter. Hers is a provocative piece in which 
she argues that humanists have revealed human life to be valued not in absolute 
terms of common humanity, but in more relativistic terms of knowledge and 
cultural practice.
Gerhard Maré, in the next chapter, examines a related body of phenomena dealing 
with state-sponsored ‘racecraft’ in the persistent application of official racial 
labelling. Reflecting on decades of realisation of the psychological and social 
dangers of racial classification, especially in the service of apartheid, Maré dissects 
the layers of meaning and social destinies associated with race labels. He argues that 
the templates of identity and behaviour propagated by race labelling, guarantee that 
individuals can be slotted into an inherently unequal system of production. This 
chapter is an essential complement to Manganyi’s because it exposes the power and 
pervasiveness of racial templates as vectors which perpetuate the social ‘disease’ 
of racism and all the societal structures that uphold it. Maré deflects a pessimistic 
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outlook, however, by returning to the salutary themes of utopian thinking and 
‘constructive imaginings’ especially in the realm of education and a rejection of the 
inevitability of racism.
The final essay in the first section of the book is by Njabulo Ndebele on the future of 
blackness. This is a creative exploration and imagining of the future of identity and 
of the responsibility of identity in South Africa. It explores the difficult territories 
of identities and the annulment of pre-assigned racial destinies and poses practical 
questions about the definition of blackness and the life of ‘the black’ after the 
demise of whiteness. How do long-disenfranchised people regain their humanity? 
The process of transition, Ndebele argues, from ‘blackness’ to ‘citizen’ to ‘human’ 
is underway, but much imagination and hard work is involved, because shared 
humanity is something that, ultimately, all people must achieve together. 
The second section of the book, ‘Naming’, comprises three essays which examine 
the process and effects of labelling the ‘other.’ These contributions look at how and 
why people have come to formally label one another by race and ethnicity, how the 
labels come to assume and connote value and how they affect the lives of people 
in democratic societies founded on principles of human equality. The essays in 
this section come from diverse intellectual traditions, but are concerned with the 
concepts and processes of identifying and labelling perceived groups and treating 
them differently because of their identified and labelled status. 
George Chaplin’s innovative chapter opens this section by looking at the taxonomy 
of race ideation. This chapter dissects and explicates the underlying linguistic 
and ideational ‘operating systems’ of race thinking. Chaplin’s motivation for 
constructing this taxonomy is to reveal the multifarious pathways leading from 
different manifestations of race-thinking to different expressions of racism. For 
scholars who have wrestled unsuccessfully with the linguistic complexities of 
race-thinking and their connections to racism, Chaplin’s extensive charts showing 
interconnections will be a welcome relief and worth the patience required to 
explore them. This chapter provides fertile ground for future scholars seeking 
to understand the connections between the various articulations of race and the 
expressions of racism.
In the next chapter, Nina Jablonski, Aaron Mauro, James O’Sullivan and Theresa 
Wilson examine the vocabulary of race from an entirely different perspective. 
They draw upon the published newspaper descriptions of two recent and highly 
publicised cases of racialised violence in the USA and South Africa to examine the 
language used to describe participants in the incidents and the actions they were 
involved in. The two incidents in question were the 2014 murder of Michael Brown 
in the USA and the Marikana incident in South Africa that resulted in the deaths of 
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34 mine workers in 2012. The analysis undertaken by Jablonski and colleagues was 
motivated by the senior author’s hunch that the vocabulary used to describe victims 
and perpetrators of these incidents in newspapers reflected prevailing racialised 
ideas about their natures and motivations. The chapter is based on a pilot set of 
textual analyses conducted on newspaper articles from both countries dealing with 
the incidents and provides a practical toolkit for future explorations of the lexical 
and rhetorical manifestations of racism and racial identity in the press.
The final essay in this section and the volume is by Maureen A. Eger and Mikael 
Hjerm and concerns issues surrounding identity formation in modern, multi-
ethnic Europe. The express focus of this piece is on societies that are not defined 
primarily by racialised identities and racism. It is, rather, an exploration of the 
very premise of identifying otherness by language or ethnicity in multicultural 
democracies. The authors approach this timely topic by exploring the notion of 
a common national identity and its interpretation. Their approach provides a 
historical and comparative sociological framework for understanding how current 
European political systems accommodate and label government attitudes toward 
multiculturalism and national identity. Their chapter discusses how adoption 
of common national identities and the espousal of values of egalitarianism, 
meritocracy and colour-blindness frame ideologies are folded into concepts of 
national identity and reconciled with increasing economic inequality between new 
immigrant and more established communities.
All of the essays in this diverse volume deal with the concept of group identity in the 
modern state. They explore questions ranging from how concepts of group identity 
have been formed and framed to the consequences of identity formation for 
individuals and societies. The chapters reflect the diverse disciplinary backgrounds 
of their authors and the voices they adopt when writing in those disciplines. What 
readers will take away from all of these essays is that the identification and labelling 
of groups is a universal practice. Beyond that, there is tremendous variation in the 
basis for the identification and labelling and in the degree to which these identities 
and labels are determinative of outcome. The authors of all of these pieces would, 
I believe, agree that labelled identities associated with differential treatment – 
whether conducing to more positive or more negative outcomes – are incompatible 
with social equality. The tension this creates for life in the modern world is not 
just a theoretical construct, it is real and is adjudicated in the politics and courts 
of South Africa, the USA and many other countries. The essays here suggest that 
injustices of the past can only be partly redressed by labels and the differential 
weighting of opportunity. The rediscovery of the importance of a shared humanity 
will ultimately militate the end of officially defined othering and identity ‘templates’ 
will evolve into ever messier, murkier and more evanescent entities.
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This book, in all its diversity and variety, is an excellent introduction to an 
understanding of race-thinking in the twenty-first century world. Most of the 
chapters focus on the origins, lingering manifestations and continued evolution 
of ‘racecraft’ in South Africa, but the discussions are universal in their relevance. 
The wide excursions into diverse literatures taken by authors here ultimately shed 
considerable light on the nature and durability of racial templates, even if they do 
not invoke that descriptive phrase. In each of the chapters, readers hear the well-
reasoned arguments and impassioned voices of scholars who live in a racialised 
world and who yearn for a human one. These contributions are a pavement upon 
which every serious scholar of race needs to tread.
Reference
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1
PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND RACISM
Before and after the South African transition
Chabani Manganyi
Despite the likely belief that democratic governments such as our own and that of 
the United States of America (USA), have distanced themselves from a centuries 
old scourge of racism against Africans and people of African descent during the 
last century, some reported that everyday life experiences of black citizens in both 
countries are a subject of unremitting academic and public interest. The centuries 
old scourge of race and racism which became the prime marker of presumed 
‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ races in many parts of the world over time needs to be 
recognised for the psycho-social scar which it became. One needs to emphasise 
the fact that the history of race and racism is replete with evidence of human pride 
and prejudice. During the first two decades of the existence of the democratic 
state which Nelson Mandela and some of his African National Congress (ANC) 
senior colleagues helped to bring into being in our country between 1994 and 
1999, racism and its predictable companion, inequality, have, to our surprise and 
disappointment, continued to thrive in post-apartheid South Africa.
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The everyday proximity between racism and inequality, which receives such 
prominence in this essay, is a deliberate one for reasons that will become evident. 
Noteworthy also, is the fact that unlike the USA and other multiracial countries, 
we were privileged because of the fact that in preparation for a post-apartheid 
future, we were determined to make a fresh start. Simply stated, the intellectual, 
moral and political resources of our people, black and white, were mobilised in 
a historic enterprise: to deal with the political and related sins of our past with a 
view to the creation of a non-racial democratic South Africa. Such readiness to 
work together within the tense atmosphere of years of the South African transition 
from apartheid to a non-racial democratic society in the years following the release 
of Nelson Mandela and his fellow Robben Island comrades was not without its 
drawbacks. However, strenuous formal attempts during the years of transition such 
as the work of the Government of National Unity and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) are historic examples of concerted efforts to work towards a 
common national future irrespective of race. 
The mid-1990s transition government participated in the structured mobilisation, 
through public policy making by South Africans of all races, in different spheres of 
national life, to bring a new non-racist South Africa into being. By the end of the 
first five years of the transition to democratic rule, I believed that spirited as our 
commitment to work was as an incoming non-racial government, the management 
of the transition from apartheid to a democratic non-racist society confronted us 
with complex challenges that, for the most part, had not been anticipated. Indeed, 
I and a few colleagues at the University of Pretoria and elsewhere, sounded some 
precautionary warnings at that time about dark clouds, which were gathering 
ominously over the horizon (Manganyi (ed.), 2004). In this chapter, I allow 
myself, and the reader, some leeway to problematise race and racism. In this way, 
I provide some room for uncertainty and curiosity. In the title, I refer deliberately 
to ‘perspectives on race and racism’ to capture the range of concerns which have 
become known over time in a number of countries and in a range of settings which 
I touch on. It was in the course of recent brushes with the international literature 
on race and racism that the role of inequality in the sustenance of race and racism 
stared me in the face for the first time. Without a doubt, the role of inequality in 
sustaining racism beyond the dawn of a non-racist democratic state in our country 
is a theme worthy of one’s attention in the future. 
Searching for a path to take in order to move our country from a sinister racist 
past, especially during the apartheid era, was an extremely complex national 
undertaking. We were confronted with the well-established tenacity of racist 
policies and practices, known during the last century as apartheid. What gives 
one a transient sense of relief is the knowledge that there has been a continuing 
Perspectives on race and racism |      13
intellectual search for a better understanding of everyday expressions of racism 
in different historical periods and countries. It is this universality of the race 
nightmare, which gives continuing significance and urgency to the problem of race 
and racism in post-colonial public life in the twenty-first century. In our country, 
thinking and writing about race and racism is complicated by the centuries old 
history of colonisation, first by the Dutch and then the British. It is in the light of 
such a longstanding history, coupled with the widely acknowledged complexity 
of racism as a psychosocial reality in contemporary public life, that a focus on 
contemporary perspectives is adopted in this essay. 
Working and thinking along these lines, helped me to come to terms with the 
continuing uncertainty, which casts a sinister shadow over this field of study and its 
social history despite the vast world literature which continues to be churned out 
on race and racism. My uneasiness arises from a notable and growing uncertainty 
in the literature about what the origins and defining ‘signs and symptoms’ of racism 
really are. In some instances, racism is defined as though it is a psychological state, 
a disease of sorts. In this regard, I have often wondered whether a ‘disease entity’ 
concept of racism is either helpful or sustainable beyond its dubious contemporary 
currency and uncertain explanatory value. Having gone this far, I could not help 
thinking about a national ‘cure’ for racist behaviour. If racism should prove to be a 
biological, or a psychosocial affliction, which we sometimes appear to be making it 
out to be, then a permanent cure would have to be found.
Antiquity: a brief social history of race and racism
I begin my discussion of perspectives on race with a passing reference to the work 
of Jablonski (2012). Her book, entitled Living Color, opens a window in human 
evolution history, which reveals human migrations over planet earth as well as 
changes throughout antiquity of human skin colour resulting in the rich variety 
of peoples scattered throughout the world. A singular lesson learnt in the course 
of reading about the evolutionary journey of human skin colour is the sheer 
complexity of some of life’s puzzles, which we humans are expected to untangle. 
Skin or ‘living colour’ is one of the primary markers of the body we each live in and 
live through. 
A second long term perspective on race and racism is detailed in the work of 
McCoskey (2012), author of, Race, Antiquity and its Legacy. In my view, her book 
is one of the most well thought through contemporary studies of race, antiquity 
and their legacy. Her text fulfils the task of making us think more carefully about 
our past in relation to our present as members of the human race, a theme carrying 
some relevance for us in post-apartheid South Africa. In writing about race and 
racism in South Africa, we too need to focus on both past and present as suggested 
14      |  THE EFFECTS OF RACE
in the title of this essay. McCoskey’s text helped me to consider the alternate ways 
in which this complex question can be approached in the twenty-first century. 
In her engaging introduction to a wide-ranging study of race, she poses what she 
describes as ‘a deceptively simple question’, namely, ‘what is race?’ Her first answer 
is close to my own theoretical and everyday concerns about racism as a historical 
and psychosocial manifestation. I am referring especially to racism in instances 
such as the practice of apartheid, born out of a centuries old colonial occupation 
of our ancestral homeland coupled with race, inspired policies of legislated racial 
segregation in pre-1994 South Africa. Writing about what she describes as a ‘racial 
formation’ McCoskey (2012: 21-22) goes on to say: 
At its most basic, race is an ideological structure that organises and classifies 
perceived human variation. Race thus allows the division of people into broad 
categories that presume to demarcate according to fundamental differences, 
such as ‘black’ and ‘white’. 
It is important to emphasise the fact that one may add other significant polarities 
such as ‘civilised’ versus ‘primitive’, ‘superior intelligence’ versus ‘inferiority’. For 
purposes of greater clarity, she adds: “As the role of skin colour in defining race 
today suggests, racial differences have traditionally been attributed to biological 
characteristics, implying that racial categories emerge inherently from the human 
body” (2012: 2). One should add, for completeness, that considered from the 
perspectives about race and racism referred to above, the evolution of racialised 
identities is a psycho-historical phenomenon.
Following a detailed review of the status of race and racism in antiquity, especially 
amongst the Greeks, Romans and Egyptians, McCoskey arrives at the conclusion 
that race and racism in the form of more contemporary variations was relatively 
unknown in antiquity. She writes approvingly of the terminology of a ‘racial 
formation’ rather than race, meaning the “socio historical processes by which racial 
categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed” (2012: 2). It is 
important to note that she makes an important distinction between: 
a ‘racial category’, i.e. a racial group whose members are assigned from outside, 
and a ‘racial identification’, i.e. a racial label actively claimed or asserted by 
the subject group itself. Greater attention has traditionally been paid to the 
historic impact of racial categories ... The concept of racial identification 
allows us to consider the complementary possibility of individual agency: 
the act of ‘taking on’ race, of asserting one’s racial identity from inside out, as 
it were. (McCoskey, 2012: 21-22)
We need to recognise the fact that in South Africa, racial categories took precedence 
in the ‘social formation’ of race and racism especially during the era of apartheid 
and the legalisation of separate development in the 1950s and beyond. An excellent 
example of a racial category in South African history is the apartheid era racial 
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category of so-called ‘Bantus’, a derogatory reference to Africans. It is worth noting 
that after 1652 following the initial arrival of the Dutch, a series of race based racial 
categories (attributions from outside) were used by settlers and their descendants 
to characterise so-called ‘kaffirs’, ‘Bantus’, ‘Coloureds’ and ‘Hottentots’. Centuries 
later, the ‘taking on’ of race, ‘asserting one’s racial identity from inside out’ found 
everyday expression in popular socio-political movements such as the Black 
Consciousness Movement spearheaded by Steven Bantu Biko and his generation 
in South Africa during the 1970s. It is noteworthy that in her concluding afterword 
McCoskey emphasises the view that it is imperative for both whites and blacks to 
appreciate that:
to confront race, to understand the roots and consequences of our blackness 
and whiteness requires first that we know our own histories and then that we 
find our own voice ... By gaining a more firm foothold on race historically, 
including its roots in classical antiquity (both real and invented), I think we 
can begin to combat its clandestine power over our lives and also see that our 
modern version of race is far from inevitable or neutral, it is simply a structure 
of belief that has been so powerful as to convince us that it is the only possible 
one. (McCoskey, 2012: 200-1)
Such a concluding statement is as assertive and unambiguous as it can be, 
considering the widespread centuries old psycho-political manifestations of racism 
beginning as we have noted, many centuries ago.
Another perspective on race and racism is presented in a collection of essays edited 
by Levine and Pataki (2004). However, for purposes of the perspective on race and 
racism being considered presently, it is Pataki who takes a furtive look at antiquity 
by noting that the idea of race started to assume its contemporary ‘modern forms’ 
during the early years of the seventeenth century. However, Pataki’s curiosity 
was broad ranging enough to have included the early history of Greece. In his 
retrospective assessment, reference is made to the fact there was a stage in antiquity 
during which Greeks considered themselves superior to barbarians. Significantly, 
Pataki goes on to qualify the above statement by noting that:
… the sense of their superiority seems not to have subtended from any 
conception of innate or natural moral or intellectual differences between 
peoples. ... The ancients appear to have been largely indifferent to group 
phenotypic differences, and they never mixed them with variations in innate 
endowment and capacity for cultural achievement to concoct a poisonous 
brew like that fed to modern racism. It is important to see that a social 
dispensation in which racial distinctions play no significant part is possible: 
there was such a dispensation. (Pataki, 2004a: 4)
How reassuring it is to learn that in antiquity, there was a non-racial dispensation. 
Here then is an important observation to make and emphasise in the twenty-first 
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century. We are reminded of the fact that significant as Greece was in the evolution 
of culture, statehood and world civilisation, it was during the early stages of its 
establishment, a state free of overt racist practices. In Pataki’s view, consonant with 
this conclusion, the preoccupation with race taking root in its contemporary form 
(‘modern form’) during the early years of the seventeenth century. An important 
conclusion to be drawn from the perspective on race, provided by Pataki, is that 
race and racism are not identical twins so to speak. There was a time when races 
existed without the concomitant existence of the social formation termed racism; 
without the widespread white narcissism, that became a dominant feature of white 
racism throughout the world centuries later.
Psychoanalysis, racism and envy
In another essay, entitled “Psychoanalysis, racism and envy” (2004b), Pataki left me 
with two noteworthy impressions. The first is that within the public domain two 
conceptions of racism have emerged. To begin with, there are people who believe 
in the existence of racism without ‘known’ motive. In other words, such individuals 
believe that although there may be motives to account for racist behaviour, such 
motives are obscure and unknown. Secondly, there are instances of racist practice 
‘without motive’. However, Pataki, for one, was determined to focus on the need 
for a full understanding of what needs to constitute the primary focus in the 
investigation of racism: a psychology of racism in which object-relational concerns 
are central. In such a psychology, we are told: 
… the primary expressions of racism will be viewed as motivated – often 
unconsciously but nevertheless intentionally – and directed at such object-
mediated ends as the sustainment of self-esteem and identity, the suppression 
of fear and anxiety, the mitigation of guilt and envy, and the fulfilment of 
wishes for specialness, superiority, and belonging. (Pataki, 2004b: 179)
In the delineation of the racist consciousness outlined by Pataki, the racist is 
motivated, driven by a number of identifiable urges. Central to such a race-
centred consciousness are motivation, irrationality and the central roles played 
by narcissism and envy. However, of singular importance in Pataki’s wide ranging 
consideration of race and racism is a rare and significant insight to the effect that 
racist behaviour and practices are neither predetermined nor inevitable. In my 
view, buried in Pataki’s statement, lies an insightful pronouncement of considerable 
significance. This insight frees us from an age-old stranglehold of the belief that 
racism is an inscrutable, inevitable, human foible that is beyond regular personal, 
moral and jurisdictional regulation. Undoubtedly, the full implications of thinking 
along these lines about race and racism remain a subject for further exploration. I 
Perspectives on race and racism |      17
return briefly to the theme of the non-inevitability of racist behaviour at the end of 
this essay.
Colonial subjects and the social history of psychology
In an essay on culture and ethnicity, Voestermans and Jansz (2004: 166) focus on 
“the ways in which psychological concepts, theories, and instruments were used to 
conceptualise the nature and characteristics of non-western people, in particular 
the ‘others’ in the colonies in the past.” Such studies, the authors assure us, were 
intimately connected to efforts to ‘civilise’ the colonial subjects of the day. Their 
account helps us to understand the process through which the attribution of racial 
difference and the alleged inferiority of colonial subjects were constructed and 
formalised by colonisers during the nineteenth century. It was around this time, 
Voestermans and Jansz tell us, that a racist psychology school of thought took 
shape side by side with the claim that colonial ideals and practices were inspired 
by Christian ideals. With Bibles in hand, religious leaders preached a gospel, which 
portrayed native peoples in British and other colonies as the cursed children of 
Ham. People’s reluctance to convert to Christianity was interpreted as a signifier 
of their inferiority, laziness, corruptibility and stupidity. In the course of time, 
colonialists required a ‘more secular legitimation’ of relations with natives, which 
were more reassuring than Christian beliefs. 
It was experiences, such as the above, which led to the reworking of the images 
of ‘others’ as objects of a civilising mission by Christians from the nineteenth 
century onwards. Voestermans and Jansz identify France and Britain as two of the 
earliest countries to be involved in colonial civilising missions. Significantly and in 
the midst of the developments sketched here, the visibility of cultural differences 
amongst races followed the publication of Darwin’s theory of evolution in 1859. 
In the course of time, claim Voestermans and Jansz, the impact of Darwinism was 
such that:
… the conviction grew that Darwinism was not merely a methodology 
and research orientation, but a model of development of species, including 
humans, based on inequality. Mechanisms such as ‘natural selection’ and ‘the 
struggle for life’ were held responsible for the existence of superior and inferior 
races across the globe. This implied a harsh verdict on ‘primitive’ people: they 
were backward as a result of their low position on the evolutionary ladder. 
(Voestermans and Jansz, 2004: 169)
It was in the light of such widespread popularisation of this kind of pseudoscience 
and its focus on race based inequality that nineteenth century claims were publicly 
made to the effect that Negroes were a species located, through evolution, halfway 
between Caucasians and chimpanzees in the universal family tree of creation. 
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Once slavery and its ancillary exploitation had been legitimised through a carefully 
orchestrated denigration of the mental abilities of African Americans and Native 
Americans, the conclusion that whites were intellectually superior in North 
America appeared incontestable.
Following their review of contributions by psychologists towards a race inspired 
discipline, Voestermans and Jansz identified a galaxy of well-known early twentieth 
century American psychologists, which included G. Stanley Hall, Yerkes, Goddard, 
Terman, Brigham and T.R. Garth. At the end of their review, they arrive at the 
conclusion that a defence of white superiority (namely a racist one), referring to 
ethnic, regional and national group differences, especially with regard to intelligence, 
by that body of psychologists was considered justified. However, such a degrading 
focus on black people’s alleged poor intelligence was not left unchallenged. Hans 
Boas, a German by birth, who made New York City his home in those days, became 
one of the most vocal critics of white supremacist race theories. 
I have chosen Andrew S. Winston’s telling statement to bring this section of my 
discussion to a close. Winston (2004: 3) comments as follows:
From 1895 when Bache published the first American study of racial 
differences in a psychology journal, to the contemporary writings of Jensen 
(1998), Lynn (2001), and Rushton (2001), ‘race’ and ‘racial difference’ have 
been persistent and troublesome issues for the discipline. Even after a century 
of severe criticism, discussions of the size of Black versus White Brains 
still appear in psychology journals, race is still treated as a set of distinct 
biological categories, and racial comparisons of intelligence test scores are 
still presented as meaningful scientific questions. Claims of a genetic basis for 
such differences emerged, receded, and emerged anew. The dynamics of racial 
difference research occurred against a broader shift in academic psychology: 
starting in the 1930s, psychologists moved away from confirming old racial 
hierarchies and took up the study of prejudice. By the 1950s, psychologists 
played an important role in the fight against racial injustice. Thus, psychology 
has had an unusual, dual relationship with race involving both racist and 
antiracist dimensions. 
Notable also from Winston’s review of the history of race in the United States, is 
the fact that while the American Anthropological Association rejected ‘the concept 
of race’ by the year 1994, psychologists are reported to have been working from a 
different perspective. They disregarded important public interventions in American 
race relations such as the legacy around the contributions of W.E.B. du Bois and the 
verdict in Brown v. Board of Education. Winston decries the situation in the United 
States and emphasises the fact that psychologists waited until the 1970s. It was only 
then that a serious examination of the history of linked notions of intelligence and 
race started to take shape. However, in 1969, Jensen’s Harvard Educational Review 
article advanced the claim that compensatory education in the United States had 
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failed due to inherited deficiencies of black children. At that time, Jensen was 
supported by a notorious, but highly regarded American physicist named William 
Shockley. Shockley championed eugenic programmes to undermine reproduction 
by people with low IQs. In the light of the developments sketched above, Winston 
(2004) considered these discussions, which took place in the American Psychologist 
throughout the 1990s and concluded that:
… the discipline had not resolved the issues of race and racial differences as 
scientific or pseudoscientific questions. Although many accounts emphasised 
the demise of race psychology, the work of the contributors ... suggests 
more a history in which racial research does not disappear but survives and 
resurfaces with changes in the social landscape. (Winston, 2004: 7) 
My own views about race and racism can be traced back to the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Looming large in my mind at that time, were a motley of political and academic 
influences which included: psychoanalysis, the neuropsychology of the body 
image, the writings and popularisation of the activism of Franz Fanon and Steven 
Bantu Biko, the prime mover of the black consciousness movement in South Africa 
during the 1970s and beyond. During this phase of my earliest writing on race and 
racism, my first publications appeared in print in 1973, 1977 and 1985. However, 
for present illustrative purposes, a brief reference to one of my essays entitled, 
‘Europe and its others’ (1985) should suffice.
I used an opportunity during an international conference on ‘Europe and its 
Others’ in 1984 in the United Kingdom to explore the historical attribution of racial 
inferiority in the work and writing of psychologists, psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, 
anthropologists and philosophers. I took aim at the views of an assortment of 
prominent figures past and present (at that time) who made unflattering and 
derogatory public pronouncements on black so-called primitive people. The 
arrogant parade of Caucasian bigotry included Hegel’s ill-conceived and regrettable 
pronouncements in which he wrote about so-called Negroes as ‘natural’ man who 
displayed humanity in its wild and untamed state. This ‘natural’ man displayed 
no morality, nor knowledge, about the immortality of the soul. Worse still, the 
devouring of human flesh was not beyond their reach.
The list in my original account included notables such as Sigmund Freud, Karl 
Marx, Engels, Hans Gunter, Arthur Jensen, Hans Eysenck, J.C. Carothers, Simon 
Biesheuvel and J.C. de Ridder amongst others. Both De Ridder and Biesheuvel (the 
South Africans in the crowd) exhibited in some of their published work, the kind 
of contempt with which African people in South Africa were treated during the 
century of apartheid. 
Nevertheless, of special note in the overall review of this theme at that time were 
the name and views of a psychologist then resident in the USA, H.A. Bulhan. In 
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1981, Bulhan wrote about an Africa-wide penetration of South African practices 
in ‘industrial’ psychology especially with regard to the use of psychological tests 
developed for use amongst Africans by South African psychologist, Simon 
Biesheuvel and his team at the National Institute for Personnel Research (NIPR) 
in Johannesburg. The primary aim of Biesheuvel’s, ‘African psychological research’ 
was, in his own words, “to gain an understanding of the behaviour of African 
peoples”, “to provide means of testing the general validity of psychological 
hypothesis concerning human behaviour” and “to determine the extent to which 
(the African’s behaviour) is modifiable” (Biesheuvel, 1958: 161-2). However, 
in South Africa at that time, attributions of racial difference and inferiority were 
not limited to the NIPR where Biesheuvel was in charge. A second example of 
racial attributions in the name of science was pronounced in the work of then 
South African psychologist, J.C. de Ridder, in his 1961 book, The Personality of the 
Urban African in South Africa, based on his research findings at the Public Utility 
Corporation (PUTCO) in Johannesburg. He had used a modified version of the 
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) to investigate the personality of urban Africans 
in South Africa. Amongst other assertions were conclusions such as the view that 
urban Africans are prone to anxiety states and insecurity. They had, De Ridder 
claimed, underdeveloped egos and super egos. He described South Africa’s urban 
Africans, inter alia, as follows:
In the urban African, anxiety and insecurity are endemic. The personality 
of the urban African is dominated by the Id – which is to say, by the most 
‘primitive’ and pleasure seeking system in the entire personality matrix 
as formulated in Freudian theory. Africans suffer from a lack of emotional 
control (under developed ego, super ego) and ‘as a group’ appear to be an 
aggressive people. (De Ridder, 1961: 55)
What is noteworthy in this context is that during the course of the widespread 
attribution of inferiority of black people’s intelligence in the mid to late twentieth 
century, book titles such as Race, Intelligence and Education, The Mind of Men in 
Africa, Mind in the Heart of Darkness and The Pagan Soul achieved wide circulation.
The South African connection 
In this section, I will for the purpose of illustration, limit myself to accounts on 
race and racism written by an increasing number of local scholars (other than De 
Ridder and Biesheuvel). My prime example is an account on psychology and race 
in South Africa by Louw and Forster (2004). They begin their account by focusing 
on the ‘prehistory’ of psychology in South Africa, recalling the segregated facilities 
and mental health practices of the pre-twentieth century period before the Act of 
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Union in 1910. They go on to describe conditions in psychiatry hospital facilities in 
those days as follows: 
In 1891, the first asylum opened on the mainland, at Valkenberg Asylum. 
This was explicitly for white patients only, and black patients were 
accommodated only in 1916, but in a separate facility across a small river. 
For currently unknown reasons, it was considered a more humane treatment 
of mental illness to separate white and black patients in the asylums ... This 
arrangement continued until the early 1990s, and the advent of democracy. 
Thus, the mental health profession, psychologists included, are grappling 
with the legacy of more than a century of colonialism and apartheid. (Louw 
and Forster, 2004:173)
Louw and Forster highlight the fact that generations of white psychology 
professionals, together with the majority of white South Africans in our country, 
ignored years of prevailing racist attitudes and practices amongst psychologists 
and their response to legalised race discrimination in mental health facilities and 
practice. They go on to describe developments in South Africa and note the fact 
that the 1950s turned out to have been a turning point.
Until WWII, the discourse on race in South Africa was not remarkably distinct 
from scientific and popular discourses elsewhere in the world. A dramatic shift 
occurred after the war when the South African government implemented the 
formal legalisation of the segregation of all races. Louw and Forster describe how 
South Africans started to work against prevailing practices elsewhere through the 
formal segregation of races in South Africa. At that stage, it turned out to be the 
first time that the all white government was determined in its resolve to implement 
an elaborate scheme aimed at the total segregation of its citizens according to race. 
Accordingly, as Louw and Forster point out, South African psychologists were 
severely criticised by their international colleagues over a long period of time for 
their silence with regard to apartheid and its practice in South Africa. 
It is enlightening to compare, the brief account about the South African situation 
above, with the account that Andrew Winston (2004) gives about developments 
in the USA. Following is a brief, but pointed review of American psychology and 
its role in the development of racism there. Winston expresses his disapproval of 
developments there by drawing attention to the fact that throughout the 1990s 
discussions in the American Psychologist had failed to resolve questions about 
race and racism as pertinent scientific questions. I make this reference to Andrew 
Winston’s perspective because his assessment, coupled with the accounts of Louw 
and Forster, may help us to think more innovatively about whether optimism 
about the end of racism in South Africa in the past 20 years of transition was 
understandable and justified. 
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Imagine the irony. About a year or so after the end of legislated apartheid in 1994, 
Dubow, a widely known scholar on South Africa and the theme of race and racism, 
published a well-researched account of what he described as “scientific racism in 
modern South Africa”. Overall, it is fair to say that the book was timely, published as 
it was at a time when substantive political changes were in sight in South Africa. His 
concerns in his book are wide-ranging and significant. Writing in his introduction 
he says:
A curious form of collective amnesia has, until quite recently, obscured 
the centrality of intellectual racism in Western thought during the early 
part of the twentieth century. Although the existence of racist attitudes has 
been widely acknowledged … notwithstanding the importance of several 
pioneering studies of the subject, there has been a considerable under 
estimation of the extent to which theories of racial difference form part of 
mainstream intellectual traditions. This silence is now being addressed by a 
rapidly growing body of sophisticated historical writing, much of it focused 
on Britain, Europe and the United States. (Dubow, 1995: 1)
Dubow took special note of the fact that race was a dominant reality in the South 
African public life. Yet, to his surprise, there had been so little interest in the study 
of the roots of racism. Indeed, this was a subject where remarkable silence was 
maintained by both the psychology and psychiatry professions until recently. 
Without a doubt, Dubow was concerned about what he perceived to have been a 
lack of interest in the academic study of scientific racism in South Africa. Rightly 
or wrongly, he believed that the “non-racial tradition of opposition to apartheid” 
was deliberately downplayed during the course of the transition to democracy 
from 1994 onwards. He speculates freely about racism’s capacity to cause divisions 
and says, “On account of its divisiveness, the salience of race has at times been 
almost wished away” (1995: 4). In the midst of his appreciation of variants of 
South African historical scholarship and the focus on social history, he expresses 
concerns about white authors ‘speaking on behalf ’ of South African black people 
and highlights the extent to which South Africa and its neighbours such as 
Namibia became mainstays of race science during the twentieth century. Based 
on numerous examples, he illustrates the fact that by the first decades of the last 
century, South Africa was already “an international repository of data and focus of 
scientific research into problems of race” (1995: 15). Commenting on the decline 
of scientific racism elsewhere in the world following WWII, Dubow takes note of 
the fact that such a development coincided with the rise of full-blown apartheid in 
South Africa. As he put it: “But, precisely because apartheid’s statutory assertion of 
white supremacy occurred just as the international race paradigm began to collapse, 
South Africa has served as an international byword for racism in the second half of 
the twentieth century” (Dubow, 1995: 19).
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Another important theme in Dubow’s list of concerns is the account on “Mental 
testing and the understanding of the ‘native mind’” (1995: chapter 6) – in which 
he writes about the role of physical anthropology and its narratives about ‘Bantu’ 
people and ‘Hottentots’. Of special importance to me is the question of ‘mental 
testing’ as the ideal road to the ‘native mind’, once a crucial preoccupation of some 
researchers and institutions of various kinds so meticulously brought to the fore in 
Dubow’s book. This is what I noted in discussing De Ridder and Biesheuvel above. 
In a concluding section entitled ‘denouement’, of Dubow’s later book, Apartheid 
1948-1994, he recognises the challenges that late president Mandela and his 
colleagues confronted during the early years of transition from apartheid to 
democracy in the 1990s. Compromises and give and take along the way were to be 
expected. In recognising Mandela’s crucial role Dubow says:
Realising a non-racial South Africa therefore amounted to a balancing act 
that depended enormously on Mandela’s personal powers of persuasion and 
commanding presence: there is simply no one else who could conceivably do 
it. (2014: 267)
It was the black majority of South Africa who sustained the bulk of the burden of 
misery and deaths during the late 1980s and 1990s – the critical years of transition 
from apartheid to democratic statehood. Notably, it is the same sector of our 
country’s population, which is currently burdened with the impoverishment arising 
from structural economic inequality between black and white South Africans with 
the new black tender-seekers reaping the benefits. Dubow reminds us of the fact 
that in the midst of the inequality, ‘redistribution’ soon became the code word for 
‘black economic empowerment’. Here then was South Africa’s transition reminding 
us of early 1960s Algeria. It was then that Frantz Fanon drew attention to the 
emergence of a new bourgeois in that country, an emerging class which put naked 
self-interest ahead of the welfare of the majority of the people. 
Dubow makes a very pertinent point in his analysis of the early days of the South 
African transition. He notes that it was far easier to eradicate the country’s apartheid 
institutional infrastructure, its multiple black, coloured and white legislatures, 
as well as the white minority’s power to oppress the black majority population. 
Significantly, what remained intact in the course of the whirlwind transition of the 
last half of the 1990s was, as Dubow (2014) puts it, underlying inequality and other 
material and social legacies. I should point out that ‘the facts on the ground’ include 
a great deal more than inequality. No one that I know of has thus far studied the old 
apartheid ethnic geography as part of the resilient ‘facts on the ground’ of the post-
apartheid era. The supreme consequence of the brief picture painted above is that 
a significant proportion of South Africa’s black majority, that is, the working and 
unemployed classes, continue to live under conditions of chronic poverty, under-
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employment and unemployment. Under the expansive shadow of South African 
white racism, old and new, lies generations of an old ethnic system amongst black 
South Africans as part and parcel of yesteryear’s grand apartheid, which we had 
hoped to lay to rest in the mid-1990s. As matters stand today, all indications are that 
the remnants of the old National Party ethnic mobilisation are not only in place, 
but remain a potential of possible ethnic and political instability amongst South 
Africans.
In the spirit of the first democratic government’s reconstruction and development 
strategy, under the leadership of President Mandela, the interim government of 
national unity amongst other strategic interventions, established a TRC. As Dubow 
(2014) points out, the short-lived TRC was primarily aimed at the high visibility 
value of national reconciliation, a kind of shock absorber to ensure a smooth 
transition from white domination towards a multiracial South African nation. 
Firstly, the Commission identified and highlighted the gross violation of people’s 
rights, especially black people’s rights between 1960 and 1994. The TRC achieved 
high public visibility at home and abroad. During the course of its limited lifespan 
the TRC ‘toyed’ with the complex prospect of implementing a national reparation 
programme. However, as Dubow points out, the Commission’s public visibility 
tapered off around 1998, a year during which the Commission’s Report was made 
public. Some critics will hold on to the view that emotional reconciliation (spiritual 
and psychological catharsis) superseded the supreme need for an economically 
just and viable form of restitution. Nevertheless, interesting as the theme of our 
transition is, what is necessary for the moment is to bring the abovementioned 
discussions to a close.
In doing so, I would like to refer to a foreword statement by Stephen Frosh, in 
Derek Hook’s recent book, A Critical Psychology of the Post-Colonial, who writes as 
follows (2012: x):
The emergence of the new, post-apartheid South Africa has provoked a wave 
of thinking around ‘race’ and the ‘post-colonial’ that links with developments 
in other parts of the world, and that has ramifications for academics and 
activists (some of them the same people) everywhere. If such an apparently 
entrenched system of racist oppression can be overturned so spectacularly, 
then maybe there is hope for other struggles; conversely, if such a massive 
political upheaval does not root out racist ideologies and practices, then what 
can, and what is it that sustains this racism into the ‘new’ post-colonial world? 
Indeed, what accounts for the ruthless resilience of white racism? 
The abovementioned question is both important and urgent. It could well be 
the most urgent, if not the most important, challenge of this century. However, I 
should add that the continued existence of racism in the ‘post-colonial world’ needs 
to be considered together with the view adopted here, namely that the continued 
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existence of racism in any post-colonial state is not and has never been necessarily 
inevitable. Put in terms that are more explicit: racism is not and has never been the 
realisation in public life of a biological law of human destiny. My plea in the twenty-
first century is for the demystification and eradication of both the claims of race as 
an identity and racism as a social practice, coupled with the co-existing educational 
and class inequalities, that thrive so mischievously in our country and elsewhere. 
The message in contemporary writing, as outlined earlier, is in part that a remedy 
for the malady named racism has remained out of reach for a considerable period 
of time, in as many countries as one can think of. The periodic visible resurfacing 
of affirmations of continuing racist beliefs and practices in post-apartheid South 
Africa and some American cities should not be shrugged off. They are crude 
reminders of how old the present is. What concerns me most is an apparent 
absence of visible resolve in our country and the USA, for example, to deal 
decisively with the occasional resurfacing of racist behaviour, which often results 
in the case of the USA at least, in the killing of innocent black people. We must 
constantly remind ourselves about the historic large-scale pogroms in human 
history in which race and racism have played a significant role. Racism on a large 
scale is the kind of scourge that made the trans-Atlantic slave trade possible, Hitler’s 
killing pogroms possible and South Africa’s Hendrik Verwoerd’s racist separate 
development programmes possible. South Africans must ask themselves the 
following question: what sustains the apartheid era’s racist consciousness that are 
the psychosocial identities which defined black and white relations since the days 
of the Cape Colony until the twentieth century’s formal consolidation of apartheid 
racism? The post-colonial and post-apartheid existence of apartheid style black 
and white racialised identities must remain our century’s lead theme for both on-
going research and the implementation of strategies for the systematic eradication 
of structural sources of race-based inequality in our country. Phrased differently, 
there is an urgent necessity to unravel the underlying socio-economic foundations 
and supporting institutional practices, which sustain expanding racial inequality in 
post-1994 South Africa. In this regard, we need to focus our resolve on the view 
that racism is not ‘inevitable’. In plain language, post-colonial racism is like its 
predecessors before, a realisation of institutionalised social, political, educational 
and economic inequality, which served and continues to serve the interests of the 
white minority in our country.
Race, racism and the South African transition 
Answers to complex questions are often difficult to find. I would be surprised if this 
statement were not true with regard to the thorny question of race and racism. In 
South Africa, policy implementation failures became evident in the education and 
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health sectors by the second decade of a democratic South Africa. In On Becoming 
a Democracy (2004), I describe the transition challenge of coming to terms with 
choices, as well as burdens of the past which continue to impact on public life 
especially during the course of a momentous transition such as our own during the 
course of the mid-1990s. 
Twenty years after our liberation, the question we must ask ourselves is: was 
apartheid’s ideology and everyday practice akin to racist practices elsewhere in 
Africa and the world? Today, some two decades after liberation in our country, 
the painful reality is that most of the generous expectations of the Mandela era 
regarding equality before the law for all South Africans coupled with the dawn 
of non-racialism in all spheres of life have not yet been fully realised. In 2004 
I described one of the important challenges we faced as a country following the 
transition in April 1994 by proposing that we were duty bound to enlarge the 
“freedom premium (the legacy of April 1994) in order for this freedom to mean 
more than the enjoyment of civil rights”. I was placing a well-deserved emphasis 
on the urgent need for the progressive elimination of race-based inequality in the 
rising new democratic non-racial South Africa. I must emphasise the point that the 
parties that negotiated our transition from apartheid to democracy made certain 
that institutions and legal provisions were deliberately established with a distinct 
intention to leverage de-racialisation, equality, nation building and the cultivation 
of national unity. This transition was done by the Constitution and its Bill of 
Rights, the short-lived TRC and at one stage, the government of national unity. 
Without saying as much, the battle against inequality and an associated presumed 
inferiority of black people was waged from all fronts during the short early epoch of 
the transition years. 
A carefully prepared ‘vaccine’ against the racist evils of the past was hurriedly put 
into place during the course of the negotiations that happened between 1990 and 
1993. My reference here is to the establishment through an act of parliament of 
our own TRC. Chaired at the time by a charismatic and internationally renowned 
African archbishop named Desmond Tutu, this transition instrument soon emerged 
together with our Bill of Rights as beacons of hope of a non-racial democratic 
future, which beckoned over the horizon of years to come. The overriding belief 
was that the TRC would serve as one of the spectacular and lasting building blocks 
of our country’s transition from apartheid racism in late twentieth century South 
Africa. 
Understandably, the transition from a legalised race-based form of statehood into 
a popular non-racial, constitutional state was not without unexpected challenges. 
One such a challenge was the rise during the early years of the transition of what 
the Nigerian Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka (2004: 8) once described as “the 
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enthronement of a cult of impunity”. It is worth remembering that such a culture 
of impunity is centuries old, as far as the relationship between blacks and whites 
in South Arica is concerned. Not long after the arrival of the first white settlers in 
1652, there was not only talk about so-called ‘kaffirs’ but ‘kaffir wars’ and ‘frontier 
wars’ in today’s Western Cape. The year 1948 became another historic landmark in 
the colonial history of South Africa. It was then that the Afrikaner-based National 
Party became the governing party and the long term purveyors of impunity and 
statutory racist inequality. After 1948, both impunity and legalised racist policies 
and practices became the hallmarks of South African racism into the early 1990s. 
Apartheid became such a trajectory of race-based statutory inequality and 
impunity. It encouraged me to cast a glance over our own history and beyond our 
borders into the rest of the African continent. In so doing, I found it difficult to 
resist a momentary look at the history of colonialism on the African continent since 
Ghananian independence in 1957 and the end of apartheid in South Africa in April 
1994. The broader trajectory of Africa’s decolonisation need not concern us here. 
However, I do want to emphasise the historic significance of the All Africa People’s 
Conference of December 1958 in Accra. That was a continent wide wake-up call 
initiating the claim for a total decolonisation of the continent from west, north, east 
and southern Africa. 
Franz Fanon, who was present at the conference, is known to have spoken in 
prophetic terms regarding the power and prospects of failure amongst the elites of 
the post-colonial states of the 1960s. His daughter, Mireille Fanon-Mendès-France 
quoted him – from The Wretched of the Earth: 
The national middle class which takes over power at the end of the colonial 
regime is an underdeveloped middle class. It has practically no economic 
power, and in [any] case it is in no way commensurate with the bourgeoisie 
of the mother country, which it hopes to replace ... It is completely focused on 
activities of the intermediary type. Its innermost vocation seems to be to keep 
in the running and to be part of the racket. The psychology of the national 
bourgeoisie is that of the businessman, not that of a captain of industry. 
(Fanon-Mendès-France, 2016: xvii)
As a South African who was privileged to live and work in government through 
the 1990s transition in our country, I am dismayed by the uncanny familiarity of 
Fanon’s mid twentieth century pronouncements about the moral and political 
fickleness of an emerging post-colonial bourgeoisie of the 1960s. Let us remember 
that Fanon was one of the earliest, if not the most outstanding writer until now, 
to expose the everyday social and political primacy of skin colour in colonial 
countries during the last century. Yet, it is important to remember that he was part 
of a widening political and intellectual intelligentsia that included luminaries such 
as Aimé Césaire, Léopold Senghor and the French intellectual notables Morris 
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Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre. Of greater significance is the fact that in 1961, 
before his sudden death, Fanon completed his last book, a grand finale, entitled The 
Wretched of the Earth (1963). 
In the preceding paragraphs, I was building up Fanon’s prophetic prescience. 
Following our 1994 salvation from a colonial variation of racial domination 
called apartheid, I am enchanted by Fanon’s profound mistrust of undeserving 
post-colonial purveyors of both wealth and power such as some of those who 
suddenly sprung to light in our country since 1994. I continue to believe that the 
most promising phase of the South African transition occurred primarily between 
the years 1994 and 1999, the foundation years of the Mandela-Mbeki transition 
administration. During those years, the country was at work and President Mandela 
was visibly in charge. National policy and laws were put in place to undergird 
the overall governance of the state machinery, the reconstruction and economic 
development of the country, as well as the de-racialisation of the South African 
state and society as a whole. 
More important, Fanon placed the masses side by side and face to face with the 
new emerging African bourgeoisie of his day. He found the emerging elites 
wanting. The recognition and initial intellectual formulation of the practical and 
historical consequences of the alienation of the people (the masses) from the 
post-colonial native bourgeoisie must be regarded today as one of Fanon’s most 
prescient contributions to contemporary studies of post-colonial societies. Our 
own contribution follows the dismantling of apartheid racism and its supporting 
infrastructure of laws, racial discrimination and educational, economic and social 
inequality. Hamouchene (2015) comments: 
This focus and vivid attachment to the wretched of the earth, their lives and 
their struggle is put in opposition to an instinctive aversion to a national 
bourgeoisie that will betray the masses, halt liberation and set-up a national 
system of tyranny and exploitation, reminiscent of the colonial counterpart. 
Fanon rightly observed how nationalist consciousness can very easily lead to 
‘frozen rigidity’, merely replacing the departed white masters with coloured 
equivalents. 
What is more than likely is that both Fanon and Mandela underestimated the 
avarice of emerging post-colonial bourgeois classes. Interestingly, the substantive 
post-liberation measures, which were so assiduously developed and ultimately 
institutionalised in our country after 1994, through both legislation and 
administrative practice, have been disarmingly ineffectual especially during the later 
years of the past 20 years. There are numerous examples of policy implementation 
failures during the post-1994 era of democratic rule. They include failures in critical 
areas such as school education and the country’s health system, which have reached 
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chronic proportions in the recent past. However, for immediate purposes, an 
important area of national concern has to be the existence of unmistakable signs 
of failure in the domain of racial integration following the highly publicised work 
of the TRC during the mid-1990s, the adoption of the country’s Constitution and 
its Bill of Rights. Not surprisingly, race based inequality in South Africa appears to 
be on the increase and so are the muted murmurs about non-abating white racism 
from some faceless members of our country’s white community.
Searching for a needle in a haystack 
Present indications are that widespread interest in the question of race and racism 
has reached a new peak in the recent past. While no ready statistics exist, reflecting 
an increase in the publication rate of books on the subject of racism, indications 
are that undoubtedly intellectual and popular interest in the subject has been 
rising locally and internationally in the recent past. It could be that, challenging 
and exciting as it may be to continue grappling with the challenge of racism in the 
world on an intellectual plane, in South Africa specifically, practical remedies in the 
interest of society beyond the limits of mere intellectual disputes is warranted. For 
a beginning, it would be helpful to accept that from a science and academic point 
of view, we have a considerable body of writing on an international scale, about the 
sources, forms of expression, as well as the history of the evolution of both race and 
racism. The range of perspectives on race and racism reviewed earlier confirm the 
veracity of this view. 
While thousands of labour migrants risk their lives crossing turbulent seas between 
North Africa and Mediterranean Europe presently, in search of livelihoods in 
Europe in conditions reminiscent of the age of the slave trade, new thinking should 
be brought to bear on the crisis.
It would be nihilism of the worst kind to continue providing credence to the 
implied inevitability of black inferiority coupled with the varieties of its presumed 
manifestations in everyday life. When race-based social, economic and educational 
race-based inequalities become the cardinal point of our focus, the false 
inevitability of racism is focused on and can be thrown into relief and disrepute. 
Consequently, when the presumed inferiority of black people takes its rightful 
place as a false social-psychological legitimation of white superiority by race-
conscious whites, the prevailing fiction of never ending white superiority is thrown 
into relief and disrepute. Consequently, democratic governments such as our own 
are duty bound to develop strategies that purposefully interrupt the age-old hoax of 
the claimed inevitability of the superiority of white people. What history demands 
from black people themselves is a self-conscious and well-developed determination 
to interrupt and discredit the presumed inevitability of racial inequality in South 
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Africa and elsewhere. I believe that thinking and writing about race and racism 
needs to be demystified once and for all. So much so, that whiteness (one of the 
primary incubators of race supremacy) and racism, are deprived of the mystique 
which has sustained them for such a considerable period of time. 
While working on this essay, I found myself grappling with difficult questions; 
puzzles in respect of which no readily available answers could be found. No 
immediate answer could account for the fact that most writers on race end up 
assuming the role of a diagnostician. Answers to questions such as the following 
are likely to be numerous and varied: is racism an illness? Is it a nasty chronic 
behavioural malaise? Is it prejudice turned viral? Is it an irreversible psychological 
affliction for which there is no known remedy? Is racism all of the above combined? 
Raising questions of this kind has become necessary because a dead end appears to 
have been reached in the literature on race and racism. While a substantial world 
literature on racism in different countries, including South Africa and the United 
States for example, is readily available, complex questions continue to plague us 
since racism continues to thrive in our country and the USA. Yet, no substantive, 
self-evident remedies for racist practices appear to be readily available.
When Dubow made the claim that ‘capitalism did not create racism’ (2014: 276), 
he missed an important point. What is missing in his assertion is the fact that racism 
and capitalism survive extremely well in close proximity. They feed on each other. 
The proximity of apartheid racism and capitalism throughout the later course of the 
twentieth century has been one of the primary precursors of widening inequality 
between white and black South Africans for example. South Africa’s post 1948 
scenario (the rise of undiluted Afrikaner political and economic dominance) needs 
to be understood in close proximity to Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd’s legalisation of an 
inferior and infamous Bantu Education (education for Africans) from the 1950s 
onwards. Verwoerd must have known that black people were not intellectually 
inferior because of heredity and/ or God’s will. As a psychologist, Verwoerd must 
have figured out that an artificial kind of race-based intellectual inferiority could be 
created through a specially designed inferior education system for Africans known 
as Bantu Education. As is well-known, successive apartheid governments incubated 
African intellectual inferiority in the country’s school classrooms and universities, 
using the shameless promotion of inadequate teaching capacity in high schools, 
colleges and ethnic universities as a weapon. 
The shadow of apartheid and white capitalism coupled with carefully crafted race-
based policies during the second half of the twentieth century overshadowed any 
glimmer of hope that the Mandela-Mbeki administrations introduced during 
the first decade of our transition from apartheid to democracy in South Africa. 
Consequently, strategies to interrupt and diminish the assumed inevitability of 
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race inferiority and intellectual inequality must be shamelessly developed, publicly 
promoted and acted upon. The differences in race, which installs both uneasiness, 
the need to subjugate and define the black other on the part of white people, 
needs to finally be put to rest. Psychologists amongst us need to ask ourselves the 
question: what happened to the early studies of prejudice? What if racism turns 
out to be a self-sustaining rationalisation of prejudice with social-psychological, 
economic and ego enhancing capabilities amongst our white compatriots? This is 
what I believe it has become in the course of time. 
In the recent past, the people of South Africa put their trust in our recently created 
democratic dispensation with all the rights and responsibilities enshrined in our 
constitution. We placed our faith in the ‘healing’ powers of truth telling, as well 
as its potential to promote reconciliation through the work of the TRC during 
the late 1990s. In the public open court of world opinion, we placed our national 
trust on relating, reliving and re-enacting our violent, racist and undemocratic past. 
We chose this path to our national well-being: reconciliation in the present and 
the creation of a future non-racist democratic society. Undoubtedly, the vehicle 
for such substantial change was to be the TRC. It was an undertaking, coupled 
with and indeed underpinned by, an exemplary twentieth century non-racist and 
democratic Constitution.
Philomena Essed, writing in the Foreword to Race, Memory and the Apartheid 
Archive, says, “The misunderstanding that racism is only about skin colour and 
explicit racial superiority continues to hold even today, in particular in mainland 
Europe. A different view on apartheid, revealing mundaneness, confusions and 
denials, can be an eye-opener to an international audience. The Apartheid Archive 
Project is a unique platform for South Africans to document their experiences 
anonymously.” Essed concludes the above assessment by saying, “It is exactly the 
reluctance to fully process the racial past in understanding the present that hampers 
the attainment of full equality and dignity for all in Europe, the United States and 
elsewhere.” (2013: viii)
It should be evident by now that I too entertain a number of difficult questions 
about race and racism. Firstly, on a deeper level of curiosity: what is it in relations 
between blacks and whites, which engender such unease as to result in such frantic 
questioning of each other’s motives? Secondly: what are the elements in skin colour 
and intelligence which singled out such features as the prime markers of racial 
inferiority and superiority? Thirdly: is it reasonable to assume in terms of current 
academic wisdom, that the habitat of racism and oppression (the drivers) are to 
be found in the human psyche of whites and their victims of racist oppression? 
Lastly: is the impulse to demean black people an age-old remnant of the instinctual 
evolution of pre-historic man? Some astute readers will have seen through the logic 
32      |  THE EFFECTS OF RACE
of my self-examination as a black person who has spent the greatest part of his adult 
life in South Africa. 
The increased academic interest and writing about race and racism, substantial as it 
has become in the course of time, leaves me with a lingering sense that experiments 
such as the American slave trade, German Nazism during WWII, as well as the 
occupation of South Africa by Europeans since 1652 until our liberation in 1994, 
caused that racism today still feels like a lingering smell of dubious origin. However, 
the good fortune is that I have become a firm believer of McCoskey’s view on racism. 
I believe that white racism’s notable impact on human development in societies 
such as our own in South Africa is neither inevitable nor irreversible. Racism can 
be eliminated through the use of carefully crafted national strategies (policies and 
laws). This include ready access to quality education for all, coupled with the wide 
scale elimination of racially-based resource and opportunity inequality between 
black and white South Africans in the employment market. 
Is racism and its deadly claims on the lives of millions of black people in our 
continent and elsewhere in the world, a centuries old human tragedy? Or is it 
just a nasty outcome of pride and prejudice? Undoubtedly, a sense of God-given 
superiority of white people, coupled with prejudice against the full humanity of 
people of colour, has characterised inter-race relations between whites and blacks 
for centuries. Relations between black and white people have been dominated by 
a history driven and dominated by racist pride amongst whites accompanied by an 
ideologically and legally enshrined denigration of black lives at the height of our 
country’s century of apartheid. Black people lived, until fairly recently, in a country 
which promoted white superiority as national policy and God’s will. Hendrik 
Verwoerd, amongst other prominent National Party leaders, championed and 
exploited such logic to the wildest limits possible.
The imposition over nearly a half century of the twentieth century of sub-standard 
Bantu Education over generations of African children and their families was a 
substantive crime against African people, as well as future generations of South 
Africans. Consequently, black South Africans as the country’s majority population, 
remained alienated, educationally and economically disadvantaged. For a variety of 
complex reasons they have remained academically and economically disadvantaged 
to this day. As a group, we were compelled to function in the national public sphere 
at levels well below what was reasonably expected of our white compatriots. In this 
regard, it is worth remembering that it is not only individuals and their families who 
become life-long failures in politically driven race supremacist environments such 
as South Africa was before 1994. Indications are that a complex set of economic 
and political factors may, in all probability, lead to the emergence of a failed state 
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characterised by extremes of inordinate wealth, crippling poverty and inequality on 
the other.
Undoubtedly, skin colour is one important element in the twin human realities 
known as race and racism. Within the range of perspectives considered in this 
essay and elsewhere, there is no firm evidence to confirm the generally presumed 
inevitability of race differences in human abilities such as intelligence and other 
human attributes. Indications are that prevailing attributions of black inferiority 
are undoubtedly groundless. They serve other ego enhancing needs, as well 
as opportunities for economic and political domination of subordinate black 
populations. As suggested here, as well as in the available world literature on race 
and racism, the twin centuries old drivers of racism are racialised by differences in 
biological features such as skin colour, coupled with the concurrent needs to sustain 
the development of colonial expansion and the rise of capitalist economic systems. 
What is also clear is that while racist practices affect victims on many levels, such 
practices appear in society in a manner, which suggests a chronic inevitability of 
the outrageous racist behaviour in question. Examples of such highly publicised 
racist behaviours in the USA are the sporadic killings of African Americans by 
white American police officers in public spaces. However, a contemporary reading 
of all these gruesome racist happenings has to be that racist practices against black 
people by white compatriots, wherever they occur, are not inevitable.
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RACISM, EXISTENTIAL INEQUALITY 
AND PROBLEMS OF CATEGORICAL 
EQUALISATION
Reflections on the South African experience
Göran Therborn
“…race is the child of racism, not the father”.
—Between the World and Me (Coates, 2015: 7).
Race, racism and inequality
‘Race’ is a large-scale social category and as such comparable to other categories 
grouping a large number of different individuals under one heading, like gender, 
age, religion, tribe/ethnicity/nation and class. Currently, the main referent of race 
is skin colour, but in the nineteenth, early twentieth, century, race was often used 
as a synonym of ethnicity or nationality, as in ‘the British race’. The Latin American 
notion of ‘la Raza’, still celebrated on Columbus Day, 12 October, refers to people 
of Hispanic-American or to Indo-Hispanic American culture. Inversely, skin colour 
or ‘tone’ can be invoked without necessary implications of ‘race’, as in Indian 
marriage ads boasting of ‘fair’ prospective brides and have status effects within 
Black populations, as in Haiti and USA (Keith and Herring, 1991). 
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Whether or to what extent race ‘exists’ in some essential sense is not an issue here 
– although I am certainly convinced that race is not a socio-biological determinant. 
Race is currently used as a social category in everyday, as well as in mainstream 
political discourse in South Africa, USA and many other countries. As a frequently 
used social category, race clearly has a social existence.
Like the other above-mentioned categories, race can be an identity, imposed 
or chosen, a target of state policies, malign or benign, and a vehicle of collective 
mobilisation. One effect of race, of variable strength and significance, is to raise 
a competition in these respects with other categories, class, nation, religion, sex/
gender and introducing a division between them, or leading up to new hierarchies 
of division, such as, e.g., the formation of a pan-ethnic white working class in the 
US (Cherlin 2014: ch.2). For these reasons, a pervasive modern effect of race is to 
complicate and constrain egalitarian mobilisations and policies (cf. Haller, 2015).
Racism is a manifestation of human inequality, meaning that it is a historical 
social construction of super- and subordination. It is a translation of a perceived 
difference, e.g. skin colour, into a vertical inequality of superiority and inferiority 
(On inequality, its patterns and its dynamics the reader may be referred to a book of 
mine, Therborn 2013).
Inequality racism is a form of existential inequality, one of the three major kinds 
or dimensions of human inequality, alongside vital and resource inequality. Vital 
inequality refers to social constructions shaping human life-courses with respect 
to life expectancy, health and mental-somatic development. Resource inequality 
is most frequently measured in terms of income and wealth, but may also include 
social connections, ‘cultural capital’ and power (to command). While vital 
inequality creates inequality among humans as living beings and resource inequality 
among humans as actors, existential inequality impacts us as persons.
Existential inequality affects us as persons by shaping our constitution and 
recognition as autonomous and integral subjects. Existential inequality allocates 
maturity or full personhood, degrees of freedom, autonomy, dignity, recognition 
and respect – and their opposites, immaturity, unfreedom, contempt, disrespect, 
ignorance, discrimination, humiliation and persecution. To be denied your dignity 
and autonomy as a person is arguably the most cruel and humiliating of inequalities. 
The ultimate point of existential inequality is genocide. Racism is existential 
inequality, along with sexism and patriarchy, with the denial of full personhood to 
handicapped people and, as a transient form, to people below a certain age. 
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The production of inequality and effects of race
The generation of human inequality has to be analysed at two levels: at a macro, 
systemic, population level and at a micro inter-individual, inter-generational 
level. At the macro level, vital inequality is shaped by population ecology, i.e., 
how the population is distributed among disease-prone, polluting, or hazardous 
environments and by the stratification of medical-hygienic knowledge and of the 
prevailing health care system. Resource inequality is governed by the political 
economy of mode of production, political rule and policies. Existential inequality 
is rooted in socio-cultural systems of inferiority and superiority, buttressed and 
protected by polities and fitted into economic systems, from macho nomad 
pastoralism to plantation slavery and capitalism. 
The micro perspective focuses on the generation of unequal individuals, through 
inter-individual and inter-generational interaction. This means paying attention to 
two processes necessary for the making of functioning humans, capability formation 
and self-formation. 
Capability formation may be seen as skills, motoric, cognitive and social. They 
have a potential provided by an inherited genetic program, but the extent of the 
latter’s actualisation and development is determined by interaction with mother, 
father and/or other proximate individuals. It has been known for some time to be 
affected also by fetal experiences in utero, such as mother’s malnutrition, resulting in 
underweight babies, tending to slower and truncated capability development and 
more prone to heart disease and diabetes later in life. Recent biological research 
is now beginning to unravel mechanisms of this kind of fetus-mother interaction, 
as epigenetic processes. They refer to changes in the expression of the child’s 
genetic program, which do not derive from its DNA. Maternal nutrition, pollution 
exposure, drug abuse and social trauma during pregnancy are external social factors 
discovered to be internaliseable by the fetus and capable of altering the child’s 
genetic course. (Kaur et al., 2013; Rezendiz et al., 2013).1 
In other words, humans are not born equal. Socially created, inequality starts before 
birth, spawning unequal health and life expectancy. After birth capability formation 
proceeds very fast and its foundations are mostly established by the age of three. 
While capability, of course, increases well after that, early underdevelopment 
creates a handicap which rapidly becomes increasingly difficult and by adolescence 
almost impossible, to repair (Cunha & Heckman, 2009). Unequal capability 
predisposes adult actors to unequal resources, even before unequal inheritance of 
property and contacts.
1  I am indebted to Nina Jablonski for drawing my attention to the epigenetic literature.
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Self-formation is the second fundamental aspect of child development, unfolding 
in interaction with social others. From an existential point of view, the two most 
significant aspects are the development or not of self-esteem and self-confidence. 
The very meaning of racism and of patriarchy is to deny self-esteem and self-
confidence to black (or any other racial group) girls, and instead to install shame, 
self-contempt and fear. Such punitive processes are, of course, far from always 
successful, but they usually inflict lasting wounds.
Prejudice and stigma impact as stressors on the victims and have both somatic and 
psychological effects (for an overview, see Williams & Mohammed, 2009). Under-
performance by the targets is caused by themselves. Experimental psychology 
has shown that groups, for example of girls and boys, black and white, members 
of different castes, were experimentally told that they are inferior and then they 
perform badly on given tasks. The opposite was also true, if told that they are 
expected to be superior they performed so much better. (Maass & Cadinu, 2003; 
Hoff & Pandey, 2006).
Children of poor, oppressed and/or discriminated populations are loaded with two 
sets of heavy burdens, which cause many or most of them to under-perform. One 
is the burden of social determinants of ill-health, stunted development, deficient 
emotional security and social stimulation. These are all bearing upon capability 
formation. The other operates through the negative impacts on self-development 
of esteem, confidence and ambition by the existential processes of stigmatisation, 
humiliation and fright. Both these childhood experiences tend to have life-long 
effects, that start life-curves of cumulated disadvantages (see further Therborn, 
2016). 
These cumulated disadvantages are ‘effects of race’, not out of any genetic 
determination, but effects of experiences of racist social constructions.
The early handicaps of capability and self-formation among the oppressed or groups 
discriminated against are crucial to equalise the attention and policy practice, not 
only for their enduring effects on the victims, but for all generations. Systemic 
existential inequality, like racism and patriarchy, tend to leave a structural legacy 
of advantages and disadvantages long after the system itself has been dismantled 
institutionally. This structural legacy tends to reinforce stereotypical prejudice that 
any disadvantaged population is inherently inferior, whether it is black people, 
Indians, women, ‘Gypsies’ or poor people in general.
Two paradoxes of racism in our time
The three kinds of inequality of course interact with each other and may often 
be viewed as interwoven or entangled. However, each has its own dynamics and 
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therefore also its own specific historical trajectory, which brings us into a paradox 
of our times.
In the first half of the twentieth century, global vital inequality increased, due to 
better sanitation, diet and health care in the industrial North. After the end of 
WWII the gap decreased, with the globalisation of preventive medicine and with 
the start of socio-economic development in the South and in Eastern Europe. 
That tendency was broken around 1990, with the restoration of capitalism in the 
ex-USSR and with a catastrophic rise of mortality – to some extent foreshadowed 
by an Eastern European stagnation of life expectancy from around 1970 and by 
the hecatomb of AIDS in Africa. Western European data show that intra-national 
inequality of mortality did not decline in the course of the twentieth century, 
contrary to the equalisation of income and economic resources. In the last 25-30 
years national vital inequality is rising in Europe, as well as in the US.
Economic inequality on a planetary scale increased steadily from the early 
nineteenth century until the 1950s, whereafter it lay more or less flat on a high 
plateau until around 2000 and then bending slightly downwards. China is the main 
factor, if not the only one. Internally, in the rich countries there was a substantial 
economic equalisation from the end of WWII. Domestic economic inequality, 
however, is on the rise in most countries since about 1980, except for South 
America who only experienced this in the first decade after 2000 (see further 
Therborn, 2013).
It is against this picture that the paradox of a largely simultaneous epochal crumbling 
of institutionalised, fortified and armed existential inequalities, ancient, as well 
as modern, stands out and calls for explanation. The contrast was dramatically 
illustrated in the USA in the first years of this century. At a time of soaring income 
inequality, bringing the country back to the roaring 1920s before the crash and of 
mounting gaps of life expectancy, including an absolute decline of life expectancy 
among the least educated, the USA got its first ever black top military commander, 
its first black national security adviser (also the first woman) and its first black 
president. 
The last third of the twentieth century brought the most profound and wide-ranging 
existential equalisation in recorded human history. Institutionalised patriarchy was 
dismantled in Europe and in both Americas in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, 
as well as in many parts of Africa and Asia. African-Americans got the right to vote 
and towards the end of the century many indigenous people in the ex-European 
settler countries were recognised both as people and as collectives. Apartheid 
imploded. Racial and sex/gender discrimination became legal offences in large 
parts of the world and were condemned in the United Nations Conventions.
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The Atlantic Revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
abolished feudal aristocracies and inherited access to high social positions, but 
neither did they abolish male sexism nor do away with slavery. The Communist 
Revolutions decreed away most existing existential inequalities and fought 
courageously for freedom of marriage and for women’s rights among a recalcitrant 
patriarchal peasantry. Stalin’s USSR, however, gave many concessions to sexism 
later on. Both the Russians and the Chinese Communists institutionalised an 
existential inequality of different rights between ‘the people’ on one hand and the 
defeated classes, including their families and descendants, on the other.
As we have already noticed, this recent epochal existential equalisation was not 
part of a general turn of human societies towards more equality. On the contrary, 
it largely coincided or overlapped with a turn towards more economic inequality, 
particularly on national level. National income inequality started to rise again after 
a low point in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) world around 1980 and around 1990 in China, Eastern Europe and 
India. In Latin America the turn came with the military dictatorships, from the 
mid-1960s in Brazil, the mid-1970s in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, with civilian 
neoliberalism and rigged elections from 1988. Vital inequality, measured by life 
expectancy among class and educational groups began to increase within the rich 
nations in the last decades of the past century and continuing. The global trend of 
vital equalisation was broken dramatically around 1990 by developments in Africa 
and in Eastern Europe. 
How is this disjuncture of inequality trajectories to be explained? The barest outline 
of a brief sociological answer would be: the opposite development of the social 
force of pertinent social categories.
Generally speaking, inequalities change when the relations of force between the 
superiors and the subalterns change. If the former gains strength and autonomy, 
inequality increases. If the latter does, inequality declines. The decisive struggles 
always take place in particular contexts and through particular strategies and tactics. 
Existential equalisation was driven by women strengthened by a previous rise of 
mass higher education. Secularisation, by indigenous people also played a role, as 
well as getting a thin intellectual stratum of their own and then being drawn into 
national economies. 
Racism received several shocks because of its particularly ingrained and fortified 
character. The defeat of Nazism and the discovery of Auschwitz made public anti-
Semitism unsustainable, but not racism per se, as the rise and worldwide tolerance 
of apartheid showed. Colonial emancipation undercut claims to Euro-White 
supremacy. USA racism lost its economic rationale with the end of plantation 
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slavery and the demise of share-cropping agriculture. The black population 
was strengthened by moving into the industrial North and by its new student 
generation. A similar change happened in South Africa with black people relocating 
because of an industrial demand for more skilled labourers and this undermined 
apartheid. For the USA regime, the Cold War competition provided the context 
for active Federal support and this dismantled institutionalised racism. For South 
Africa the implosion of international Communism reduced the regime’s fear of 
black emancipation. 
National economic inequality, on the other hand, was pushed by the weakening 
of the main egalitarian force of the twentieth century, the industrial working class, 
declining by de-industrialisation in the North, exacerbation by forceful anti-union 
drives and replenished in China and the new industrial South by new recruits fresh 
from the land, regimented, fragmented and not yet with a collective culture of its 
own. At the other end was the distancing from capital and declining dependence on 
labour by a financing capitalism, awash with petrodollars and pension funds. With 
respect to vital inequality in the centres of capitalism something similar happened 
through different channels. On the one hand there was a new upper middle class 
health consciousness and investments, and, on the other, the rise of a new precariat 
of insecurities, unhealthy living and working conditions.
These effects of changes in the constellations of force between these classes 
overrun, but do not wipe out vital and resource effects of existential equalisation. 
Male-female wage and income gaps have shrunk almost universally, though not 
enough to stop the overall Gini coefficient and other measures of inequality from 
rising. In the USA black-white gaps of income and of life expectancy have narrowed 
somewhat in the midst of general polarisation (Therborn, 2013: 131, 143). To 
South Africa I shall return below.
The reduction of inequality, or even large-scale equalisation, does not mean that 
inequality disappears. A series of killings of unarmed African-Americans in 2014-
2015 by white people, including white policemen, highlights a vicious persistence 
of violent racism, in spite of the drastic institutional changes (cf. Goldberg, 2014; 
Coates, 2015). How should that second paradox, the post-institutional persistence 
of racism, be understood?
Racism institutionalised and racism privatised
We have to distinguish between two kinds of racist and, generally, existential 
inequality. The one kind is institutional, public, hegemonic, systemic, it is based 
on power and conquest and operates on a big scale. It also typically derives from 
a political-economic system of slavery or from servile labour and gets further 
sustained by systemic labour discrimination. The second kind is habitual, private, 
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personal, experiential and based on personal experiences that are imagined, learnt 
or real. 
In the current era of privatisations of public institutions and public services, 
racism has also been privatised. It is also protected from public scrutiny and 
public accountability – this theme has been extensively developed by David Theo 
Goldberg (2014: 52ff).
This second, experiential racism is a set of dispositions, or habitus to speak with 
Bourdieu, with two pairs of attitudes: contempt and fear, or resentment and fear. 
There is, among not so few people, a contempt for weakness and/or poverty, a 
contempt which may be attached to certain social categories, be they ethnic (e.g., 
Roma people in Europe), religious (e.g., poor Christian or Muslim minorities), 
ethno-religious (most viciously today the Rohingya of Myanmar) or skin-coloured 
(like black people). Contempt is usually paired with fear, in varying doses: fear for 
the ‘savages’, the ‘barbarians’ or simply for the uncomfortable proximity of the never 
quite understandable and predictable miserable. The recent USA police shootings 
of black people living in ghettos appear to illustrate this kind of racism, which can 
live on unperturbed by the toppling of hegemonic systemic racism.
Categorical resentment is directed against people imagined to be unjustly privileged 
in some sense, be they successful ethno-religious minorities, Jews in Europe, 
Armenians in the Ottoman empire, Chinese in Southeast Asia or previously 
contemptible groups now viewed to be favoured by new anti-discrimination 
norms, by affirmative action or simply by the reception of poor immigrants. The 
accompanying fear is for one’s own or one’s children’s jobs, earnings or status. 
Whether institutionalised or privatised, to its targets and victims, “racism is a 
visceral experience … it dislodges brains, blocks airways, rips muscle, extracts 
organs, cracks bones, breaks teeth” (Coates 2015: 10).
Categorical and universalist equality
All social inequalities are received by individuals, having the realisation of their 
human capability denied or stunted. A process of equalisation can be framed 
either as opening the doors of opportunity to uncounted, unnamed individuals or 
by letting (a) specified group(s) in. The early modern Atlantic revolutions, whose 
(existential) equality so fascinated-cum-frightened Alexis de Tocqueville, were 
clearly of the former, formally universalistic kind. At the same time, this liberal 
‘bourgeois’ tradition demonstrated its implicit limitations from the very beginning. 
‘All’ humans were ‘created equal’ according to the Founding Fathers of the USA, 
who were in fact only white male property owners.
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The circle of individuals endowed with rights can of course be widened, which 
occurred gradually in today’s liberal democracies. Individual personal rights, 
however, do not deal with the inequality of resources of individual actors, nor with 
systemic divisions of inequality such as the capital-labour divide of capitalism. 
From the nineteenth century, this kind of inequality gave rise to socialism as a 
project of creating an egalitarian socio-economic system. Later welfare states added 
civic socio-economic rights, sustained by general taxation, public services and 
redistributive grants.
Categorical rights are ancient, providing hierarchies of estates, castes, religious 
communities, and ethnic groups with particular rights and protection. They had 
developed for purposes of a hierarchical order, not for equality, and as such they 
were targets of liberal and liberal-nationalist individual equalisation, sometimes 
with disastrous results.
Categorical equalisation is a fast track to overcome the structural legacies of 
institutional discrimination and inequality in the form of disadvantaged capability 
formation, damaged self-esteem, self-confidence and discouraged ambition. A 
history of attempts and strivings at categorical equalisation remains to be written. 
Early discussions include, from mid-nineteenth century, critiques of the socially 
destructive effects of liberal abolitions of communal Indian land rights in Latin 
America. The dissolution of multinational European empires generated collective 
rights of representation and culture to ethnic minorities, in the wake of WWI. In 
the same period the British introduced minority rights of representation into their 
colonial Westminster-type polity of colonial India.
Independent India has developed the most extensive program of categorical 
equalisation, with reserved electoral constituencies and quotas of higher education 
and public jobs for the lower castes, and for the previous ‘Untouchables’ below 
them (see further Sankaran, 2014). Affirmative action for African-Americans 
later resulted from the Civil Rights movement and soon extended to women’s 
representation in a number of countries.
On the whole, categorical equalisation measures seem to have worked, in the sense 
of making positions of status, influence and good earnings more available to (many 
members of) underprivileged categories. A valuable overview of affirmative action 
‘from the Global South’ is from Dupper and Sankaran (2014). In India some castes 
have claimed to be ‘backward’ too, in order to get inclusion into the quota system. 
While resented by some members of previously favoured categories, categorical 
equalisation, for women in particular, has achieved a broad legitimacy. As far as I 
understand, this seems to be the case also in post-apartheid South Africa.
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However, the South African experience also shows that categorical equalisation is 
not a simple matter even in theory and may in practice develop into blockages and 
to reproducing stark inequalities. 
From apartheid to equality: categorical or universalist equalisation?
Categorical race equalisation was a socio-political necessity in a post-racist 
democratic South Africa and corresponded to an egalitarian vision of development. 
There seems to be three crucial issues that have not been widely discussed and 
thought about in post-apartheid South Africa.
1. From an egalitarian point of view, what should be the priorities of categorical 
equalisation?
2. Are there any problems, limitations or internal contradictions of categorical 
equalisation?
3. Can categorical equalisation collide with universalist equality?
There are two areas of priority, power and capability formation. Categorical 
equalisation is imperative, first of all, with respect to positions of political, judicial 
and repressive power. This means that the government (ensured by elections), 
including the top administration, the judiciary, the police and the military, manifest 
and solidify the transfer of power. It is also important with regard to social services 
to the public, manifesting a novel relationship between the state and its citizens. 
Categorical equalisation of capability formation means targeted education and 
training of the disadvantaged or previously oppressed population. This has to be a 
two-pronged approach. On the one end investing is done heavily in early pre-school 
child development and in elementary education. On the other hand investments 
are made on access to higher education, facilitating social mobility and providing 
the new society with new categories of professionals and managers.
In a world of limited resources, there is a dilemma here, how much into one or 
the other? In the long run, priority engagement with early child development and 
good basic education for the disadvantaged population would be better, laying an 
egalitarian foundation for higher education. However, there are short-run political 
gains from concentrating on access to higher education, students being a loud and 
volatile political force. Independent India concentrated on the latter, Communist 
China on the former. Now, China has both a wholly literate, increasingly skilled 
labour force and some of the best universities of the global South, while India is 
still burdened with illiteracy and a large unskilled labour force alongside mostly 
mediocre universities, in spite of an impressively argumentative intelligentsia and 
a few elite institutions.
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The challenges of capability and self-formation, among the grandchildren of 
apartheid, are tremendous as a survey finding and a couple of ethnographic 
vignettes highlight:
In the Eastern Cape in 2012, a fourth of all children under the age of three were 
‘stunted,’2 an indicator of severe maternal and infant malnutrition and a strong 
predicator of enduring cognitive underdevelopment, albeit not necessarily 
irreversible (UNDP, 2014a: 44, referring to a study by John Sender). 
In the Western Cape “The overwhelming majority of black students in Cape Flats 
live without stable supporting family structures. Most are born to single mothers or 
who have fathers who live elsewhere and do not partake in family life … 
Children sent to school with the hope of securing a better future, find no place of 
learning and security, but rather a gang warzone where young ‘gangsters’ fight with 
screwdrivers, pangas, knives and guns” (Adam & Moodley, 2013: 57).
The result has been two decades of basic reproduction of the bi-modal apartheid 
school system, with low levels of numeracy and of reading ability concentrated in 
historically black or poor area schools and high capability concentrated in ex-white 
or affluent area schools (UNDP, 2014a: 43, based on work by Nicolas Spauli). 
There are at least two obvious problems with elite categorical equalisation. One 
refers to technical expertise and public service competence. As passengers or 
patients, few of us would like to be flown by pilots or to be operated on by surgeons 
selected by social quotas without proper qualifications. A wide range of public 
services and infrastructure may suffer from being managed incompetently, but in 
many fields a determination of proper technical qualifications is less clear-cut than 
in the two examples just mentioned. 
Municipal administrations appear particularly under-qualified and under-
performing in South Africa. For the fiscal year of 2013-2014, the auditor-general 
gave only 40 out of 278 municipalities a ‘clean audit’, 30 of these were concentrated 
only in two provinces among nine (Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal). Three 
provinces had not a single clean municipality (Free State, Limpopo and Northwest) 
and out of Eastern Cape’s 45 municipalities only two were clean. Among the 
country’s eight metropolitan municipalities only two received a clean audit (Cape 
Town and Ekurhuleni), i.e., neither the national capital (Tshwane/Pretoria) nor 
the nation’s business centre ( Johannesburg) (Auditor-General, 2014).
A second problem is created by setting quotas of wealth and economic power. It can 
have an ethnic or ‘racial’ rationale and it has been used extensively well before South 
2 Defined as being at least two standard deviations shorter than the WHO norm for 
their age.
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Africa’s policy of Black Economic Empowerment. In Malaysia, in order to boost 
the economic weight of (majoritarian) ethnic Malays, and other Native bumiputra 
who also, like the Indian ‘scheduled castes’, have reserved quotas to scholarships, 
universities and government jobs (Lee, 2014). This, however, means a deliberate, 
further reinforced division of the previously disadvantaged population into 
capitalists and workers, hardly a contribution to overall equality. In traditionalist 
hierarchical Malay society, still deferential to its sultans and aristocrats, this 
economic addition to hierarchy has not caused much political turmoil, so far. For 
an originally socialist liberation movement like the ANC, leading a black society 
socio-economically compressed under apartheid oppression, creating a black class 
of privilege is more risky. 
A blunt demand of categorical equalisation like Julius Malema’s in 2011 – “We 
must have everything that white people have” (Posel, 2013: 68) – highlights, as 
well as hides the underlying complexity. White society in apartheid South Africa 
was a very unequal capitalist society. Is that something ‘we must have’ too?
Quoting wealth tends to have another negative effect, reaching beyond egalitarian 
concerns. It elevates personal wealth into a legitimate prime social value, thus 
providing a strong incentive to political and administrative corruption. This is a 
means for politicians and public managers to achieve this criterion of achievement, 
in a new state apparatus under construction without any tradition of a public 
service ethos.
While in several ways expedient and effective, categorical equalisation can come to 
collide with universalist equality, even to entrench overall inequality. This happens 
for two reasons, along two channels. One is that categorical equalisation of elite 
status can co-vary with undiminished or even increased non-elite inequality. The 
second is that a political, public opinion focus on categorical elite equalisation and 
may keep overall inequality out of the view and concern. 
A telling illustration of the latter is the National Planning Commission objective, 
that in 2030 the country should have an economic inequality (Gini) coefficient 
of 0,6, meaning that in 2030 South Africa should continue to be the world’s most 
unequal country (perhaps together with Namibia). The poorest 40 per cent of the 
population were graciously to be conceded 10 per cent of the national income. 
(National Planning Commission, 2010: 24, 54). In Latin America, the globe’s 
economically most unequal region, such an objective would now mean a drastic 
increase of inequality, currently ranging between 0,4 and 0,55) and would have 
been met by massive protest demonstrations. Around 2010, not a single Latin 
America country forces the poorest 40 per cent of the population to live on 10 per 
cent of national income. In Bolivia in 2011 the poor got 15,6 of national household 
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income, an increase by 6,1 percentage points since 2002 (CEPAL/ECLAC, 2013: 
Table II A.1).
South Africa’s persistent inequalities
After more than 20 years of democracy and under an uninterrupted government 
by a party committed to categorical equalisation, South Africa is still the most 
economically unequal country in the world. According to the Gini coefficients 
of income inequality it varies slightly from one study to another (Tregenna & 
Tsela, 2012: 36 table 1), but has oscillated just under 0,70 for the whole period of 
1975-2010 (Leibbrandt et al., 2010: 13; Ngepah & Mhlaba, 2013: 76 fig.2.2.a). In 
other words, overall economic inequality has remained the same as during the last 
decades of apartheid, while between-race inequality among the rich has declined. 
By 1995, income inequality among South African black people had become similar 
to that among all the races of Brazil, one of the world´s most unequal countries 
(Gini 0,55; Bhorat & van der Westhuizen 2012: 9 table 3; CEPAL/ECLAC, 2013: 
table II. A.2) Between 2001 and 2011 the proportion of black people among the 
highest income group (roughly the top 0,1 per cent) increased from 19,5 per cent 
to 37,5 per cent, while the white people’s share declined from 73 to 49 per cent 
(Statistics South Africa, 2014: tables 2.3.9 and 2.4.5).However, the white-black gap 
of median earnings increased from R3,104 in 1993 to R3,810 in 2000 to R3,821 in 
2008 (Leibbrandt et al., 2010: 78 table A.3.2). 
Post-apartheid economic inequality has been driven by increasing gains at the 
top. Inequality among the lowest 80 per cent of the population actually declined 
somewhat from 1993 to 2010 (UNDP, 2014a: 56). In the early 2000s, the median 
South African manager was paid three times as much as the median Brazilian 
manager (UNDP, 2014a: 52). 
The resilience of the apartheid era’s economic inequality in South Africa may be 
compared to the dramatic equalisation of Bolivia, also turning (in 2006) from a 
settler oligarchy to a post-colonial democracy. Between 2005 (Evo Morales’ 
government of transformation began in December) and 2011, Bolivian economic 
inequality was reduced by 13 Gini points, from 0,60 to 0,47 (INE, 2015, Estadísticas 
sociales). This has been achieved mainly by public control of the main export sector 
(natural gas), contributing massively to fiscal revenues amounting to around half 
of GDP in 2012-2014 (Inter-America Development Bank, 2016). Furthermore 
by public enterprises, services and transfers, alongside a flourishing, actively 
promoted private sector and by general incomes policies, ensuring that for 2005-
2014/2015 workers’ wages increased significantly more than managerial salaries, 
in the private, as well as in the public sector (INE, 2015, Estadísticas económicas). 
An Amerindian entrepreneurial class has risen, but as supported entrepreneurs 
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from the below, and not by categorical quoting into shareholding and boardrooms. 
Under the new post-colonial government of Evo Morales, the Bolivian economy 
has grown by about five per cent a year, above five per cent again in 2016 and above 
four per cent in 2017.3 
From 1994 to 2008 the national income share of the poorest 20 per cent of South 
Africans declined from 2,0 to 1,6 per cent. The share of the richest increased from 
53,9 in 1994 to 55,2 per cent in 2001, then falling back to 53,1 (Simkins, 2011: 
108). Even more remarkable is that for 1991-1996 when average household 
income decreased in South Africa, the worst decline befell the poorest 40 per cent 
among black Africans – who lost a fifth of their income – while the second best-
doing group – after the ten per cent richest Asians – were the black top ten (Taylor, 
2000: 61). This strange effect of democratisation, of poor black people losing 
income, might be partly due to the chaotic dismantlement of the bantustans, which 
together had almost half a million employees (Picard, 2005: 315ff) and their small 
prebends.
Statistics South Africa does not publish any data on vital inequality, for instance on 
life expectancy by race (or class). Apartheid statistics did have vital statistics by race, 
but without bothering with black people. However, from medical and demographic 
reports a picture can be put together. On the threshold of apartheid, African infant 
mortality was estimated at ‘40-50%’ and in 1943 a study of metro Durban pinned 
it down to 483 per thousand (Hellman, 1949: 22). Half of all African children 
died before their first year birthday. Four out of a hundred white children did then 
(Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1960: B32).
The advent of democracy came to coincide with a life disaster. From 1994 until 
2005, South African life expectancy plummeted ten years, from 62 to 52 years 
(SAIRR, 2016b: 23). Only by 2013-2014 the country was back at the life 
expectancy of the end of apartheid. The reasons for this were HIV/AIDS and an 
enormous increase in vital inequality. In 1991 adult prevalence of HIV was 0 per 
cent among all racial groups. By 2005, when vital inequality culminated, the white 
HIV rate stood at 0,9 per cent and the African at 20, where it has stabilised since 
then. The incidence among the other racial categories has increased somewhat, 
to 5,9% among Coloured, 4,7% among Asian and 2,5% among white people. 
(SAIRR, 2016a: 612) Since 2010 the number of new HIV infections has stabilised 
at somewhat more than 320,000 a year (SAIRR, 2016b: 10). The differential rates 
of HIV/AIDS were part of the apartheid legacy, under new virological conditions, 
due to the accumulation process by migrant labour. It took, however, a fatally 
long time for the ANC government to grasp its significance and to start doing 
3 https://tradingeconomics.com/bolivia/gdp-growth-annual
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something about it. Black life expectancy in 1984-1986 has been estimated at 60 
years (Dorrington et al., 1999), 12 years shorter than white lives (Central Statistical 
Services, 1997: 3.15). By 2001 the racial life gap had widened to 18 years (Sanders 
& Chopra, 2006: 73), about the same as the life gap between white and Coloured 
people in 1969-1971, then 17 years (Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1978: 3.19)
Also from the UNDP’s Human Development Reports we can learn that South 
African vital inequality is very substantial. In 2013 the South African life expectancy 
index lost 25,7 per cent of its value when adjusted for inequality. That is higher than 
for the ‘medium development’ group of countries as a whole (21 per cent loss) 
and higher than Brazil (14,5 per cent loss), but below the average for sub-Saharan 
Africa, at 36,8 per cent (UNDP, 2014b: table 3). The rate of under-five child 
mortality – a major determinant of life expectancy in a developing country – in the 
Eastern Cape is about 2,5 times higher than in Western Cape (Shisana, 2013: 539). 
South African vital inequality is declining though, from 30,0 inequality loss in 2010 
(UNDP, 2010), likely due to clear improvement of the HIV/AIDS situation after 
the end of the (in this respect) disastrous Mbeki government. 
Envoi: racism and inequality
Racism should teach all egalitarians that (in)equality is a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon, having at least three fundamental dimensions: vital, existential 
and resource. Like the other kinds of inequality, racism has to be analysed and 
understood as both systemic/institutional and as private/interpersonal. The latter 
involve both capability and self-formation-development. Anti-racists should learn 
from general egalitarians that racism is part of a wider set of existential inequality, 
including gender, sex, ethnicity, handicap and others. Categorical equalisation, 
targeting promotion of previously oppressed, discriminated and disadvantaged 
people are an important fast-track remedy. This, however, can have many different 
effects, including even becoming a buttress of overall inequality. 
South Africa constitutes a social laboratory of world significance. It has achieved 
an almost unique re-foundation of its nation and state. It went from a conquistador 
settler nation and state ruling conquered natives to a (by now) ‘normal’ democratic 
nation/state, a feat in modern times approximated only by Bolivia, a poorer, but less 
sharply cloven country. Like all settler states, apartheid South Africa bequeathed to 
its successors an extremely unequal society in vital and resource aspects, enduring 
long after institutional existential equalisation. 
Democracy and universal civil rights are epochal achievements of the new South 
Africa. While there have been alleviations of poverty and vast extensions of public 
services, such as electricity and housing, the democratic South African record on 
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equality is dismal. Income inequality kept hovering around the apartheid standard 
of 1975 and was very much in contrast with Latin America of the first decade of 
the twenty-first century. That Latin American moment of equality is now ending in 
economic crisis and political acrimony, but not in Bolivia, South Africa’s closest kin. 
There are probably, as usual, many reasons for this outcome. A concluding, but only 
circumstantially supported, hypothesis of this paper is that the governmental focus 
on elite categorical equalisation, strongly supported by powerful social movements, 
has contributed significantly to this record. Categorical equalisation policies should 
be evaluated and deployed within a clear framework of universalist egalitarianism.
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3
‘RACE’ AND ITS ARTICULATION WITH 
‘THE HUMAN’
Zimitri Erasmus
The issue of race as the issue of the Colonial Question, the Non-white-Native 
Question, the Negro Question ... was and is fundamentally the issue of the genre of 
human, Man. —Sylvia Wynter (2003: 288) 
And lastly, most important, humanism is the only, and, I would go as far as saying, 
the final, resistance we have against the inhuman practices and injustices that 
disfigure human history.  —Edward Said (2003: xii-xiii)
In a passionate response to the paucity of Research Chairs in the Humanities 
offered by South Africa’s National Research Foundation in 2012, Premesh Lalu 
(2012) excavates the underlying conception of ‘the human’ from the list of allocated 
Chairs. He laments the absence in the proposed research of an enabling, agentic 
conception of ‘the human’. Instead, he finds a paternalistic notion of the human as 
‘lack’, in need of ‘benevolent outreach’ (Lalu 2012: 4) and of development. Lalu 
wants to unsettle this racialised and professionalised frame in which experts are 
positioned as redeemers of the lives of their ‘subjects’. His lament is in part shaped 
by two concerns among some scholars of anti-racism in the South African academy. 
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First, an implicit or explicit “habitual resort to inherited orthodoxies of notions of 
race and ethnicity” (Lalu, 2012, p. 5) in a politics of blame, guilt, redemption and/
or entitlement. And second, a struggle among many of the young people we teach 
to conceive of what it means to be human (Lalu, 2012, p. 5) without resorting to 
either colour-blindness or racialized attachments.
Alongside the paternalist humanism noted by Lalu, appeals to ‘our common 
humanity’ emerge from various political standpoints in South Africa. These are 
most often linked to arguments that grapple with persistent and growing racial 
inequalities and with the prevalence of violence in this country. In an edited volume 
published by STIAS on the subject of humanism in South Africa (De Gruchy (ed.), 
2011a), some scholars implicitly or explicitly evoke ‘origin stories’ as they rely on 
the archaeological, palaeontological, anthropological and/or biological sciences 
for their notions of ‘common humanity’ (De Gruchy, 2011a; Solms, 2011). Some 
contributors to that volume engage with a form of Christian humanism that 
emphasises life enhancing relationships (Ackerman, 2011; De Gruchy, 2011b). 
In a more recent publication Crain Soudien (2013) revisits what we know about 
‘race’ as he deals with the disjuncture between ‘formal knowledge’ about race and 
everyday practice in post-1994 South Africa. He focuses on knowledge from the 
biological sciences in his appeal to our common humanity. These works offer me 
friendship in thought as I explore questions that arise for me as a reader. 
Given our colonial history, is it enough to know that as humans we are genetically 
and biologically the same? Is it enough to assert that birth, death, suffering and 
uncertain futures are what humans share (De Gruchy, 2011b: 57) when most 
humans are more vulnerable in birth due to poverty, more likely to die and to suffer 
brutally, and face more uncertain futures than their more privileged counterparts? 
Is it enough that social difference, as inclusive, is central to post-1994 South Africa’s 
official knowing (Soudien, 2013)? And, do we have a common humanity outside 
of a bio-centric conception of the human? Scholars of anti-humanist orientation 
would say ‘no’ on all counts. The twentieth century humanists of the black radical 
tradition for whom a critical political consciousness is more paramount than a 
species-consciousness, would say the same. Frantz Omar Fanon, Steven Bantu Biko 
and Sylvia Wynter are among these humanists. 
In what follows I want first to contextualise both anti-humanist and critical 
humanist orientations within a brief history of what I refer to as Hu-Manism and 
its articulation with the idea of race. This history challenges appeals to common 
humanity premised on archaeology and biology, as much as calls to include all 
into a bourgeois and colonial conception of ‘the human’. It suggests that if our 
‘formal knowledge’ is premised primarily on these sciences, and if ‘inclusion’ means 
inclusion into a conception of ‘the human’ into which people with histories of 
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colonisation never comfortably fit, it follows that our formal knowledge cannot 
meet the demands of everyday anti-racist, decolonial and critical humanist 
practice. I shall then consider attempts to de-link race and ‘the human’ in selected 
works by Biko (2004) and Fanon (1986). I end this chapter with a view to further 
conversation about this contested terrain. To this end I draw on the work of Edward 
Said (2004) and Sylvia Wynter (2003, 1994, 1984).
HuManism’s shadow
Sylvia Wynter’s work is significant for a meta-history of the relationship between 
ideas of ‘race’ and ideas of what it means to be human. She notes that prior to 
colonial conquest all human societies mapped their conception of the human onto 
the physical cosmos making criteria for being human dependent on some version 
of the supernatural. Premised on the supernaturally grounded theocentric idea, 
that humans were ‘sinful by nature’, the medieval West distinguished between 
‘Chosen’ and ‘Fallen’ humans within the bounds of its cosmographic distinction 
between spiritually perfect heavens and the ‘fallen’ earth. In this symbolic order of 
Spirit/Flesh, ‘Spirit’ represented new life inaugurated by Christian baptism, as well 
as knowledge of things Divine; knowledge of the clergy. ‘Flesh’ represented ‘fallen’ life 
before rebirth through baptism – “a life that was now ‘death’” (Wynter 1984: 26) – and 
lay knowledge that was subjugated by the clergy (Wynter, 1984: 26). Furthermore, 
the medieval conception of God as Omnipotent meant that humans could not 
know their physical reality because it was ruled by God’s miracles (McGrane, 1989; 
Wynter, 2003: 277). 
However, fifteenth century voyages of the Portuguese, the beginning of travels of 
conquest and the Copernican revolution enabled an epochal conceptual shift in 
the Western imaginary from an Omnipotent God to a Caring God who created 
the universe for the sake of humankind. This caused a shift from irrational man 
to rational Man who could now know and control the universe (McGrane, 1989; 
Wynter, 2003: 278). For Wynter, the medieval Christian idea of Spirit/Flesh – 
was reinvented in history’s forward and backward movements as either Noble/
not-Noble; European/non-European; rational/irrational; civilised/primitive; or 
selected/dysselected in the Culture/Nature binary of the nineteenth century. This 
implicated Christianity in making the idea of ‘Man’. 
‘Man’ is for Wynter an artefact of colonial ways of knowing. For her, voyages of 
colonial conquest inaugurated ‘Man’, ‘the Hu-Man’, and ‘HuManism’ as racialised 
and gendered ideas and practices premised on a European and male conception 
of what it means to be human. This particular Euro-phallo-logo-centric idea was 
universalised by the West creating a measure for ‘the human in general’ according 
to which ‘Man’ would decide who could and could not be admitted into the fold 
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and to which all humans would supposedly aspire. People who are considered to 
be less-than-Hu-Man in the Western imagination were relegated to ‘the difference 
outside’ (Mignolo, 2015) of Europe, outside of the Hu-Man, outside of Europe’s 
time, outside of its history, its law, its language, outside of its capacity to reason and 
of its capacity to know the world. Despite these outsides, the less-than-Hu-Man 
were however placed inside colonial governance (Hesse 2007: 656) for the benefit 
of metropoles. 
Wynter argues that the West’s nineteenth century idea of race enabled it to re-
describe its earlier ideas of the human – ‘Man’ with knowledge of the Divine; ‘Man’ 
with Natural Reason (Wynter, 1984: 29, 33) – as ‘Man’ the natural being who 
belongs to a natural community in the form of a nation, a race and a culture (Wynter, 
1984: 43). Thus, “Man’s being … [was made into] an empirical thing ... a natural 
thing” (Ferreira da Silva, 2015: 91, 94), subjectivities were racialised by making race 
part of Nature and thus inscribed on and in the human body, and culture was made 
to work as if it were Nature. This re-description established and sustained Man as 
the conception of the human through its disavowal of other coexisting forms of 
understanding the human (Ferreira da Silva, 2015: 91). It inaugurated a shift in the 
Western imaginary from mapping ideas of the human onto the physical cosmos, to 
mapping such onto the physical bodies of all non-European and then making the 
latter the physical referent of Europe’s HuMan Other (Wynter, 2003: 265). 
With this shift, ‘race’/culture came to occupy the place of the human divine (Said, 
2004: 39) or extra-human ground for the answer to the questions Who and what are 
we? What does it mean to be human? In this place, the idea of race came to do the work 
of naturalising colonial relations between Europeans and non-Europeans (Quijano, 
2013). Thus European colonists’ and scientists’ hierarchical differentiation of 
the human; their hierarchical differentiation between the human and the non-
human; European Enlightenment scientists’ biological or scientised conception of 
‘race’; and colonial conceptions of culture, constitute a constellation of forces that 
forms Man as a ‘genre of the human’ (Wynter’s phrase) applicable to humans-in-
general. Sylvia Wynter demystifies Man as the symbol for all humans (Kamugisha, 
2006: 140). Thus we learn that through these processes Western conceptions of 
human difference are immured by inequality because of the ways ‘race’ as a set of 
articulated political relations banishes colonised and formerly colonised people 
from the domain of the Hu-Man. We learn that Europe’s scientisation of ‘race’ and 
its related biocentric and bourgeois conception of the human sustains ‘the HuMan’ 
as an extra-humanly determined objective truth rather than “a particular collective 
self-representation” (Ferreira da Silva, 2015: 95) created for the benefit of some and 
the detriment of other humans. 
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This history of the articulation of race with ‘the human’ plays itself out in various 
ways in the history of South Africa as ‘a difference outside’ Europe. André du 
Toit alerts us to the evangelical humanism of Dr John Philip, a British colonist in 
the nineteenth-century and founder of what is today known as the Cape liberal 
tradition (2011: 118). Strongly influenced by the Scottish Enlightenment, Philip’s 
humanism was in line with Europe’s civilising mission and its sciences’ artefact, 
‘Man’. For him, ‘Man’ was the measure of ‘the human’ to which Khoi, San and 
Xhosa residents should aspire in order to be incorporated into colonial notions 
of a ‘common humanity’ and into a colonial civil order in which Africans would 
be eligible for civil rights. Philip held that as God’s creatures, all human beings 
were endowed with ‘equal natural capacities’ (Du Toit, 2011: 121, my emphasis) 
irrespective of race. 
He spoke against the violence of military conquest, but supported peaceful 
conversion of ‘the natives’ to the ways of Europe. Notwithstanding his discredit in 
the eyes of most colonists as “the foremost ‘friend of the natives’ and critic of all 
things colonial” (Du Toit, 2011: 120), Philip’s praxis is a quintessential example 
from colonial South Africa of Christianity’s implication in making ‘Man’ the 
racialised imperial subject and in arguing for conditional inclusion of Africans 
into this conception of ‘Man’. In contrast to Philip’s incorporationist imperialism, 
Dubow (2008) and Du Toit (2011) alert us to Jan Smuts’ classical humanism and 
its ideological function in twentieth century South Africa. Smuts, the mastermind 
behind segregation and indirect rule, was a ‘separatist imperialist’ bent on 
preserving European civilisation by maintaining separate institutions for Africans 
who in his view were barbaric and for the most part incapable of being civilised, 
in other words, incapable of becoming European. We learn from Saul Dubow that 
Smuts’ ‘holism’, premised on evolutionist thought – the origin story of nineteenth 
century ‘Man’ as a natural being who belongs to a natural community – combined 
an appreciation for the idea of ‘Natural Man’ living in harmony with nature with 
the idea that human life was not devoid of a greater, extra-human force, or ‘Spirit’ 
(Dubow, 2008: 55–57). The then embryonic disciplines of palaeontology and 
anthropology provided enduring sources for his ideas about the history of ‘kinds’ 
of humans and their racial and cultural differences (Dubow, 2008: 59), in other 
words, their ‘natural communities’. Moreover, Smuts was at the centre of the South 
Africanisation of science, a project that supported and gave meaning to the ideology 
of South Africanism at the centre of the colonial nationalism of twentieth century 
white South Africa (Dubow, 2007). 
These colonial ideas were not anathema to classical HuManism. In his brief 
exploration of the two forms of imperial HuManism represented respectively by 
Philip and Smuts, du Toit attributes the ‘dark sides’ of this HuManism to a lack of 
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self-reflexivity and to the ‘inextricable fusion of Christianity and civilisation’ (2011: 
119). Dubow (2007, 1995) reveals the ways in which knowledge production, 
through the South Africanisation of science, was complicit with these ‘dark sides’ of 
imperial HuManism. For these competing forms of humanism inside the imperial 
tradition, the European Rennaissance idea of ‘Man’ was the foundation of their 
conceptual universe, of their differently racist ideologies and forms of governance 
and for racist practice as we know it today. Philip and Smuts equally disavowed 
understandings of ‘the human’ among the colonised.
Delinking ‘race’ from ‘the human’
Against these paternalistic and imperial HuManisms and their related racist 
practices, it is important to remember the ways in which late twentieth century 
Black Consciousness thought in South Africa engendered an enabling, agentic 
conception of ‘the human’ amongst oppressed people at the height of apartheid. 
Biko held to what was difficult at the height of apartheid: living outside of 
conventional ‘race’ postures of that time. Against black people’s enforced complicity 
with racist discourses of subservience, unworthiness and inferiority, Black 
Consciousness advocated, in the midst of crippling oppression, an emancipatory 
and defiant posture (Biko, 2004: 101) for black people as active social agents who 
were able to govern their own lives and to make history. This is the challenge Biko’s 
thought poses for us today: to live outside of conventional ‘race’ postures of this 
time. I wish to suggest that the value of Biko’s thought for South Africa today lies 
more in its critical humanist traces than in its valorisation of blackness as an act 
of personal recovery and political defiance. These traces live in his assertion that 
“[a]t the heart of true integration is the provision for each man (sic)” (2004: 22). 
I interpret ‘provision’ broadly here to refer to the conditions – objective, inter-
subjective and political – for enabling and enhancing life. 
These traces live in Biko’s assertion that “Black Consciousness makes the black man 
(sic) see himself as a being complete in himself ” (2004: 102); “not as an extension 
of a broom or an additional leverage to a machine” (2004: 74); “that beyond 
material well-being, the fact of being human should be the centre of our social 
and political concern” (2004: 51); and that through these material and ‘spiritual’ 
projects we will, in time, be in a position to give ‘the world’ and “South Africa the 
greatest gift possible – a more human face” (2004: 108). In other words, for Biko 
the black person is not a thing behind tools of production. Nor is he or she ‘lacking’. 
The black person thinks and feels. The black person has needs and desires. The 
black person makes meaning and has imagination.
Granted, all is not critical in Biko’s humanism. He addresses black men and 
white people of liberal persuasion, but he excludes black women. Thus he leaves 
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untouched the humiliations and injustices of gendered hierarchies (Gqola, 
2001). Furthermore, while Biko cannot be relegated wholly to an essentialist 
standpoint, there are moments when he locates his humanism in a romanticised 
construction of African culture as “pure” (Biko, 2004: 45), “close to nature” 
(2004: 51), characterised by beliefs in “the inherent goodness of man” (2004: 
46) and in “community oriented action rather than individualism” (2004: 46). 
Notwithstanding the contradictions in some of his writing, the value of Biko’s 
humanism for us today is enhanced when we invite his thought into challenging 
conversation with critical humanist thinkers like Fanon. 
In the oppressive and divisive context of ‘deep’ apartheid, it is not surprising that 
blackness became Biko’s predominant focus. For him, racial separation for the 
purposes of domination (apartheid) was dehumanising. Racial separation as a road 
to liberation, however, was essential for him “at [that] stage of our history” (2004: 
18). His argument for such separatism was not premised on a view of segregation 
as “the natural order” (2004: 18, 21). Instead, separatism was for him a necessary 
measure at the time to enable black people to deliberate over our understandings of 
what it means to be human, should we wish to do so, and over our inner and where 
possible our outer lives, unencumbered by a disabling and disempowering notion 
of the HuMan as the epitome of whiteness. 
While Biko sometimes tends toward a ‘natural’ notion of culture, he very clearly 
understands ‘race’ and its attendant inequalities and privileges to be historically 
situated and human-made. For him a society divided by ‘race’ is a “deliberate 
creation of man” (2004: 96), rather than part of the “natural order” (2004: 18, 
21) of things. Nevertheless, Biko only partially succeeds in delinking race from 
‘the human’. On the one hand he advocates the abolition of whiteness: “whiteness 
… warrants being … destroyed and replaced by an aspiration with more human 
content” (2004: 8, my emphasis). On the other, to recover the personhood and 
agency of that “shadow of a man” (2004: 31) produced by white racism, Biko 
advocates embracing and valorising blackness as a path for becoming human. Black 
Consciousness thus sought to demolish “the house that race built” (Lubiano, 1998) 
while excavating only half its foundation. Biko’s route to humanity for black people 
passes through racial membership; his route for white people lies in its destruction. 
His path to freedom lies primarily in a politics of ‘race’: “colour…[being] the 
greatest single determinant for political action” (2004: 54). On this view black 
nationalism in the form of Black Power, is freedom.
On the contrary, Fanon warns against the absolutist tendencies of nationalisms, 
particularly of racialised nationalisms (Fanon, 1990: 119, 131). He writes against 
négritude or a romanticised rehabilitation of blackness when he refuses to “dedicate 
[him]self to a revival of an unjustly unrecognised Negro civilisation” or to devote 
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his life “to drawing up the balance sheet of Negro values” (1986: 226, 229). While, 
like Biko, Fanon ignores gender, he goes further with delinking ‘race’ from ‘the 
human’ in his attempt to destroy the psycho-existential effects of “the juxtaposition 
of the white and black races” (1986: 14). Fanon addresses both poles of the racial 
binary in his attempt to excavate the entire foundation of ‘race’. He sees a politics of 
‘race’ as “an oxymoron” (Sekyi-Otu, 1996: 87). What does this mean in the context 
of the subject of this paper? Racialised representations of ‘the human’ as ‘Man’ 
disavow meanings of ‘the human’ among those racialised as ‘not-Man’/ ‘less-than-
Man’. This negation of thought, desire, speech and agency among the (formerly) 
colonised, each of which is fundamental to political relationship, forecloses such 
relationship between racially dominant and racially subjugated people. Hence, as 
Gilroy puts it, “politics ends where ‘race’ lives” (2000: 41). 
‘Race’, for Fanon, is the grave in which empire buried – alive – the very notion of 
humanity. Fanon will not allow empire completely to erase possibilities for dis-
interring alternative ideas of being human (Sekyi-Otu, 1996, p. 25). Thus, for 
him the path to becoming human lies not in the denial or embrace of ‘race’, but in 
recovering ‘the human’ from its grasp. Hence he writes: “I have one right alone: 
that of demanding human behaviour from the other … I have no wish to be the 
victim of the Fraud of a black world” (Fanon, 1986: 227–229). Racial membership, 
for Fanon, offers only a fragile solidarity; one too narrow to accommodate the 
complexities and multiplicities of human existence and injustice and too close to 
the very principles of colonial domination. Seeking value in this narrow identity is 
for him the “great black mirage” (1970: 37). Biko advocates celebrating blackness 
and making it the centre of politics. Fanon is disturbed by the existence of black as 
a category “to which one inevitably belong[s], whether one desire[s] to or not. A 
category that identifie[s] from a distance, without inquiry, without exchange of a 
single word” (Ehlen, 2000: 87; Fanon, 1986: 117, 126). For him, to assume that 
racial membership brings peace of mind is to tolerate its misfittings and distortions 
in exchange for false belonging (Ehlen, 2000: 87). Ehlen suggests “perhaps, for 
Fanon, it was exactly this false acceptance that would be the most unbearable” 
(2000: 87). 
No common humanity, only ‘genres of the human’
Drawing on Fanon, Sylvia Wynter argues the bourgeois subject, Man, is but one 
genre of the human, suggesting we do not have a common conception of ‘the 
human’. For her, among the tasks of radical Black thought is to refuse the insertion 
of Black life into this bourgeois genre of the human and to excavate and (re)invent 
hidden genres of the human as a construct, rather than a fact of existence (see Biko, 
2004: 51), measurable in one way or another. In other words, a central task of radical 
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Black thought was and is to recuperate and recreate ways ‘the human’ is imagined 
and lived by those set outside of Man as a genre of the human (Weheliye, 2014: 8). 
Put differently, it is to decolonise what it means to be human and so to “produc[e] 
new formations of humanity” (Weheliye, 2014: 12) from the other sides of power. 
This is what Fanon means when he writes of rescuing ‘the human’ from the grip 
of ‘race’ (Sekyi-Otu, 1996) in an effort to begin crafting a new humanism and to 
imagine humanity otherwise.
Wynter’s suggestion that we do not have a common conception of ‘the human’ rests 
on the production of ‘pieza man’ as the constitutive outside in relation to hegemonic 
Vitruvian Man. ‘Pieza man’ was African, enslaved, about 25 years old, healthy and 
“calculated to give a certain amount of physical labour value against which all the 
[other slaves] could be measured – with for example, three teenagers equalling one 
pieza and older men and women thrown in a job lot as refuse” (Wynter cited in 
Mignolo, 2015: 114). She argues that we continue to work within the parameters 
of a hegemonic conception of ‘the human’ – Man and its constitutive Other, ‘piece 
of a body’/ ‘flesh’ – and that we need to construct conceptions of the human post-
Man; after-Man; against-Man; conceptions other than that of the liberal humanist 
subject, Man. If we conceive of modernity/coloniality and of Hu-Man/Black non-
person as relationally constituted through political and economic violence, we can 
explore the ways forces of subjugation and exploitation both press upon and press 
out forms of the human among ‘pieces of black bodies’/ ‘flesh’/ ‘life that is death’. 
This means conceptualising new forms of the human from places of catastrophic 
suffering/injury and of hope in spite of catastrophe, rather than from places of 
white dominance (Maldonado-Torres, 2008: xiii; Weheliye, 2014: 14). If we are to 
disrupt the monopoly liberal humanism holds on the idea of ‘the human’, we must 
reinstate the central place of this idea in the history of Black thought (Weheliye, 
2014: 21). This implies neither the inclusion of Black life into liberal humanism, 
nor the abolition of humanism, but rather reinventing ‘the human’ from the liminal 
spaces of the oppressed (2014: 25).
In this vein of reinvention, Alexander Weheliye creates “habeas viscus as an 
assemblage of the human … borne of political violence” (2014: 11). He questions 
and reformulates Agamben’s (1998: 119–153) conception of bare life and its 
relation to Foucault’s notion of biopower. For Agamben, bare life is the realm in 
which all humans are reduced to mere biological life thus erasing all socio-political 
markers of difference. In contrast, Weheliye is concerned with “why certain 
subjects are structurally more susceptible to personifying [bare life]” (2014: 35) 
and with the fact that “most instantiations of bare life do not necessarily entail 
physical mortality [as in Nazi concentration camps] per se, but other forms of 
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political death” (2014: 35), for example, slavery, other forms of racialised political 
and economic violence. He writes: 
The conjoining of flesh and habeas corpus in the compound habeas viscus 
brings into view an articulated assemblage of the human (viscus/flesh) borne 
of political violence, while at the same time not losing sight of the different 
ways the law pugnaciously adjudicates who is deserving of personhood 
and who is not (habeas) … The flesh, rather than displacing bare life or 
civil death, excavates the social (after) life of these categories: it represents 
racialising assemblages of subjection that can never annihilate the lines of 
flight, freedom dreams, practices of liberation and possibilities of other 
worlds (2014: 11, 12).
What is the value of this reinvention? First, it turns our attention away from ‘race’ 
as a ‘human divine’ and toward lived experiences of black people. In this regard, 
readers will remember that in line with liberal humanism, a Eurocentric, scientised 
conception of ‘race’ locates what it means to be human in the realm of the extra-
societal, the extra-human. In contrast, contemporary radical Black thought locates 
blackness as racialised assemblages of subjection in their colonial histories and 
thereby places conceptions of the human both in the realm of lived experiences 
and in the realm open to human intervention. This move enables a shift toward 
a critical humanism for which living as a black person produces understanding/
knowing for the purposes of living/surviving in the modern world. Thus, black 
life is not reduced to a socio-demographic location. Furthermore, black suffering, 
rather than reduced to data, is humanised through recognition of the ways forces 
of subjugation press upon and press out practices of freedom in the forms of hope, 
dreams, survival and endurance among oppressed people. Conceptualising ‘new’ 
or ‘other’ forms of the human from the places of black suffering, as opposed to a 
place of white dominance, allows one to think through rather than transcend ‘race’.
In her historical novel, Unconfessed, Yvette Christiansë (2006) reinvents a genre of 
‘the human’ from the repeatedly broken, stolen life of the central character, a slave 
woman at the Cape in the nineteenth century. Sila van den Kaap is transferred to 
the prison on Robben Island after serving some years in a Cape gaol for infanticide. 
Readers learn about her ‘life that is death’ and her understanding of what it means 
to be human as she talks to the spirit of her son, Baro. Through this narrative Sila’s 
humanity, as well as its disavowal is revealed to the reader. She speaks to Baro as a 
mother would to a son. She believes Baro “[did] not need the boat in which flesh 
[came] to this place [the Cape]” (Christiansë, 2006: 46). Sila took his ‘life that was 
death’ because she could not bear the way the slave owner, Van der Wat, “picked 
Baro up by the arm and swung him away like a piece of rubbish”, all because he, too, 
yearned to be lifted up onto a horse (2006: 38). She describes her life as “[a] life 
[that] keeps me from life itself ” (2006: 115). She dreams of freedom. She thinks. 
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She feels. She tells her son and she tells the court “I was heartsore” (2006: 130, 247, 
278, 279). Christiansë powerfully counterposes Sila’s ‘knowing’ against the ‘not 
knowing’ of the prison superintendents; her world of violence and of a life of many 
deaths against the buttoned, neck-tied and waist-coasted world of colonial officials 
and slave owners. This novel animates the psycho-social (after) life of slavery at the 
Cape.
The (after)life, thought, torture and death of Biko animates Weheliye’s conception of 
habeas viscus. In the context of apartheid’s law and political violence Biko’s tortured, 
“naked, manacled, and lonely” (Ndebele, 2000), body becomes ‘flesh’/ ‘life that 
is death’. The social after-life of his enfleshment and death reveals the incapacity 
of such violence to annihilate dreams and practices of liberation and possibilities 
of more human worlds. Biko refused ‘Black’ as a category imposed by the human 
divine, advocating instead for an understanding of Blackness as lived political 
experience from which a human face for South Africa could be imagined and 
fashioned. Black Consciousness thought offers ways of knowing and Being that 
are pressed from practices of freedom during apartheid South Africa. Sila van den 
Kaap’s knowing is pressed from her life that “keeps her from life itself ” (Mignolo, 
2015: 116). She is a woman able to read the world despite being illiterate. She 
interprets her world and criticises it. Thus, Being through the eyes of the imperial 
‘Other’, might be considered a way of knowing. 
A living, if imperfect, critical humanism
Given Western HuManism’s tainted history, crafted by the long reach of its brutal 
and racialised Christian, ‘civilising’ and science arms, concerns about its value 
for the world today are undoubtedly legitimate. In light of these concerns, how 
might one build on the traces of critical humanism in Biko’s work, on Christiansë’s 
creative reinvention of ‘the human’ from the places of Sila’s suffering, and on 
Fanon’s new humanism? How might one use these advances to think through 
possibilities towards a living and critical humanism that accounts for the real effects 
of racialisation on human life? If we accept that history is made by all men and 
women, not only by those in Europe and North America, is it not incumbent on 
formerly colonised people to refuse, as Fanon did, empire’s desire to monopolise 
meanings of humanism? Given that histories produced by colonial modernity are 
interdependent, can one relegate humanism to an exclusive preserve of ‘the West’? 
For example, Said (2004) and Moosa (2011) remind us that practices at the heart 
of humanist knowledge – reading, interpretation and critique – were central to 
the much older Arabic-Islamic intellectual tradition also known as humanism. 
Already by the twelfth century, long before Western Christian HuManism, these 
practices were not only established in Arabic universities of North Africa, Persia 
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and Southern Europe, but shaped politics in the twentieth-century (Said, 2004: 54, 
58). 
Edward Said (2004) and Sylvia Wynter (2003) each offer convincing arguments 
for re-inventing humanism as living, critical praxis. Said is concerned with 
humanism “not as a possession … of desirable attributes … [but] as a usable 
praxis” (2004: 6). Both scholars locate the value of human life within the realm of 
human intervention, rather than that of the human-divine: origins, science, biology, 
nature and the market. In short, they locate the value of human life in the realm of 
knowledge and cultural practice. Neither Said nor Wynter offers an ideal humanism 
waiting to be discovered or with promises of redemption. On this matter it is best 
to quote Said at length.
One can acquire philosophy and knowledge … but the basically unsatisfactory 
fallibility (rather than its constant improvement) of the human mind persists 
nonetheless. So there is always something radically incomplete, insufficient, 
provisional, disputable and arguable about humanistic knowledge … that 
… gives the whole idea of humanism a tragic flaw that is constitutive to it 
and cannot be removed … [and] can never be superseded. Another way of 
putting this is to say that the subjective element in humanistic knowledge and 
practice has to be recognised and in some way reckoned with since there is 
no use in trying to make a neutral, mathematical science out of it (2004: 12).
In a word, whatever is within the realm of human intervention is always already 
imperfect, incomplete and open to critique.
Both Said and Wynter argue for a humanism that emerges from subjugated 
experiences and knowledges. In the light of recent conversations in South Africa 
about decolonising the university, its curricula and its pedagogies, intellectuals 
would do well to heed Sylvia Wynter’s (1994) now older-than-two-decades 
argument. Her point that the articulation of race with ‘the human’ lies at the 
foundation of our current order of knowledge, returns me to where I started this 
piece: Premesh Lalu’s (2012) appeal to the Human and Social Sciences in the 
South African academy to unsettle racialised conceptions of ‘the human’. Wynter 
writes:
… if the ostensibly divinely ordained caste organising principle of Europe’s 
feudal-Christian order was fundamentally secured by the Absolutism of its 
Scholastic order of knowledge, … the ostensibly evolutionarily determined 
genetic organising principle of our Liberal Humanist own [order], as 
expressed in the empirical hierarchies of race and class [and] … gender …, 
is as fundamentally secured by our present disciplines of the Humanities and 
Social Sciences (1994 : 53).
In similar vein, Edward Said, fully cognisant of the ways societies are structured in 
dominance, argues for a secular humanism as critique of Eurocentric epistemologies 
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and of conditions of existence in- and out-side the university (Said, 2004: 22). 
For him, the relevance of humanism today lies in its “technique[s] of trouble” 
(2004: 77): unsettling the ways things have been and are done; questioning the 
‘truths’ presented to us as self-evident (2004: 28). On her part, Sylvia Wynter 
lays the responsibility firmly on our doorstep when she argues, if lay HuManists 
of fourteenth and fifteenth century Europe could undo prescriptive theological 
categories of that time, intellectuals in- and out-side today’s academy ‘hold the key’ 
to undoing prescriptive race/class/gender categories of this time (Wynter, 1994: 
52). In a word, “knowledge must be rewritten” (Beer cited in Wynter, 1994: 69). 
Moreover, you and I need to rewrite knowledge.
Such writing ought to be conscious of one of the limits of Western HuManism’s 
critique of European theodicy of the late Middle Ages, namely, that it replaced 
one structural opposition of Sameness/Difference with an articulation of two 
other sets of oppositions. Spirit/Flesh was replaced with Reason/Lack of Reason 
and Culture/Nature. These oppositions produce cultural forms of group and 
self-representation and forms of consciousness through which we learn to know 
ourselves and the world (Wynter, 1984: 24–28). A living critical humanism would 
need to make HuManism’s symbolic oppositions the object of its critique (1984: 
44). This, for Wynter, is where meanings of ‘the human’ are made: in Representation, 
not by divine Creation nor by Evolutionary selection (1984: 50). For, given that 
“meaning pre-existed … speech” (1984: 24), human consciousness and reflective 
thought is prior to the idea of natural laws of evolution. Thus, there is something 
in Said’s assertion that humanism as critique might be all we have as we struggle to 
build a more just future. 
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4
TEMPLATES OF ORDERING AND 
MAINTAINING THE SOCIAL
Racial identities and consequences
Gerhard Maré
Template or templet noun: 1a a pattern, mould, or stencil used as a guide to the 
shape of something that is being made or drawn. b a thing that serves as a model for 
other things.1 
Our lives are henged round with systems of classification, limned by standard 
formats, prescriptions and objects … yet few see them [the classification systems 
and standards] as artefacts embodying moral and aesthetic choices that in turn craft 
people’s identities, aspirations and dignity. (Bowker & Star, 1999:1)
Introduction
Ideological contestation at times introduces new urgency around older issues, 
opening new thought and possibilities, focusing on necessary essential social 
change and even what may be called transformations and revolutions. However, 
it can also, simultaneously, be founded on the same underlying understanding of 
1 Robert Allen (consulting editor). 2004. The Penguin Dictionary. London: Penguin. In 
Afrikaans patroonplaat, profielvorm, sjabloon.
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society. This can serve to maintain aspects of common sense, rather than challenge 
it and ensure continuity rather than rupture it. It can serve as minority power 
relations, rather than serve majority segments of society, marginalised through the 
lack of social power: transition rather than transformation.
Such very public contestation swept both South Africa and the USA recently. 
Dissatisfaction with experience of self-worth amongst younger people, absence 
of respect from those other than yourself, unequal chances from birth of realising 
human capabilities and extensive material and related inequalities that characterise 
life within these societies, came to the boil for many of that cohort. Unsurprisingly 
it occurred mainly at universities. Dissatisfaction, hurt and anger, expressed through 
such as #FeesMustFall and #BlackLivesMatter, respectively, dominated social and 
other media coverage. Unfortunately, these exchanges live on in the present. The 
experiential and explanatory summary voiced is loud and clear: racism. In the 
USA racialised and racist police brutality and murder, and apparent wide social 
acceptance of such actions formed, and still forms, the basis of social protests in 
several cities. Trump’s campaign and presidency has provided fertile ground. 
In South Africa too, despite a very different social and political context, anger at 
experiences of racism and subsequent mobilisation at universities (dominating 
other on-going and wider social protests at failed basic service delivery), racism has 
been at the centre of understanding and attempts at solving the problems that have 
been named in the events. 
In this turmoil of questioning racialism – the socially constructed belief in the 
biological existence of races with essential characteristics – on the few occasions 
when it is raised, is perceived as racist itself. A long-term commitment in South 
Africa to exploring non-racialism has been emptied of the little power it ever 
had, other than rhetorical repetition. Instead race essentialisms – ‘blackness’ and 
‘whiteness’ – serve for many to claim or allocate membership and attributes and 
inform political discourse and action. Within this simplified binary room has 
been created for sub-divisions and extreme variants (such as ‘colouredness’ and 
‘indianness’ and various ethnic and national categories). Karen Fields and Barbara 
Fields link racialism and racism. Therefore the only escape route, in their discussion 
of ‘racecraft’, in the context of the USA needs be: 
[T]he first principle of racism is belief in race, even if the believer does not 
deduce from that belief that the member of a race should be enslaved or 
disfranchised or shot on sight by trigger-happy police officers …. Once 
everyone understands that African descent is not race and that African 
ancestry differs from others only in the racism with which Euro-America has 
stigmatised it, the problem changes: what is needed is not a more varied set 
of words and categories to represent racism but a politics to uproot it (2012: 
109, italics added).
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This is where my concerns are located. Why does racialism continue, effectively 
as the indispensable base for racism in South Africa, when colonial, segregationist 
and apartheid capitalism had previously ensured, even demanded, its repressive 
continuation. Why has such a history not contaminated racialism against any 
future use? To put it another way, why formally classify and informally live, without 
question, the very basis of apartheid, the everyday acceptance of race itself? 
Why are the consequences not delinked from the abhorrence of race thinking – 
‘racecraft’? And then, what is the link of racialism and racism with other largely 
accepted continuities – capitalism, traditionalism, sexism, nationalism and the 
general acceptance of essentialised differences? If race is the problem, from which 
everything else flows, then the obliteration of other races or race domination, are 
the (only) answers. This ‘solution’ has been offered during the turmoil in social 
media, as organisational goals and emblazoned on t-shirts, emanating from all races. 
In exploring these concerns the terms ‘template’ and ‘ideology’ will be employed. 
Template was used as an explanatory concept by South African political activist 
and influential public intellectual, Neville Alexander, in his discussion of the 
continuation of racialism and, hence, racism and conflict (Alexander, 2007). 
The dictionary definition above provides a way of discussing Alexander’s use of the 
term. It also stimulates further thinking on how his approach may be employed as 
a heuristic device in social analysis and towards identifying solutions. Building on 
previous work (Maré, 2014) I reflect on the maintenance, adaptation and creation 
of racial and other forms of essentialised social identities. These processes are 
given effect through templates: variously legal strictures, accompanying policies 
and practices of classification, and ideological interpellations through the range of 
socialising engagements that individuals experience during their lives. These social 
processes of template creation have actual and potentially stultifying and tragic 
consequences. 
I accept, firstly, the primacy Alexander gives to state-created and operated templates 
in exploration of racialism and racism. Anthony Marx had also drawn attention, in 
comparative perspective, to the implication of such templates: 
State actions were highly consequential in shaping the template of modern 
race relations. Where and when states enacted formal rules of domination 
according to racial distinctions, racism was reinforced. … Where racial 
domination was not encoded by the state, issues and conflicts over race were 
diluted. (1998: 267; also see Maré, 2014: 61)
Secondly, my position, as it was for Alexander, is that the central concern of the 
state is the maintenance of capitalist relations of production. This happens through 
the Constitution with its clause on private property and the web of subsequent 
legislation, practices and institutions – most of them systemic continuations 
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of the past. The white noise of confirmation and assurance of living in the 
space of capitalist production and consumerism in a multitude of obvious and 
commonsensical institutional forms or ideological templates is, in effect, everyone’s 
everyday life. The articulation of class ideology with other interpellations shapes 
such confirmation, or, at the very least, does not contradict them. The local form of 
capitalist inequality was given its historically racialised rules and practices especially 
from the nineteenth century. This form has been the template of transformation 
since 1994, ‘deracialising capitalism’ remains the expressed goal. My primary focus 
here, however, is on the templates of racialism in South Africa.
Thirdly, the effects of these templates can be examined through auto-biographical 
moments. It can either (or both) be illustrated by the common sense of race as bio-
cultural – which could be labelled the ‘born with’ position on essentialised social 
identity – in other words, a destiny; or/and the immediate or subsequent processes 
and consequences of realising the possibility and necessity of change – accepting 
a ‘born into’ approach, thus allowing the possibility of agency (Maré, 2014). Such 
reflections on the ‘born into’ realisation are also to be found in Nat Nakasa (1964), 
Mark Gevisser (2014) and Stephen Clingman (in both his biography of Bram 
Fischer [1998] and autobiography [2015]). Escape, or even reflection, requires 
critical thinking, stimulated often by sometimes unpredictable occurrences or 
moments, either personal or social, is what becomes clear. 
Templates of identity and behaviour were state-imposed in pre-1994 South Africa 
through policy, legislation and effectively ensured through policing boundaries and 
punishing miscreants. This happened within the ether of racial and racist content 
that existed within legislated bounded spaces (physical, class and cultural). The 
content of racial templates centrally ensured integration into an unevenly shared 
world of capitalist production, which determined the overall structure. It had to 
be, and was, lived out often in small unrecognisable detail, as one would expect is 
common sense in everyday life: how to answer; what to expect; who to see around 
you; what and how to appreciate; where to walk; how to talk, dress, sing and play; 
what to avoid. Race was accepted, even if the consequences for the majority were 
rejected and vigorously resisted. And yet agency shaped life, as well within this 
regulated society, the spectacular and brave, the adaptive and also collaborative 
(Nakasa, 1964; Dlamini, 2009, 2014). For some, such as in the Unity Movement, 
there was even the clear rejection of race thinking itself, unusual in South Africa 
with its near total multi-racial approach. The formal and the less formal templates 
of difference are neither synchronous nor necessarily mutually reinforcing. We 
live complex lives in our individuality. Here may lie some of the possibilities and 
recognition of the need and actual, disruption of the racialised world. 
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There is not only the world into which one is born, the ‘prior vocabulary’, that 
exists for the ways we interpret social life. There is also the incorporation of 
individuals into an ideological framework, being subjected to and qualified through 
deliberate calls made upon them. How do we approach the “ideological formation 
of human subjects” (Therborn, 1982: vii) in its complexity – in mobilisation and 
contestation? This question is set by Göran Therborn himself in his 1980s essay 
on ideology and power. On subject formation he notes the “dialectical character 
of ideology”, expressed in the opposite ways in which ‘subject’ is relevant: “(‘the 
subjects of history’; ‘the subjects of the prince’). Ideologies not only subject 
people to a given order. They also qualify them for conscious social action” (1982: 
vii). In addition, ideologies are ‘social processes’, in various relationships to each 
other, such as contestation and reinforcement, a “cacophony of sounds and signs” 
(1982: viii).
With such subject formation, divided into categories of being human, it is also the 
result of what is made of the subject by those outside the social category. This is 
an interaction that could be seen as deliberately employed or unintended in its 
banality. Specimens of a category need the existence of other categories, members 
of which are not ‘us’ in a variety of ways, thereby confirming ‘us’ and ‘they’, then cast 
an actual or perceived eye of alternate recognition on ‘us’ (white and black, English 
and Afrikaner, Zulu and Sotho, Christian and Muslim, male and female, gay and 
heterosexual). Richard Alba writes that “… identities are socially constrained: that 
is, they are in part products of the ways others see us and not just our free choices. 
The influence of social environment is especially strong in childhood” (Alba, 
June 11, 2015).2 Escaping, or redefining any of these categories, in South Africa – 
or local variations in numerous contexts globally – has to occur against the grain of 
calls, interpellations, directly addressed ‘from within’ the category, and against the 
grain of the expectations and definitions emanating ‘from without’ (Pillay, 2014, 
2017). 
In part 1, I discuss ‘template’ and ‘ideology’ in their inter-relationship. In part 2, 
I extend the argument to include second-level practices and sites of socialisation, 
2 Social identity formation through categories of information gathering (especially such as 
censuses) appeared in a report on ‘The myth of a white minority’ in the The New York Times 
(Richard Alba, June 11, 2015). While citizens are expected to identify themselves, or be 
identified, into race or ethnic categories the already existing common vocabulary of race 
remains, or is altered to adapt to changing templates of indexing. 
 Measurement of race categories in South Africa indicates that while the ‘white’ population 
was 20 per cent of total in 1948, the census picture now shows ‘whites’ to be 8,2 per cent, 
or third largest ‘population group’, obviously after ‘black’ and ‘coloured’. Available online 
at: http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022014.pdf. Also see Nobles, 2000; 
Christopher, 2002, 2009; Haffejee, 2015 & Maré, 2014.
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labelling and stereotyping, ones that fall outside direct state authority and practices, 
of the everyday and of common sense. I point, in part 3, to the consequences of 
templates and ideologies, with an illustrative focus on race and racialism. And, 
finally, I engage in the necessity of utopian thinking, the need to think in ‘as other 
a way as possible’, to moderate the consequences, or adapt the causal factors, 
towards being human in the first instance – even to entertain the promise of radical 
alternatives to racialism. The near impossibility of meaningful change is accepted, 
in large part because of the common sense of what exists in everyday life and the 
benefits to the economically powerful of maintaining such distracting notions of 
the social world.
I
Templates and ideologies are useful concepts in my quest towards understanding 
the route between intention and effect, whether deliberate or unintentional. The 
distinction I draw, between template and ideology, is required for the purpose as set 
out in the introduction. 
Templates, refer to the state’s functions of policy formulation and execution: 
creating legislation, providing guidelines for practice, preparing and employing 
agents in these tasks, involving citizens in executing plans and fulfilling demands 
and addressing them in political mobilising discourse. In other words it means 
the ‘ordering’ of society. This can either mean, in a sense, to create an order or in 
another sense to command behaviour. These templates, in addition, ensure shared 
strategies in dealing with opposition and responding to proposals of alternatives by 
such as contesting political parties or class interests. Having templates also fixes the 
guidelines for gathering information about citizens, how they should be perceived 
and the world they inhabit (primarily through census taking); thereby creating, 
rather than simply reflecting, the social world in what it asks for and what it ignores.
Ideologies, on the other hand, refer to interpellations of populations, discourses of 
identification and perceptions.3 This occurs usually through language, but also with 
signs and expectations of behaviour (implied or explicit). The purpose is to create 
subjects who accept a version of what exists, what is good and bad, what is possible 
in terms of social action, thus qualifying them for roles to perform and to expect. 
In other words, ideologies serve to confirm the existing allocation and practices of 
power, behaviour and expectations, in specific forms and contexts, and to deny and 
contest alternative versions (Therborn,1982: i-28) – and, therefore, demanding 
ideological struggle over meaning. 
3 USA Republican candidate performances in 2015/2016 illustrate the social processes of 
‘interpellation’ or ‘address’ very clearly, as does race politics in South Africa.
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Firstly, the one does not exist without the other: templates also do ideological 
work, as well as are shaped by and shape ideologies. In summary, creation and 
managing of specific types of subjects is the effect both of state templates and of 
formal ideological discourses.
To take a concrete example, the apartheid-era Population Registration Act (PRA, 
1950), was a drastic and far-reaching exercise in ‘indexing the human’. On the one 
hand it confirmed an existing ideological interpellation and political practice and 
on the other it created an adapted template by initiating an alternate ideological 
discourse. This was not the first template for ‘population groups’ (with races then 
counted in further demographic categories: sex, age, location, education, income, 
birth rates, and so on). The PRA continued and confirmed in the first instance 
continuation of allocation in race terms, but now there were also further division 
into ethnic templates (see, for example, Terreblanche, 2002; Posel, 2001; Norval, 
1996 & Moodie, 1975). It would guide law makers and bureaucrats who ensured 
that the constituting elements in the ‘something’ to which the dictionary definition 
of ‘template’ refers, were available; that the pieces would fill the space intended, 
guiding the social engineering and policing agents. It directed the bantustan policy.
These templates had existed historically in formal and informal ways, in colonies 
and Boer republics and then in the Union of South Africa after the creation of 
a state (‘nation state’ does not ever ring true in South Africa) in 1910. The PRA 
set in motion and allowed formal processes, far beyond anything previously 
attempted: multiple laws relating to economic, labour, spatial, social, religious and 
other dimensions of any society; the placing of individuals in the racial and ethnic 
shape of the template and giving ‘proof ’ – the ‘dompas’ and other ID documents 
– of such allocation, from that moment for those already born and through birth 
certificates to each future generation. The stencil ensured, through controls and 
at times vicious policing and murderous action, obedience to the allocation and 
intended behaviours and acceptance of the consequences of such allocation, as 
well as the resistance from different forms and locations. Always the state maintains 
and regulates the template of class (of the relations of production), of capitalism 
and of property. Race and ethnicity served to provide context-appropriate shape to 
capitalist practice and profits.
However, the informal ways of the race template, my interest here, reflected human 
cognition, socialisation and behaviour, accumulated, adopted and adapted from 
birth. Homo sapiens is social and the largely blank slate at birth carries outlines 
of scribbles made before the cohort for whom it is recreated – such as seeing the 
traces of permanent markers misused for whiteboard lessons in previous classes, for 
previous cohorts of learners. Gendered perspectives, race, religion, ethnic group, 
nation, all exist as ‘the past’ for groups, the world into which we are received, even 
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if experienced, and ensured individually as born with. Then we also need to add the 
genetic markers of species and appearance.
A second point is that the templates referred to in this essay are essentially 
templates of difference between and not of collectivity and inclusion of all. The 
only shared allocation is to ‘race’ (but in the plural), not ‘human’. Under apartheid 
‘citizen’ was also ‘race’. Other than banal and ineffective calls for ‘nation-building’, 
‘social cohesion’, ‘non-racialism’ and the like, the state post-1994 has attempted to 
obfuscate the crudity of the templates of difference it employs (race and nation, 
subjects and citizens, to name just two sets). It occurs behind the veil of common 
sense or populist necessity. Firstly, necessity is presented as that of addressing 
inequality and secondly it is inter-related, as required in attending to the racially 
discriminatory legacies of apartheid. These are goals nobody can, or should, 
disagree with. But the form of the solution, the template of race, is both ineffectual 
and abhorrent. I have, deliberately, previously called it a “crime against humanity” 
(Maré, 2014: 121, 126). However, the purpose is also to ensure political and 
economic power through race-populist simplification; making sense for some, 
while being claimed for all.
The formal templates of racial difference – through legislation and the subsequent 
demands required for additional classification in creating the standards, the data, 
the measures (Bowker & Star, 1999) – reinforce and confirm the already-existing 
informal templates, those of already-given social identity. Ironically the present and 
the past of difference mutually reinforce each other; the formal tales that are told 
of apartheid, in the way they are told, serve to justify the apparently unavoidable 
present.4 Class is now to be ‘deracialised’ (through a twist of logic, reflecting the 
‘national demographics’ of races in all employment categories, rather than doing 
away with race classification). Most importantly, capitalist ownership, control 
and management too must be racially representative. The smooth transition 
of capitalism into a new South Africa, now with old and new bourgeoisies as 
beneficiaries and as aspirational models of appropriate behaviour, is thus assured. 
In addition apartheid’s ethnic bantustans are now to be returned to allegedly pre-
colonial forms, continuing to serve ‘traditional authority’ and, in mediated and 
complex ways, the ‘modernised’ and westernised holders of political and economic 
power outside of these areas. The state itself, within 1910 borders, includes many 
4 I wish to draw attention, as I have done in previous writing, to the distinction between 
difference and diversity that Jo Beall (1997) utilised in the development policy field. What is 
called ‘diversity’ in South Africa (a positive, as in ‘the rainbow nation’) is actually ‘difference’ 
(a dangerous negative in its top-down fixing, as can be illustrated with regrettable ease) (also 
Maré 2015).
Templates of ordering and maintaining the social |      77
of the apartheid created or preserved internal ethnic fragmentations and suggested 
population allocations (Maré, 2014: 80-82).
Lastly, recognising and examining templates demand that not only state institutions 
be included, but also supportive – or for that matter oppositional – creators of 
specific versions of what exists and what change may consist of. Research centres, 
cultural bodies, political parties and their policies and the media, all contribute to 
creating templates of seeing the world as consisting of races, offering descriptions 
and arguments, that focus on the social construct ‘race’ as the near-exclusive basis 
for understanding and acting in and on the world. Performances, such as television 
coverage of parliamentary debates or political rallies, are racialised in their verbal 
expression; social media are saturated with race, racialism and racism; a vast 
number of forms require the completion of blocks asking for race confirmation 
and require a multitude of overseers. The overlap between template and ideology 
is clear.
II
The ideology of race as participated in by citizens as raced-subjects already created 
through socialisation, rather than as the discourses and actions predominantly 
expressed and guided by the state through templates, is shaped by a large and 
complexly interacting number of determinants. Here it is more appropriate to 
speak of subject formation through ideology – individuals located in their ‘proper’ 
social identities. Templates exist and operate through multiple material and 
institutionalised forms – such as educational sites, class and race differentiations 
expressed in spatial forms and religious institutions – thereby reflecting the 
articulation of legal and policy templates with state and civil apparatuses and 
their material effects (Bass et al., 2012). These identity continuities include 
confirmations, powerfully expressed, in turn, though a range of moral, hurt, 
alienation and anger emotions. These are themselves guided by notions of what 
exists and what appropriate responses are. They contribute to effective ideological 
subjection and qualification in Therborn’s terms – a powerful over-determination, 
in other words. Ian Hacking deals with ‘making up people’ and the ‘loop’ that is 
created in the dynamic process of naming. He comments: “These reflections on the 
classification of people are a species of nominalism. But traditional nominalism is 
static. Mine is dynamic; I am interested in how names interact with the named” 
(2006: 23).
Templates, however, provide the structuring infrastructure for these more 
ephemeral contributions. State-level templates ensure continuity, not only to 
demand, confirm and reward, but to deny the need to question what already exists. 
Alternative visions of what could and should be, such as the already mentioned 
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Constitutional commitment to ‘non-racialism’ and ‘dignity’, therefore remain at 
the level of empty and contradictory repetition by politicians, heard as cynical 
obligations. 
The well-publicised voices of student protest in South Africa (and the USA) 
from 2015, should be noted here, as illustrative of the public processes of identity 
maintaining, claiming and renaming. In addition, the use, effect and implications 
of social media on contemporary social identity formation needs to be integrated 
into studies of issues and moments (such as the student protests) in the ideological 
confirmation of identities. It is essential to a fuller understanding of the events 
and trends mentioned above and many more globally. Social media excludes 
(through unequal access to and ability within the technology) and includes (cyber 
‘communities’ can be created) and ideas can be confirmed as valid with ease and 
extra-ordinary speed.5 Violent action can be as easily called for as avoided; enemies 
and ‘friends’ are identified and rumours get started with ease; mobilisation is within 
reach in an instant. A good example of this is the taxi drivers who utilised cell phones 
to mobilise in their disruption of anti-xenophobia marches in Durban in April 
2015. Statements and claims do not need evidence to exist as fact. The ‘echo effect’ 
ensures that confirmatory messages are selected. The worlds of facebook, television 
shows, celebrity, twitter, etc., are homogenising through consumption of the same 
– but not necessarily in individual detail. We receive information and set values 
against the backdrop of an existing individual vocabulary, even if that individualism 
may itself be levelling amongst certain sections of global society, through calls to a 
‘we’. Consumerism is a good example of such individualism within the social. The 
call by Brian to the gathered multitude, in Monty Python’s ‘Life of Brian’, that “We 
are all individuals!”, tumultuously and enthusiastically received with, but a single 
voice saying ‘I’m not’, seems relevant?
A very powerful inclusionary, and thereby also exclusionary, term in mobilising 
and in making claims has been experience. ‘Experience’ was used – vehemently at 
times – in feminist debates in South Africa in the early-1990s. It is so at present in 
a period of intense identity politics. Brian Fay’s (1996) discussion of the question 
whether you need ‘to be one to know one’ and his answer remains directly pertinent 
to present race-debates in South Africa for it has enormous consequences in the 
process of fixing templates of difference and in the search (or absence of searches) 
for solutions. ‘Races’ are claiming racialised experiences – obvious enough. But, 
if you can say an experience is unique, or rather uniquely shared in its mobilising 
social form, it serves to include. It also excludes and totally silences those whose 
5 The term ‘community’ I reject, for its mostly unqualified and misleading use. It serves to hide 
the tensions, conflicts and hierarchies of powers found within the implied inclusive claims 
under a cloak of homogeneity.
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experiences have been defined as different, beyond the pale. Again I must turn 
to the word ‘essentialising’, whether through race classification or through claims 
made for biological, bio-cultural and/or experiential expressions of race belonging. 
If memory (for that is all we immediately have of experience, unless ‘experience’ is 
perceived to be embedded, fixed or essentialised in being) is linked to the apparent 
individual, social-identity tension that may make sense of voluble contemporary 
race politics in South Africa. This politics is at times presented, especially within the 
apparent confidentiality of social media, as defiantly irresolvable, from ‘both’ sides: 
“My hurt and anger can only be resolved if you are removed from the equation”; 
“There is no resolution to what we have suffered and continue to experience while 
you and those who fall under your label, as the cause, are there”; “Julle staan in die 
pad van ons selfvervulling as ’n minderheidsgroep”; or “Go back to India”. Fay does 
not deny the relevance of ‘experience’ to exploring social or individual lives, but 
‘experience’ is not a given (a ‘fact’, the uncontested ‘truth’); it has to be ‘understood’ 
through questioning and reflection: 
Sensitivity heightened by shared experience is often an important step in 
understanding the lives of others: … But genuine understanding goes beyond 
sensitivity. To know others – indeed to know oneself – is to make sense of 
their experience. For this one needs, in addition to sensitivity, the ability to 
decipher the meaning of their experience. (1999: 28) 
Here the frequent arrogance of those who benefited from apartheid in effect to 
deny the need to ‘make sense’ of acknowledge and respond to the experience of all 
those now classified as ‘previously disadvantaged’, is blind and inhumane. 
The calls and the questions raised by the students in 2015, and the sometimes 
too easy acceptance of these calls as valid to the context to which they were 
addressed, require testing for their claims of more encompassing validity. The task 
of understanding what sense a marginalised majority, in its disaggregated multiple 
forms, make of existing dominant discourses and interpellations of anger remains.6 
On this more material and extensive level, the continuity of traditional authority 
and traditional landholding, affects a very large proportion of the marginalised – 
more than 16-million necessarily racialised South Africans. Historian, William 
Beinart, compared this to the Verwoerdian intention, within apartheid’s template of 
identity, and of social, economic and political organisation of a category of citizens. 
He writes: 
6 See Emmanuel Mgqwashu ‘Decolonisation should be about appreciating difference, not 
despising it’, The Conversation, November 30, 2015, in a growing debate about race populism 
in the student and related protests. Available on-line at: theconversation.com/Africa
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It may seem mischievous to suggest that Jacob Zuma’s thinking on chiefs 
and traditional authority echoes that of the infamous apartheid leader H.F. 
Verwoerd. But, oddly enough, the two men had similar decisions to make 
about the future of rural South Africa, and the path Zuma is choosing is not 
all that different from the one his white predecessor trod.7 
The notion of tradition as an ethnic distinctiveness, were at times violent fragments 
of race categories that was tragically illustrated in what is now the province 
of KwaZulu-Natal in the decade after 1985. In ‘tradition’, race and ethnicity is 
combined or fragmented in distinctive ways.
III
State templates – created, maintained and nurtured – shape the limits of possibility 
for subject formation in society. Shared racialism is the result of the race templates, 
as it had been under apartheid. Race categories, as descriptors of social identity, 
confirm the belief that continued acceptance of its common sense existence 
will, could and/or should be rewarded in material ways – even if effectively only 
for some. Reinforcement occurs through a ‘magic encyclopedia’ of perpetual 
confirmations (to borrow a term from Walter Benjamin [Maré, 2014: 49-52]): the 
racialised form of presentation of state achievements – the census and extensive 
institutional reporting providing the necessary race-categorised statistics; through 
the appropriate comparison with apartheid’s racist legacy of inequalities; through 
shaping the South African dream of displays of consumption heaven to be realised 
in racialised form and so on. Identity politics dominate the South African and 
probably global, scene in this second decade of the twenty-first century.
Kwame Anthony Appiah (2014), developing his WEB du Bois lectures, reflects 
on du Bois’ life, devoting a section to ‘Identity now’. I refer briefly to his summary 
of the “contemporary philosophical theory of identity”(2014: 147), in which he 
identifies four main elements. Firstly, for social identities to exist the labels that 
identify them have to be there. Self-identified labels used in contemporary South 
African claims emanate from the colonial and settler political order – but with 
occasional claims to ‘time immemorial’; from the state’s templates of race;8 from 
media – increasingly social media with its rapid spread of the short-term new, often 
linked to consumer trends; from political mobilising calls; from intellectual voices; 
from pasts presented in confirming ways; and more. 
7 Available on-line at: http://www.customcontested.co.za/verwoerd-zuma-chiefs/ website of 
the Centre for Law and Society, at UCT.
8 Lee Stone and Yvonne Erasmus produced a useful overview of legislation that directly 
replicates apartheid race categories (Stone & Erasmus, 2012; Maré, 2014: 52).
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The second element refers to “norms associated with social identities”, of which 
Appiah writes as ‘ought to’ behaviour and ‘ought to’ expectations from and towards 
others. He warns that these may not be very moral behaviours and expectations; in 
fact, they may seem banal, but nonetheless also dangerous (Appiah, 2014: 149). 
Therborn’s “power of ideology” (1982) applies here, as does Appiah’s “honor 
codes” (2010). The violent and degrading enforcement of a ‘no-trousers’ rule 
on women at a taxi rank in Durban, as well as on racist treatment of fellow rugby 
supporters, can serve as just two South African examples. The consequence of the 
naming templates, therefore, also creates forms of behaviour, the display of and 
discourses around, which reinforce race labels and identification. 
This element is linked to the third, namely subjectivity that ‘requires’ that I act in a 
certain way because I am of that sort, even that kind. Ideological interpellations of 
subjects as ‘Zulu’ or ‘Afrikaner’, ‘white’ or ‘black’ provide numerous examples of 
expected behaviour (Therborn, 1982; Hacking, 2006). The label of traitor – as in 
all such situations, even in mild mode, is powerfully and dangerously employed for 
failure to obey the necessity of required action – coconut, faggot, terrorist, counter-
revolutionary. 
Fourthly, a point that brings together the individual and the social, “[n]orms of 
identification are central in the project of individuality, which is the creation of 
a distinctive human life”(Appiah, 2014: 151). However, what if that ‘distinctive 
human life’ is also self- and other-perceived as predominantly – during distinct 
occasions, but potentially available all the time – that of a specimen of a category 
(Bauman, 2000: 227); effaced through templates and ideologies of difference, 
through the processes indicated above?9 All consequences, positive and negative, 
flow from here.
Appiah also draws attention to the ‘multiple nature’ of identity – the case for du 
Bois, too, in his life course – the personal/individual and the social find different 
expressions at different moments and in different contexts: I fall in love as an 
individual, but express it in ways that are socially and historically already there. 
This also applies, therefore, to who exists as the ‘you’, ‘they’, the other who is/are 
not ‘me’/’us’: whites, colonialists, Indians, amakwerekwere, blacks, Jews, Nigerians, 
female – and the derogatory terms employed in each case. 
9 See BBC article on the images used in target practice by soldiers in training (www.bbc.com/
news/magazine-30573936, accessed January 2, 2015). This core of my concerns is drawn, as 
so often (Maré, 2014), from such as Zygmunt Bauman (2000) and Roberto Toscano (2000).
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IV
Let me immediately admit that I am increasingly influenced by climate change 
pessimism – for readable examples, see Nordhaus (2015a, 2015b), and Kingsnorth 
(2014) – when trying to find a way out of the mess of essential social identities 
within which we exist: ‘pessimism’ about humanity’s ability to act to minimise 
the effects, as the past is already unavoidable. Structurally it is much the same. 
Specific forms of capitalist production and consumption continue to exist, to be 
the existence for most. Reading newspapers and perusing magazines, watching 
television and with the ether of social media visible in billions of hands, it is possible 
for all with the power of consuming to live in near oblivion of the consequences of 
climate change for humanity. It seems that the misery that has occurred through 
racism in its own many forms, related notions of essentialised differences through 
the ages and in viciously on-going form today, may fade into insignificance for many 
of the immediate and marginalised victims as humanity faces self-made extinction. 
But until then race remains a form of mobilisation. Refugees flee starvation, as 
well as vicious religious, ethnic or nationalist warfare. As Paul Kingsnorth (2014) 
concludes a review: 
Neither [Naomi] Klein nor [George] Marshall [authors of the books 
reviewed] can convincingly tell us how we should get from where we are to 
where we need to be in the time available; but then, neither can anyone else. 
Reading these books back to back, I’m inclined to side with Daniel Kahneman, 
whom Marshall spoke to in a noisily oblivious New York café. Kahneman 
won a Nobel Prize for his work on the psychology of human decision-making 
[and received an honorary doctorate also from the University of Stellenbosch 
in 2015], which may be why he’s so gloomy. “This is not what you might want 
to hear,” he says, but “no amount of psychological awareness will overcome 
people’s reluctance to lower their standard of living. So that’s my bottom line: 
there is not much hope. I’m thoroughly pessimistic. I’m sorry”. 
William Nordhaus, some months later (2015a), does make a suggestion, but with 
extensive doubt as to successful global and in-time application. In the case of race, 
ethnicity, nationalism, sexism and religion we are not talking ‘standard of living’ 
in material terms (for anyone except a few), but apparent existential/ontological 
security and templates that fix them. We are also experiencing the crude use of 
these social identities in populist mobilisation, by the powerful or towards power 
and benefits.
How then can we possibly offer reasonable alternatives, avoid the consequences of 
what I have sketched above, of ‘racecraft’, as Karen Fields and Barbara Fields term 
racialism (2012: 18-19, 207)? We should not even be listening, or have to listen, to 
those who wish to argue against racialism, essentialism or climate change: in this 
way the student who initiated ‘Rhodes must fall’, in an interview with Chris Barron 
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in the Sunday Times at a certain point refused to answer questions because they 
were asked by a white man, Barron.10 
There is enough reinforcement of whatever position one holds to obviate the 
need for evidence or debate. To return to social media and the internet in general, 
Michael Massing, in his evaluation of digital news media, notes that with so much 
information available, along with the consequent need to set interest-selection 
parameters very narrowly, the necessity “produces its own potentially worrisome 
by-product – the fragmentation of the audience. Some have cited this phenomenon 
as an important factor in the growing ideological polarisation in America, with 
people gravitating to sites that reinforce their preconceptions” (2015). There is 
enough extreme examples of positions with which to associate: “… social media 
have become a sluice gate for the dissemination of misogyny, racism, anti-Semitism, 
xenophobia, and vitriol” (2015), confirms Massing, also in readers’ comments 
sections in all media. It takes but a second on the internet to find such examples. 
The use of social media in recruiting for Isis often discussed in media in the USA, 
referring to academic units aimed at understanding the processes.11 Why does it 
appear that there are no strong institutions in South Africa, or elsewhere, critically 
examining racialism and essentialism in general, along with racism and sexism? A 
cynical reply would be because there are material benefits for those who maintain 
templates, not just existential rewards that focus on racism, but rather on its racial 
infrastructure that serves immediate political ends. 
How do we escape, or at least talk of alternatives that address the fundamental 
issues that affect the majority of people? How to make that leap where the starting 
point demands alternative goals and, hence, perspectives? What if those goals can 
be realised only if the starting point is shared responsibility, complexity, debate and 
collective action (however small the collective may be initially)? Are we incapable 
of utopian ways of thinking, an imaginative positing of a desired future? For without 
conceding to initiating conversation, to engaging in imagining, moving beyond 
what is there in the mind, there is truly no way out. 
Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel The Buried Giant (2015) raises this issue. Do we have to 
lose all memory to enable such a starting point of cohabitation, or is it possible to 
10 While revising this essay I came across a statement from the contradictory Israeli president 
Reuvin Rivlin, responding to the “tragedy we are now living in”, referring as much to 
Arab-Israeli relations as that within Israel itself, with the growth and acceptance of Jewish 
extremism as a common sense: “I’m not asking if we’ve forgotten how to be Jewish,” he said, 
“but if we’ve forgotten how to be human” (David Remnick ‘The one-state reality: Israel’s 
president speaks up for civility, and pays a price’, The New Yorker November 17, 2014).
11 For example, “Online embrace of ISIS, just a few clicks away”, New York Times, December 9, 
2015.
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incorporate memory, respectfully and considerately, and therefore effectively, into 
the larger project of cosmopolitanism and humanism?
If templates provide the mould, the stencil, limiting what we can, and should, 
imagine and engage with, then the solution has to lie, not in another template. If 
ideological interpellations insidiously fix those guidelines in the way we operate as 
subjects, confirming an unchanging ‘born into’, then we limit human possibilities. 
The solution cannot, should not, be a counter stencil with other shapes, letters and 
symbols already cut into it, but in visions that are open, appeals that do not call 
or cast subjects into categories, but that allow (even demand) the questioning of 
categories with their already-existing final solutions implied. A potential answer 
is to reject templates of difference and find shared goals to address collectively – 
this is where a new honour code should be constructed, which holds an inclusive 
collective together. In calmer times I suggested that commitment to an expanded 
notion of democracy could be such a goal, an argument to which I wish to return 
at some point. In South Africa culture serves to define diversity as difference – 
effectively another outline in the template – reduced to an empty claim most 
appropriate to the advertising for consumerism and tourism publicity.
Amongst the elite there is no need to have visions of inclusivity. What you have 
you do not wish to share and what you hanker after you wish for yourself in the 
first place. Racist arrogance of ‘white South Africans’ was such that for decades 
inclusivity could be defined through the obviousness of exclusion. How do we 
convince of the need for inclusivity? By imagining a truly equal South Africa, to 
confront the costs and benefits and for whom in each case it would mean to demand 
in various ways and to participate actively towards such a goal.
The utopian thinking which Rick Turner (1972) proposed in the early 1970s – 
against the background of apartheid repression, but also within the ferment of black 
consciousness and revival of worker militancy (Moss, 2014) – rests on recognising, 
firstly, that there is a primary problem to be solved, in its complexity and multiple 
articulations. It is here that what Appiah (2010) calls an ‘honour code’ exists to 
justify an existing problematic practice or system – in effect a dishonour code. 
Secondly, that the problem, once recognised, is perceived to remain because it is 
lived as common sense about which little or nothing can be done – the existing 
code(s) and the ‘status’ attached to them stand in the way; ideologies deny that 
efforts to address them have effects or that it is being addressed by those who 
are capable of achieving success and not ‘us’. It is thus the ordering of things, 
within the existing templates, which has to be eliminated, that which is deemed 
unquestionable. The third step is to imagine a utopian ideal – shared austerity to 
address climate change and inequality, vastly different life chances, diversity rather 
than difference, human dignity for all – a vision of what should be. Lastly, it requires 
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stepping back into the present to identify the obstacles in the way of resolution; 
impediments that requires to be addressed collectively in order to approach the 
utopian idea; in a process guided through measures shaped, in debate, by the goal. 
So now we are back to my starting point.
Neville Alexander recognised that the major block in a slow process towards 
realisation of a non-racial utopian goal is the existence of a state that maintains the 
same template of race as before. Elimination of that block is itself a sine qua non 
in many social contexts of the greater goal of equality in its multiple dimensions 
(Therborn, 2013). The template exists for reasons similar to what should have been 
left behind – ensuring the continuation of the uneven and unequalising, rewards of 
capitalism, albeit in a ‘deracialised’ manner. The ideal of non-racialism should guide 
a process through multiple means: each identifying obstacles, each demanding 
specific resolution. It is certainly not colour-blindness, a label that serves frequently 
as one of the obstacles towards such imagining.
The existing honour codes and dishonour codes attached to the process of 
classification and to the results of such classification deliberately have to be 
rewritten. The idea of the mutability of social identities has to be made acceptable 
– while acknowledging the power of experience, of repetition, of selection based 
on what has become ingrained, of personal value and apparent indispensability to 
being human. This was what the proponents of black consciousness demanded, 
against apartheid’s fixed template. 
To escape, however, we need to allow ourselves, as Rebecca Solnit (2006) writes, 
“to get lost”, to expose ourselves to uncertainty, to search and find value in the 
search. The common sense of the template that links achieving equality through 
maintaining race categories – in effect the dishonour code – has to be challenged. 
Through confirming a strong commitment to equality and dignity but showing that 
race – as racism and race discrimination, but also as racialism – is one element in 
the failure towards equality and, moreover, carries its own dangerous consequences 
as it had in the past. What Göran Therborn (2013) refers to as ‘existential 
inequality’, including racism, is used since 1994 in effect – whether intentionally or 
unintentionally – to bolster capitalism as a system, the primary source of ‘resource 
inequality’ and therefore also a major source of ‘vital inequality’ – the class-race 
debate silenced.
Karen Fields and Barbara Fields effectively link ‘racecraft’ with inequality, the real, 
rather than constructed, issue – already in the title of their book: Racecraft: the soul 
of inequality in American life. Racecraft, they write, as 
[d]istinct from race and racism does not refer to groups or to ideas about 
groups’ traits. … It refers instead to mental terrain and to pervasive belief. 
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Like physical terrain, racecraft exists objectively; it has topographical features 
that Americans regularly navigate and we cannot readily stop traversing it. 
Unlike physical terrain, racecraft originates not in nature, but in human action 
and imagination; it can exist in no other way. (2012: 18,-19, 201-203) 
They return to this terrain and the effect on human action and the need for 
‘constructive imagining’, where it most counts, towards the end of the book: 
Racecraft operates likes a railway switch, diverting a train from one track to 
another. It is unlike a railway switch, however, in that the switchman seldom 
controls where the train ends up. It may end up on a siding in the middle 
of nowhere, its passengers stranded. By crowding inequality off the public 
agenda, racecraft has stranded this country [the USA] again and again over its 
history. It may do so again, permitting an economic sickness that arose from 
inequality to be treated homeopathically by further doses of inequality, which 
may eventually provoke rage that will sweep away respect for democratic 
politics and the rule of law. Forestalling that calamity is our duty. The first 
and fundamental step in that direction is to observe racecraft in action, study 
its moves, listen to its language and root it out. Only after doing so will we 
be prepared for the still harder work of tackling inequality. Are we up to it? 
(2012: 289-290)
Because of the massive weight of templates created or maintained by an existing 
state, with a popularly elected governing party and the existence and confirmation 
of racialised social identities – and maybe despite these immovable factors – smaller 
initiatives, as part of ‘constructive imagining’ are essential. The ways of illustrating 
utopian thinking, of offering and exploring steps along the way despite the obstacles, 
should display the same play of imagination: from innovative changes in education 
– books, art, play, creativity – to creativity in many fields. Achille Mbembe (2015) 
writes that “Literature and music in particular are also practices of desecration 
and profanation. Each in its own way involves a paradoxical and at times risky play 
with limits – both the limits set by moral or political orders and those that shape 
language and style, thought and meaning”. Mbembe (2015) concludes, and that is 
the challenge, because it is exactly what templates do not accept and allow, “Africa 
will never be a given”. Race cannot be a given if we are to confront, bravely, what 
equality means.
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5
‘BEING-BLACK-IN-THE-WORLD’ AND 
THE FUTURE OF ‘BLACKNESS’
Njabulo S. Ndebele 
I
The #RhodesMustFall Movement began at the University of Cape Town (UCT) 
on 9 March 2015. On that day human faeces were thrown at the commemorative 
statue of Cecil John Rhodes. Until then, the statue of the controversial entrepreneur 
and benefactor who donated land on which the university was built, had dominated 
the commemorative heraldry of the university. With an imperial loftiness Rhodes 
pondered the world spread out in front of him, as well as that he presumed existed 
behind him. He would do that in perpetuity. To this new breed of student, the 
statue’s daily dominance and the history it recalled, despite his philanthropy, had 
become intolerable. The defacement of the statue was soon followed by calls for 
it to be removed. A debate ensued nationally about history and commemorative 
statues, but it did not save Rhodes’ statue. On 9 April 2015, one month after the 
student movement had begun, the statue was swiftly and dramatically removed.
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Student protesters deemed the statue a painful relic of colonial times; except that 
this relic, they argued, continued to breathe life into the economic order and the 
social arrangements supported by it on campus and in the large society beyond. Its 
imperial effects have displayed a resilience often glaring, but sometimes not easy to 
recognise in the current post-apartheid present. The removal of the Rhodes statue 
would also be the onset of the ‘decolonisation’ of the University of Cape Town, a 
process in which the adverse effects of a colonial legacy could be unveiled, altered, 
or be replaced by a new order. The demands of the student movement subsequently 
spread to other campuses in South Africa, their disruptive intent acquiring a global 
reach. They were to resonate also at Oxford University where Rhodes exerts a 
significant commemorative presence. 
At the heart of the call for the ‘decolonisation’ of UCT was a more elemental source 
of student disaffection: being ‘black’ in a ‘white’ world. The #RhodesMustFall 
movement projected ‘blackness’ as a critical element in the discourse of protest 
against the ‘whiteness’ of Rhodes’s legacy and its resilient effects. The ‘black body 
in pain’ needed to be affirmed as human against its dehumanising depreciation as 
exploited labour in more than a century of captured service to Rhodes’s imperial, 
capitalist vision and the strong racist under/overtones that drove it. The colonial 
economic system and its politics established and developed superior-inferior 
relationships between ‘white’ and ‘black’ humans respectively. It is common to 
approach this relationship from the perspective of its driving agency: ‘whites’ 
oppressing ‘blacks’; or civilised ‘whites’ as superior humans, oppressing uncivilised, 
sub-human ‘blacks’. In reality, the system dehumanised both. It is the less recognised 
dehumanisation of ‘whites’ by the very system they created which is the target of 
the uncovering intent of the ‘decolonial’ project. 
It is to be assumed that part of the ‘decolonial’ project is to change the attitudes of 
‘whites’ towards ‘blacks’ by getting them to abandon racist attitudes and behaviour 
associated with them as a group. The urgency in this has to do with the perception 
that South African ‘whites’ did not give up much to make the post-apartheid 
reconciliation objective more successful. ‘Whites’ seemed to assume that the 
country they claim to have ‘built’ is desirable as is to everyone in 1994, including 
the millions of ‘blacks’, who were on the receiving end of its being ‘built’. 
So what is expected of the ‘unveiled colonial’: remorse, guilt, identification as 
Africans, adopting Bafana Bafana national soccer team, moving from the ‘white’ 
suburbs to the ‘townships’, giving away a portion of their wealth in some way, 
whose accumulation on a social scale is fundamentally questionable on historically, 
moral and ethical grounds, adopting African names, learning African languages, 
transferring their skills…? The list of the forms of transformation expected of them 
is potentially infinite, but it could be reduced to a single item. 
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It is reasonable to expect that ‘white’ South Africans disentangle themselves from a 
pre-1994 social order in which injustice and unfairness had been institutionalised. 
The impact of such an order on personal and group conduct, towards themselves 
and others outside of the group, was so deep that it takes a purposeful unlearning 
to change and then to open themselves to new learning with others. It was clear 
by 1994 that South Africa despite its best official ideological intentions up to that 
point was by struggle and default evolving into a different society. Public and private 
institutions would have to radically review what Zeus Majosi in a recent open letter 
to talk show John Robbie, called their “cultural architecture”.1
Perhaps the question of what is to be expected of ‘white’ South Africans can partly 
be answered by asking another one. What did the ‘blacks’ of South Africa have to 
become once they had been conquered? There is a long list here. It includes that 
they had to give up their social systems as they had lived them for generations before 
the arrival of ‘whites’; they were forced to become workers; they dispersed over 
the entire southern African landscape to work; in their travels and places of work 
they exchanged languages; over time they intermarried massively, blurring cultural 
boundaries and rendering them porous; they became locally cosmopolitan in ways 
that those that consigned them to servitude, locked in their legalised privileges, 
couldn’t; they worked in ‘white’ people’s homes, and got to know far more about 
‘whites’ than ‘whites’ bothered to know about them; and as the economy grew 
out of control for those who ‘built’ it, they, in addition to being workers, became 
graduates, managers, lawyers, scientists, engineers, politicians, chief executive 
officers and state presidents.
The question of who becomes what or who after being something they would rather 
not continue to be, can be both simplistic and complex all at once. Descriptions 
can typify simplistically at the same time as they can amplify meaningful, complex 
ways. It all suggests that for South Africans, compelled by a set of historical 
circumstances to cooperate, at first, out of a system of structured compulsions, 
later the energies released out of such compulsions become too powerful to be 
contained by compulsion and now have to enter the space of dynamic interactions. 
By definition that space will now be coloured by the numerical primacy of those 
once disenfranchised. Thus, by another definition, the responsibility of the now 
enfranchised to play the leadership role, their numbers demand is enormous in a 
mandatory kind of way. What is the society they envision for all?
In the reality of the protest movement’s unfolding a question emerged for me. If 
‘black pain’ was a state of being to which those who were ‘black’ felt consigned, not 
only in the respective institutions in which they found themselves, but in the general 
1 http://thedailyvox.co.za/letter-john-robbie-everyone-else-heard-702-interview/ 
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societal environment, what is it that constituted relief from ‘black pain’? It seemed 
to me that this was a deeply historical question whose import resonated beyond 
the political moment. There had to be a notion of ‘black’ well-being and objective 
conditions that supported it, for it had to be affirmed and it had to flourish. What 
were the features of the alternative identity and social value of ‘black’ well-being 
after the termination of ‘black pain’ when ‘whiteness’ had been removed from the 
scene? What is ‘black’ wellbeing? In what kind of society would it flourish? Would 
there still be ‘blackness’ after the demise of ‘whiteness’?
I began to ponder these questions in a brief discussion paper entitled The End of 
Blackness? presented at the Effects of Race (EoR) group seminar at the Stellenbosch 
Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS) in July 2015. It is not a title I chose without 
some trepidation. For a start, I felt that a paper with such a title, presented as it was at 
that very moment that the #RhodesMustFall movement unfolded at the University 
of Stellenbosch, could be courting provocation and controversy. As it turned out, 
three of the student leaders of the #RhodesMustFall movement at Stellenbosch 
University were present at the seminar and participated in the discussion. It turned 
out to be discussion worth having.
Indeed, as the movement unfolded across the country, the seminar was the first 
time I had the opportunity to confront in a space of collective thought what was 
beginning to gel in my mind. It seemed to me that a great deal of what I heard from 
the movement came across as very similar to what I and my generation said some 40 
years ago. I sensed a vital connection with the energy at play. What seemed new to 
the current generation of students, came across to me as a replay of times past under 
different circumstances. A thought then crystallised. I faced an intergenerational 
dissonance. What are the dynamics of such dissonance? What did it all mean? 
For a start I could attempt a comparative perspective. If ‘black pain’ is a current 
reality on our historically ‘white’ campuses, 40 years ago, my ‘black pain’ was far less 
campus based than it was a result of a more generalised sense of being oppressed 
across the entire South African landscape. The apartheid-imposed limitations on 
my movements were remarkably countered by an internal sense of expansiveness 
I experienced as the very meaning of ‘black consciousness’ at the time. A being 
externally depreciated in value by an exploitative economic order discovered 
profound inner value. My fear of ‘white’ people, no matter how economically or 
militarily powerful they may have been, was replaced by an enormous sense of inner 
possibility and power which did not in any way minimise the brutal reality of what 
could happen to me were I to fall into the hands of the ‘white’ system. Despite the 
overt power of the racially oppressive system, there was something in me beyond 
its reach. Something in the national environment, articulated on some individual 
campuses in 2015, had reached the inner core of ‘black’ students and appeared to 
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have destabilised that core significantly. What was it in the 20 years democracy that 
led to this situation? 
There was another historical reality. The majority of ‘black’ students in South 
African higher education 40 years ago were registered in ‘historically black 
universities’. They were on campus as a manifestation of what it was required of 
‘black’ people to do if they wanted a university education. They were required to 
apply to institutions specifically designated for them. There, they were ‘blacks’ 
first and then ‘black students’ after. There, their colour a given, required little 
justification. There was something numerically normal about that situation. 
‘Black’ people were just too many to exterminate and their labour too vital for 
such extermination to be contemplated. The ‘white’ state needed to devise ways to 
control them in their vast numbers. In the total scheme of things it was impossible 
for the ‘white’ South African state to close the doors of human aspiration for people 
to participate in the fullest complexity of social endeavour even if ‘white’ ideology 
demanded otherwise. Thus in the context in which ‘black consciousness’ developed 
and evolved, ‘black’ students were naturally more vocal where the stakes for their 
being ‘black’ were considerably higher. They were a voice of a downtrodden people.
From the beginning, ‘black’ presence on a ‘white’ campus has always had to be 
justified. A legal instrument was created to administer and process such justification. 
There had to be and still has to be an argument to be advanced for ‘black’ students 
to be there even after two decades of democracy. Thus, ‘black’ students on a ‘white’ 
campus carry the burden of self-awareness, of ‘intruding’ that their fellow students 
at ‘black’ campuses are not burdened with. But the latter do carry a different 
burden. It is the burden of class and the perception of institutional inferiority. Yet, 
‘black’ students at ‘historically black universities’ are comparatively less vocal as 
‘blacks’ than those at ‘historically white institutions’. Numerical size and ‘cultural 
architecture’ seem to modulate self-awareness and identity. 
Forty years later, in a country in ‘black’ hands for 23 years, I feel far more in a ‘black’ 
country than in a ‘white’ one. In this ‘black’ country, I feel no insistent compulsion 
to be designated ‘black’, even far less so to designate myself as such. Then staring 
at me is a dissonance of the moment: that between a current generation of ‘black’ 
students who treasure the designation ‘black’ and an older generation that is less 
insistent on the designation. Between the older generation and the overwhelmingly 
vast majority of ‘black’ students on ‘black’ campuses is the question: what is the 
prospect for less stridency on ‘black’ identity and a greater confidence in engaging 
with historic opportunity? But the relative minority of ‘black’ students at ‘white’ 
institutions seem uniquely placed in a space to sharpen the critique of that historic 
opportunity. One can see in this the prospect of a student movement across the 
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higher education system that is founded on an entirely different set of activist 
premises. What could be the enabling historical context for such premises?
II
In 1973 Chabani Manganyi published the book Being-Black-in-the-World. Reading 
this book in 2016 got me to ask another set of questions. What if student activists 
of the #RhodesMustFall had in large numbers encountered this book in their 
undergraduate syllabus at any South African University they had randomly chosen 
to attend? What if they had studied this book together with the writings of Steve 
Biko and Franz Fanon and other related books as standard curriculum fare in 
a country so remarkably described by James L. Gibson? “Perhaps no country in 
history has so directly and thoroughly confronted its past in an effort to shape its 
future as has South Africa” (2004: 1). The story of such confrontation would have 
been expected to be a learning country’s preoccupation. This does not appear to 
have been the case.
There are many more books which could have formed the base of a shared, 
foundational or intellectual culture in the educational system. This could 
have happened across the body of knowledge spanning fiction, biography, 
autobiography, poetry, drama, history, political science, philosophy, anthropology, 
sociology and science. A store of books and other educational media across these 
fields of knowledge would have become standard fare in a curriculum to stimulate 
imaginative thinking and speculation about a new society, its contours and its 
prospects. What would have been the cumulative impact of such knowledge on the 
#RhodesMustFall discourse on ‘blackness’ and ‘whiteness’ in the context in which 
they were engaged in recent protest? To what extent would the running discourse 
of protest not only have expressed a broader and deeper awareness of alternative 
intellectual currents, but also represented a significant advance on a local tradition 
of radical critique in South Africa?
Of course, individual #RhodesMustFall activists on their own may indeed have 
been exposed to these and more thinkers. Their exposure to such thinkers is 
surely the gift of their resourceful, questing spirits, reminiscent of many black 
consciousness activists of the South African Students Organisation (SASO) in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s who discovered on their own, vistas of knowledge 
that radically expanded their thinking despite prohibitions on, and restrictions to, 
knowledge by the apartheid state. While such prohibitions and restrictions were 
formally lifted in 1994 they seemed to have remained by default as a weakness in 
systemic commitment to a radical, comprehensive and integrated review of the 
educational curriculum across the entire education system. 
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SASO student activists’ response to systemic prohibition was to read extensively 
and learn collectively outside of the restricted prescribed syllabus, thus providing 
for themselves a self-motivated subversive norm of alternative learning. 
Fortuitously, they were laying foundations for encountering a forbidden imaginary. 
Their venture into this imaginary could very well have provided a pedagogical 
opening towards the imagining of alternative content for a future system of 
education. It is reasonable and unsurprising that after two decades of freedom, the 
#RhodesMustFall activists should expect that the legacy of such a subversive norm 
would by now be the foundational norm of pedagogy in the new South Africa.
What if, when they undertook their disruptive activism in 2015, they had been 
learning in a public system of education in which they, and their generational 
peers, were grounded in an alternative local imaginary that had been enjoying 
systemic affirmation by the new state for 21 years? This could have enabled them 
to acquire a sense of being-in-the-world that would accord them the ability to 
interact with knowledge systems around the world with some confidence. Against 
such a background, what would have been the content and tenor of their disruptive 
discourse?
It is in answer to this last question that Manganyi’s writing acquires a special 
resonance. What is it in Manganyi’s book Being-Black-in-the-World that the students 
and their teachers would have been grappling with intellectually? In all likelihood 
they would have been shaped by a different discourse of critique that was built on 
the foundations laid in 1994. This situation suggests that in 1994, only one part of 
the struggle for liberation ended. What was the other part that should have begun? 
This other part, that is arguably more vital, required yet another question that 
needed to be asked. How do South Africans visualise the nature and character of 
the constitutional society, the fullness of which they have yet to achieve and for 
which they struggled for close to a century? How did it become that at the point 
of liberation the liberated, despite their best intentions, seemed to lose focus. The 
agenda of transformation seems to stall in the face of a resurgence of the politics of 
racial conflict reminiscent of pre-1994 conflicts. 
III
In Being-Black-in-the-World Manganyi conveys a grounded faith in the elemental 
nature of human transformations that have been going on in Africa before and 
since the continent’s at first curious, and then violent, interaction with Europe. It is 
here ‘on the African continent’ he asserts, “where the great and intricate drama of 
being black-in-the-world is taking place” (1973: 3). It is his characterisation of the 
drama as intricate that captures my attention. 
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The intricate is necessarily complex. Complexity of any kind can invite impatience 
and nervousness of the restive or frustrated kind; or it can induce excitement or 
yearning born out of eagerness. The former, in the environment of colonial or 
apartheid repression, can lead to reactive violence, or to the danger of the ‘emotive’; 
while the latter reaction can call the impatient self to order in favour of curiosity and 
the desires of eagerness to inquire and perhaps to hit on invention and unexpected 
resourcefulness. Thus, grappling with the intricacies of complexity may indeed 
result in creativity and inventiveness.
For Manganyi, both reactions to complexity, stimulated as they would be by real 
life social interactions, call out to be understood for what they are. This kind of 
understanding out of inevitable social engagement is the basis of Manganyi’s 
faith that out of 300 years of a violent, often brutal interaction between Africa 
and Europe, a reflective and activist African agency can arise and restore African 
selfhood and inventive assertiveness in reshaping the human face of the world.
If there are intricacies in the drama of being-black-in-the-world, the work of Charles 
van Onselen (1996) has shown that relationships between ‘black’ and ‘white’ 
South Africans have generated their own set of intricacies. Mutual dependence 
and interdependence are possible even in inherently conflicted human situations. 
Intricate relationships arise when unavoidable contact between people generate 
some logic of cooperation. South Africa has been a space for such logics to play 
out for three centuries. In 1994 yet another phase began in that kind of history. 
Without this kind of perspective we may become a record that keeps playing on the 
same scratch, placing ourselves outside of evolutionary renewal.
It is against such a context that Manganyi argues that ‘being-in-the-world’ with a 
‘black body’ has similar human implications as ‘being-in-the-world’ with a ‘white 
body’. The fundamental similarity in both these experiences of being-in-the-world 
is in the shared human necessity to make culture, which “may be understood as 
constituting the most concrete medium for the structuring of the dialogue between 
man and the universe”. If there are any differences, they are differences of lifestyle 
indicative of different ways in the respective histories of “being in dialogue” with 
the world (Manganyi, 1973: 37). 
Significantly, Manganyi conceives of the relationship between people and their 
environment as dialogical. What is different between people, as in the same manner 
that their cuisine may be different, is in the nature of the ‘dialogue’ each ‘being-
in-the-world’ has with itself; with the people around it; and the world of objects 
around it. The sense of history and of being in it emerges from these three forms of 
dialogical interaction singly or in combination. 
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It ought then to make a decisive difference what ‘being-black-in-the-world’ is able 
to deploy in its recovery from what has been a fraught dialogical interaction over 
several centuries with ‘being-white-in-the-world’. More than bring attention to 
its pain, at the hands of its aggressive, oppressing antagonist, Manganyi seems to 
be saying, ‘being-black-in-the-world’ must foreground the values of its lifestyle, a 
product of its culture making proclivity which may be fundamentally different and 
potentially more self-enabling in confronting and negotiating a persistently hostile 
and dominating ‘being-white-in-the-world’. At stake is the human view of the world 
as oppressed ‘blacks’ have seen it, lived it, even in the most difficult existential 
circumstances and continue to see it and often value it as they re-establish their 
place in the world.
Thus far, the ‘blacks’ have yet to project with sufficient confidence, knowledge and 
authority their perspective of ‘being-black-in-the-world’. Against five centuries of 
‘being-white-in-the-world’, dominating the world and the repressive cultures of 
that dominance, further restrained and contained as it has been by its existential 
discomfort with the condition of oppression, ‘being-black-in-the-world’ has yet to 
deploy the liberatory potential of its worldview with an authority and decisiveness. 
Such self-assertion is critical if the perspective of ‘being-white-in-the-world’ has 
to seriously engage with an alternative value system, particularly that resurging, 
reforming, recreating and emerging from worlds doggedly repressed by ‘whiteness’. 
The urgency of challenging ‘being-white-in-the-world’ with new self-affirmations 
by the liberated humanity of ‘being-black-in-the-world’ takes on greater significance 
against the background of other changes occurring in the world. The demographic 
ascendance of the so-called Global South, beyond numerical superiority, taking full 
advantage of a technological inheritance and aspects of an economic system that 
once oppressed them, is a case in point. ‘Being-white-in-the-world’ has to take note 
and to respond according to a new logic of adaptation against the background of its 
own increasing loss of dominance. 
In the South African context, such a development makes possible a new set of 
relationships that might emerge that promise over time a kind of functional parity 
that works to the benefit of a common identity that is forged out of a collaborative 
mutuality in a constitutional democracy. It becomes decisively critical that 
the ‘black-white’ relationship not assume a hegemonic dominance as a public 
preoccupation, as has been the case up to this point. In this fundamental adjustment 
in relations between world-views, ‘blacks’ are poised to bring far more onto the 
stage than their ‘pain’. There is more to the world than the history of ‘white’ racism.
Indeed, the freedom from the colonial and apartheid preoccupation with the black-
white relationship ought to promise new worlds. The ‘black-black’ relationship is 
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no longer what it was at the time of conquest. It has evolved phenomenally through 
social coagulations in the mines, factories, farms and township settlements. 
Languages, customs, music, cuisines, dances and world-views were exchanged and 
shared, thus reducing tribal affiliations to a degree of historical significance. Such 
exchanging and sharing, as already alluded to, created widespread, interpersonal 
relationships that resulted in almost universal intermarrying across tribe, 
geography, religion, education and class, cutting across the normal restrictive 
cultural boundaries.
While this coagulation may have taken place over time and through compulsions 
of various kinds, it is not easy to dispel the notion that the establishment in January 
1912 of The South African Native National Congress (SANNC), which later 
became the African National Congress (ANC) provided formative ideological 
affirmations which underscored non-tribalism as a formative value. It is for this 
reason that this value should have stood side-by-side with ‘non-racialism’ and ‘non-
sexism’ in section 1, chapter 1, of the founding provisions of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa. For over a hundred years of struggle this value was 
durable in its ability to unify black South Africans against the declared objective of 
the apartheid state to create and consolidate tribal divisions through dogged state 
intervention. Non-tribalism has been a formative value in the social cohesion of the 
‘black’ oppressed and now offers space for ‘white’ South Africans de-tribalised from 
their ‘whiteness’. 
The SANNC was the African response to “the racial exclusion and discrimination 
under the new Union of South Africa, established in 1910. Cross tribal from the 
outset, but limited to the nascent black intelligentsia, it spread its representativeness 
across class, education, and geographic barriers encompassing the southern African 
region from which South African capitalism recruited its labour. SANNC aspired 
to unite Africans in the advancement of their political and socio-economic status”.2
This speaks to the issue that without the de-centring of the black-white relations, 
racial thinking in South Africa might persist to the hegemonic advantage of the 
‘being-white-in-the-world’ worldview, even when both black and white South 
Africa might desire otherwise. This is against the historic fact of the aggression of 
‘being-white-in-the-world’ in the last 500 years of world history, such that even the 
nature of reactive resistance to that aggression in the South African context often 
comes across as itself having been encapsulated in the very spectacle of aggression 
even as the liberation movement fought the good fight in the long struggle. That 
is to say, even the resistance to ‘being-white-in-the-world’ often reproduces in 
2 http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/formation-south-african-native-national-
congress#sthash.k9lVsPru.dpuf
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the actions of the ‘black’ resisters some of their opponents’ values and action in 
the terms and means of combating them. This will remain so for as long as the 
alternative world-view of ‘being-black-in-the-world’ is absent from the battlefield. 
What will it take for the ‘blacks’ of the world, particularly in South Africa, to project 
a new sense of ‘being-the-world’, which is not galvanised by the sense of burden, 
but by the freedom of agency and initiative?
IV
In a post-1994 South Africa that had expressed its vision of a new society through 
fundamental changes in the social realm and explored it through the educational 
curriculum, the #RhodesMustFall activists would almost certainly have read and 
discussed in the university curriculum another seminal work that is almost certain 
to have shaped their activist discourse. This work presents a rich supplementary 
and bold experiential context to Manganyi’s theoretical rigour.
Native Nostalgia by Jacob Dlamini, equally rigorous in its exploration of the 
challenge of social visioning, exploded into the South African public sphere in 
2009. In this book, he asks the question: could someone who has lived in a South 
African township during apartheid after a long and by many measures, difficult 
life, ever be nostalgic for that township life? Was it possible to be nostalgic for life 
deemed pathological? To the chagrin of many habituated to the terrible conditions 
of township life as a ready and habitual justification for politics of protest, Jacob 
Dlamini answered in the affirmative.3 Thus, he began a cross generational 
conversation with Chabani Manganyi. 
“We (South Africans)”, writes Manganyi, “have been telling all and sundry that 
we are capable of teaching the world something novel about racial harmony and 
peaceful co-existence in a multi-racial (multi-national?) society. Perhaps it is time 
for us to turn inward and assess whether our claims are not in excel of our progress” 
(1973: 6). The challenge of ‘teaching the world’ for South Africans would have 
to be based on a lot more than declarations to do so, although such declarations 
may arise out of various emotional moments of a deep and genuine desire to do so. 
Such desires can indeed have the potential to be one of the ‘ties that bind’, but all of 
South Africa has to work at giving reality to those ties.
3 It is most fortuitous that as I am writing this, I am listening to a musical group I had never 
heard of before. Their name is The Soil and the name of the album is ‘Nostalgic Moments’. 
It fuses the urban and the rural with an inventive genius that is definitively ‘township’ and in 
its authenticity and self-confidence, participates in the universal, which is always reflected in 
local authenticities. 
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For black South Africans, ‘teaching the world’ may well be entangled with what 
lessons there are to learn and to share with confidence out of the experience of 
more than a century of living in regulated townships and population-depleted 
rural communities. This is despite, and perhaps even because of, asserts clinical 
psychologist Manganyi, they have “the highest cumulative unfavourable social 
experiences to be found. These are populations at special risk, from a mental health 
point of view” (1973: 8). Yet, they are not devoid of value. 
However, this acknowledges the reality of ‘native nostalgia’ for township settlements 
with the “highest cumulative unfavourable social experiences” (Manganyi, 1973: 
6). Jacob Dlamini deploys qualifications about the extent of such nostalgia. For 
example, he would say, ‘native nostalgia’ exists despite of apartheid, not because 
of it. But such qualifications, which reflect the complexity of his own thinking, 
never outweigh the overwhelming evidence by which Dlamini makes us view the 
township and its possibilities with new eyes. 
The ideological isolation of ‘black’ townships from ‘white’ suburbs has also carried 
an unexpected, if unheralded blessing: the existential absence of ‘whites’. Instead, 
general ‘white’ presence, in the form of repressive laws, was abstract. This allowed 
for ‘black’ existential cultures to emerge over time that gave township life across the 
country a universal familiarity among those trapped in them. This made possible 
living spaces inaccessible and unavailable to ‘whites’, yet formative of ‘black’ 
identity over time. 
On the other hand, the physical, existential reality of ‘whites’ out there beyond 
in their towns, gated suburbs, manicured lawns, parks, city halls, shopping malls, 
offices and factories, was accessible to ‘blacks’ as workers on a daily basis. As a result, 
it could be said, ‘whites’ have a constrained existential knowledge and experience 
of the totality of the South African human environment. Their predominant 
experience of that reality has been to devise laws to contain, from their perspective, 
the ‘other’, unknown and unknowable. As in 1994 and beyond, South African 
‘whites’, living inside the cocoon of their own creation, were the least prepared to 
contribute experientially to the challenge of a new human reality in the country. 
Much of the totality of the South African human environment is alien to the average 
‘white’ South African. Whatever there was of their predominant contribution was 
out there in the form of the plethora of apartheid laws and what those laws have 
conveyed of the economic, political, and social attitudes that were the bases for 
their promulgation. Beyond this, there is a human space in the township that no 
‘being-white-in-the-world’ could easily occupy. That space has been the site of both 
pain and joy that make ‘black’ experience so elementally human. It is this space that 
fascinates Jacob Dlamini. 
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Dlamini gets us to reflect on several markers of township culture that characterise the 
township across the land as a space of culture. Township streets flow continuously 
with human energy. This street energy is a defining feature of the African city to the 
north of South Africa in for example: Accra, Lagos, Bamako, Nairobi, Cairo, Dakar 
and Kampala. This kind of city ambience is generally in sharp contrast to the silent 
street cultures of South Africa’s ‘white’ suburbs where neighbours may live side-
by-side for many years and exchange greetings mainly on casual mutual sightings. 
Driving or walking through them still evokes in me to this day, the sense of being 
watched and that a police vehicle could appear at any moment to confront me to 
show cause why I should not be bundled into a police van to cleanse the suburb 
of me. 
To this day, all South African towns and cities die at night. This is not so in the 
metropolitan cities of the world. There might be a story in there of how ‘whiteness’ 
in South Africa perceived its urban communities as spaces of clinical isolation and 
its postured silences as evidence of the civilised European outpost. I explored a 
version of this perspective in my essay on South African game parks (2007). But 
the differences in city ambience are not necessarily a judgement, but a view on 
lifestyle. Except that in the South African context difference will more often shift 
beyond the descriptive to the comparative superior-inferior relationship. 
One can extrapolate something else from the phenomenon of streets flowing with 
energy. African cities like most others in the world retain much of their critical mass 
of human energy that is expended in the spatial setting of home and work. In South 
Africa, township energy is exported massively to the white urban spatial settings on 
a daily basis. Thus, the best of township human energy is expended away from its 
spatial communal life. Townships were designed not to provide for a range of basic 
human needs: food, clothing and entertainment, and increasingly, basic education. 
They were designed not to support Manganyi’s dialogical relationship of creativity 
between people, the communities and their physical world. They were designed to 
violate that relationship. In townships people were daily forced to enter a dialogical 
world of ‘being-white-in-the-world’ in which they would be objects in the hands of 
a population of those privileged to have legislated away the competition of those 
they turned into workers. Thus, one of the greatest gifts of being human, to work for 
your own sustenance, was transformed into working for the sustenance of others. 
It was a dispiriting and dehumanising existence in the oppressive service of others.
Such observations are not made in order to repeat the habitual indictment of ‘being-
white-in-the world’, but rather and more importantly to underscore the necessity 
to reimagine township environments in which people in them grow and flourish 
from their own energies and that when they go out of the township they carry the 
sense of who they are from what they have created. It is the act of creating and the 
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conditions in which that creativity takes place that present themselves as decisive 
in the necessity to effect a radical change in relations of power in which townships, 
which are home to millions of the South African population, become the centre of 
gravity in the future human environment of South Africa. In this universe, ‘white’ 
suburbs as we see them today would structurally be ancillary to the greater human 
transformation in the townships. 
For the sake of emphasis, Jacob Dlamini reflects on one, among other factors of 
township life that speak to the dialogical relationship between inhabitants of the 
township and their surrounding environment. ‘For me’, Dlamini writes,
as I am sure for many of my friends, after-school play was the most important 
part of our street life. Here we played soccer, marbles, spinning tops, a cricket-
like game called bhathi, a card game called boom, umgusha (high jumps), 
kites, wire cars and, of course, black mampatile (hide and seek). But these 
were not just street games. They heralded in their own way the change in 
seasons. You could tell what season it was by watching games children played. 
Local merchants would know what toys to stock by observing the sequence 
of games. This was not, however, a simple case of supply and demand but an 
illustration of a cosmology in which each segment played its part without 
having to be told what to do. There was, of course, a simple logic to this. Black 
mampatile was a winter game because the sun set early in winter making it 
easy to find hiding places spots in the dark where boys and girls could make 
out. There might be far more profound cosmology in the games children 
played. (2009: 58-59)
The essence of Dlamini’s observations is that first, the social situation he describes 
played out in exactly the same way in every township. Second, it is remarkable 
that such distributed practices never achieved organised institutional status in 
community setting to become an organised skill based feature of competitive 
gaming with an established and rooted institutional presence. The weight and 
extent of restriction on township residents was not only in physical movement, 
but also in how restricted by default was the range of imaginative play in social 
organisation through self-governing institutional architecture created over time out 
of community practice. 
When Africans were conquered, dispossessed and dispersed across the sub-
continent, who and what did they become? About the ‘what’, mostly we can say 
they became workers. The trajectory of what they became began some 150 years 
ago and it led them all the way to Marikana on 16 August 2012 where the South 
African Polices Services shot protesting workers, killing 34 and wounding 78 of 
them.4 What does ‘being-white-in-the-world’ on behalf of capital do when workers 
who make ‘unreasonable’ demands and by not returning to work, and thus adversely 
4 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marikana_killings
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affect the production of platinum that could force the mine out of business? Arrest 
them. Lay them off. Shoot them. The analogy with captured slaves is not far from 
the mind. The analogy has been relevant for over a century. It has to give way.
V
But who Africans became is another trajectory. Who did they become in their 
overwhelming numbers in townships? Even in the rural areas, those who were not 
required as labourers and got left there by relatives who went to the distant mines: 
who did they become over time? Despite being “populations at special risk” living 
in “the highest cumulative unfavourable social experiences to be found” (Manganyi, 
1973: 6) they were, where they were, not slaves. They had the space, no matter how 
minimal, to create a life. It is this that fascinates Jacob Dlamini. This situation does 
provide a window to be prised open by a determined, visionary state.
To drive the point home, there is another book that ponders the possibility of this 
window opening out further. Ferial Haffajee’s new book bears the title of a question: 
What if there were no Whites in South Africa? The book with a provocative, tongue-
in-cheek title wants to attract the eye of a South African anxious about the future 
in the present dominated by the past. It gets close to the essence of the thought 
behind the title of my presentation ‘The End of Blackness?’ It is in restating that the 
future of South Africa ultimately does not lie in the relationship between ‘blacks’ 
and ‘whites’, but in what happens in the townships and rural areas of South Africa 
where the vast majority of South Africans live, and who, when they have created a 
new world for themselves and all who live in South Africa, will no longer be ‘black’, 
but citizens of South Africa.
Haffajee looks around and is disturbed by a rhetoric of protest that calls for changes 
that are actually occurring such that whatever change has occurred is not seen as 
part of a list of achievements of the new democracy. The perception of an almost 
uncontested dominance of white power gives little credit to transformational shifts 
since 1994. Looking at the world around her, Haffajee avers: 
… my life is defined by and led by black power in all its manifestations and 
tributaries. From where I sit, blacks are the centre of my gaze in all ways.
And that is why I find our narrative of black disempowerment by whites, of 
black domination by whites, of black marginalisation by whites, so hard to 
fathom it makes me feel like I am going stark raving mad. I feel as if I’ve come 
up against the power that does not know its nature or its influence – it is what 
I think. We need a new Steve Biko for the twenty-first century to hold up 
a mirror of black ability and beauty to see once again the possible and the 
potential. (Haffajee, 2015: 1068, kindle)
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Where do those who ‘being-black-in-the-world’ look for self-affirmation and self-
validation if not in themselves? The implication of Haffajee’s observation is that 
enfranchised ‘blacks’ show a tendency to look for change in ‘white’ people over 
whom they may not in the short to medium term have total control. The new South 
African ruling class, asserts Haffajee, “is no longer white; it is demonstrably black” 
(Haffajee, 2015: 21). Therefore it is located within a majority condition that, in 
continuing to identify itself as colour coded, reduces the capacity for agency in 
social action whose success will render colour irrelevant and at that point affirm the 
condition of human freedom and dignity.
This tendency to deny agency also occurs at the same time that another nascent 
trend accentuates Haffajee’s concern. Eusebius McKaiser latest book (2015), Run 
Racist Run: journeys into the heart of racism, is an angry book, written in the wake of 
continuing acts of petty racism emanating from sections of ‘white’ South Africa and 
which are frequently reflected in the media. McKaiser critiques among other things 
what he terms ‘myths of white excellence’ in the face of their ‘unearned privilege’, 
which they have achieved through legislated lack of competition from oppressed 
black South Africans. In this he sets out to explain ‘white’ South Africans to 
themselves, through their inability for deep self-critique. Thus, the store of general 
knowledge that ‘black’ South Africans had of ‘whites’ goes beyond the outward 
manifestations of their power towards deeper territory of as it were explaining 
‘whites’ to themselves. This stance subverts the normal flow of who gets to know 
about who, and gets to explain them. It is a radical shift in perspective and signals 
another part of the shift that Haffajee had observed. 
Steve Biko has an expression for what is at play here: “the envisioned self ”. “Blacks”, 
he writes, “are out to completely transform the system and to make of it what 
they wish. Such a major undertaking can only be realised in an atmosphere where 
people are convinced of the truth inherent in their stand. Liberation therefore, is 
of paramount importance in the concept of Black Consciousness, for we cannot be 
conscious of ourselves and yet remain in bondage. We want to attain the envisioned 
self which is a free self ”(1996: 49). The greatest challenge for South African ‘blacks’ 
is to achieve their envisioned self and to invite the entire human condition of the 
country to participate in it as the new site of human freedom.
The historic transition from ‘blackness’ to citizen and human is underway, but 
more work needs to be done to imagine the emergence of the alternative South 
African human norm in the life to be lived in the future that has to be made out of 
the changing present. Perhaps the world of the end of ‘blackness’ is within reach. 
The thing is to dream it more. 
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Race is a continuing controversy. It is a controversy mainly about definition. In many 
fields of academic endeavour, like anthropology, race was so charged with meaning 
that discussion about definitions of race had almost ceased, although discussion of 
the effects of race continued. From race’s ideological development during the trans-
Atlantic slave trade, until its maturity in the civil rights era, the discussion around 
race in the USA has been mostly ineffable because the definitions of race have been 
fluid, unstable and self-serving. Racism, as a purposeful prejudicial action, is often 
only too obvious and well understood. 
Much more subtle and widespread is what I term here Race-ideation that is 
thought that includes race as a concept. Racial-ideation is not necessarily overtly 
discriminatory, but it does have the effect of reifying the idea of race, that is, that 
races do exist, that they are a real thing and nothing more. The analysis presented 
here is an examination of the usage of Race-ideation and how racism engages with 
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it. The language of race and racial studies is both entrenched and depauperate, often 
confused, with definitions that change between disciplines and over time (Maré, 
2011). Race as a concept is not well defined, it changes through time, by place, by 
social group and by academic discipline and institution. Often people engaged in 
racial discussion are not referring to the same thing and this prevents resolution 
of disputes. Neoracism results from the conflation of socially defined stereotypes 
of long-standing and equally archaic biological concepts (Graves, 2015). Because 
of these lexical deficiencies, I have used here a series of descriptive, hyphenated 
terms for this study such as Race-ideation and Race-belief, which I have defined in 
a glossary. 
Informational content can be examined as a taxonomy, by its semantics (Goldberg, 
1992) or by descriptions of its content, e.g., as a Schema (Telles & Paschel, 2014). 
These methodologies permit the unpacking of complex and often overlapping 
or contradictory explanations into a more simple explanation that has utility 
for comparative work. As such, they provide a model of the idea and not a 
comprehensive survey of every possible meaning. I look only at the major warrants 
of the arguments about claims that race is a real entity, either through positivism 
or constructivism. I do not attempt to bring any resolution to the race controversy. 
Instead, the development of taxonomy represents an attempt to find commonality 
between many varying definitions of race. Another approach to unpack the 
meaning of race is to look at the philosophical underpinning of Race-ideation. 
There are both ‘Race-positivist’ camps and ‘Race-phobia’ camps in philosophy, 
e.g., see Spencer (2009, 2011) and Ludwig (2015), but the investigation of race in 
philosophy deserves a more comprehensive review than can be provided here.
Informational taxonomy looks at classifications of informational groupings.1 
As used here, Informational Taxonomy is the knowledge of how classification 
of information is performed. Information is data. It is natural to try to classify 
knowledge and information into clustered and hierarchical groups and these can 
be represented in graphical form. This is a natural process for the human brain and 
hence all thinking. An example would be that we recognise we have a head and that 
it is different from our torso and both these individual items are part of the larger 
inclusive thing, which we call our body and to which all manner of other ideas 
might be attached. 
Information taxonomy seeks to study how knowledge is derived from new 
information found in data. An example from geography is illustrative: we know 
1 “Taxonomy as a science of order proceeds in two ways. First of all, it analyses wholes into 
units: constituent parts, elements, variables etc. The aim … is the establishment of relations of 
identity and difference between things. Secondly, taxonomy brings things together in groups 
and arranges the groups into a hierarchical system” (Slaughter, 1982: 9).
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that geographers call Africa a continent and that politicians divide that continent 
into countries. The governments of those countries divide it into ever smaller 
administrative units. Knowledge about continents is constructed from classes 
and individuals within the class definition.2 Continent is the class, and Africa the 
individual entity. Africa itself contains the class of countries, and that class contains 
more individuals like the Republic of South Africa or the Kingdom of Morocco as 
two separate countries that are individuals. Within a country, further classes can 
be defined, like administrative areas, e.g., the individual of Gauteng or the Western 
Cape. The rules regarding the classification process in this example consist of 
definitions for continent, political entities, nation states and their administrative 
areas. These definitions are a mixture of geographical rules such as contiguity, 
separateness, exclusiveness and also political ideas and their historical contingencies 
reflected as people’s consensus of what area belongs to a country. We might know 
that we are in the Western Cape, but not understand all the ramifications behind 
this individual place’s historical and geographical determination. These might 
not be universally agreed because these ideas are the result of human social and 
thought processes. Individual items are always spatio-temporally restricted. They 
are not laws of nature or even simple facts.
Similarly, informational taxonomies can be used to look at the concepts under-
pinning Race-ideation. Race to a sociologist is a class concept, but to a biologist it 
refers to individual things, as real-kinds, as described by Linnaeus in the eighteenth 
century. In his first edition of the Systema Naturae in 1735, Linnaeus described 
four individual entities to accommodate humans: European, African, Asian and 
American Indians ( Jablonski, 2012). These are clearly geographic constructions. 
Linnaeus and others later added more biological conceptions of identity, such as, 
skin colour, hair type, skull shape, physique, etc., and mental constructions about 
the temperament, nature and intelligence of people ( Jablonski, 2012). The final 
ideas added to race descriptions were broadly those derived from the emergence of 
the nation-state, which is a geo-political entity with distinct linguistic and cultural 
ethnicities. This is a heady mix of information that can be used to subdivide each 
characteristic used to define each race and to create further subclass items. This 
process hit its peak with dozens of races being described within Europe alone, e.g., 
The Races of Britain (Beddoe, 1885). In South Africa, the primary division under 
apartheid was into whites and non-whites. The non-whites variously incorporated 
other ethnicities of Blacks or Bantu, Coloured that included those of various mixed 
race persons people and sometimes also Malays, San or Khoekhoe, and Asiatic 
people like South Asian Indians. These classifications were never stable despite 
2 An individual is a discrete entity comprising one part of a class. A class has a definition, 
whereas an individual can only be described (Ghiselin, 1997).
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huge effort under the apartheid regime to systemise them. The most stable division 
in South Africa was the Us-Them divide between the politically dominant whites 
and all others. In the estimation of the ruling class of Afrikaners, even the whites 
were further split along linguistic-ethnic lines to have the Afrikaans speaking in-
group and lower out-group of the English settlers. At an earlier period this division 
was reversed because whilst Britain ruled the southern tip of Africa for what is 
called the long century, it was the Afrikaner who was considered the less regarded 
out-group. This indicates that for any classification system, it is always a historically 
contingent concept.
In modern thinking, there are many definitions of race, types of racial thinking, 
theories of racial classification and expressions of racism. In the following 
analysis presented below I have gathered and organised the main warrants used in 
developing race arguments. These include a mishmash of social, cognitive, religious, 
political, nationalistic, geographic, ethnic, physical, medical or biological ideas. 
Analysis 
The analysis presented here is not the application of the taxonomy to individual 
theories or specific examples or race talk. Therefore, I will not provide or reference 
specific examples of each manifestation of Race-ideation or racism as it is used 
today. I will not discuss the extensive interactions between major manifestations 
of racism (e.g., how economic and medical applications of race combine to 
disadvantage minority groups). The warrants of Race-ideation that are abstracted 
in the analysis, therefore, come from many different theories that utilise race. They 
are presented only as a model of how the warrants can be applied and how they can 
interact in almost endless permutations.
The analysis is presented below as a series of figures. These figures are supplemented 
in much greater detail in a series of on-line supplemental figures.3 For print 
reproduction, only abbreviated versions of the figures can be presented. The 
figures are all interconnected and cross reference one another in ways that are not 
capable of representation in a two dimensional graphic. The analysis of the figures 
is broadly hierarchical and will be referred to by a numerical key. Although there 
is no strict hierarchy in the figure design the ideas are presented as either mostly 
dichotomous divisions or sometimes as polytomous entities (where an item might 
3 The more detailed and much larger supplemental charts of taxonomic connections are 
available to view and download as pdf files here: https://scholarsphere.psu.edu/concern/
generic_works/4mw22v493. This is part of the George Chaplin’s Data Repository at The 
Pennsylvania State University Scholarsphere doi:10.18113/S1HK9F, which also has more 
metadata about the files.
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be represented more than once, as is the case with any incompletely resolved 
taxonomy). There is much more information presented in the printed charts than 
in the textual descriptive analysis presented here and greatly more information in 
the supplemental figures on-line as PDF documents. There are two examples of 
how the analysis of complex ideas can be assembled to look at the development 
of a particular manifestation of race thinking. These are for Institutional Racism or 
Medico-Racial Theory. 
Differential Cognition 
Figure 1 Self Not-Self Discrimination
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The most basic human discrimination is that of differential cognition that identifies 
self and non-self. The act of recognising these differences can lead to racism, but it 
might not. This will be investigated further. From our post-colonial standpoint at 
the start of the twenty-first century, it might be thought that Race-belief has always 
been universal, but that is not true throughout history nor is it true in all places. 
Even today, there may still be small groups with little or no contact with outsiders 
that have never experienced Race-ideation. The recognition of self and non-self, kin 
and non-kin, is initially free from any judgement. 
In-group is nearly always preferred to out-group, with ‘We are The People’ being a 
common name formation for traditional ethnic societies and implying that others 
are not ‘The People’ or possibly that they are not even humans at all. This basic 
identity cognition engenders ideas of us and other as an Us-Them dichotomy and 
is used as dialectic. This leads to feelings and preferences and, consequently, to 
biases. The biases to this point are inherent and result in preference for self, kin and 
in-group and are related to identity formation. To these inherent and somewhat 
natural preferences and biases, implicit bias is added. Development of implicit bias 
in individuals is formulated from their historical and social contingencies, but when 
the individual can recognise them she is free to accept or reject them. Recognition 
of bias is often not realised, as implicit biases tend to be subtle and pervasive. The 
consequential conscious choice is to accept and act on the implicit biases. The other 
choice is to fail to acknowledge implicit bias even though it was recognised or not. 
Alternatively, one can actively reject and reverse biases. This might not even be a 
one-time decision, but a fluid situation where implicit bias is acted upon or rejected 
as the situation changes, e.g., when bias is rejected only with the knowledge that the 
actor is being observed.
The net result of these cognitive processes is that those with strong biases will 
discriminate further, leading to personal enmity towards another individual. This 
personal dislike can be mapped to race from the actions of racism. This will lead 
to what is termed here as Strong Racism. The other side of the balance is Weak 
Racism arising from recognised or unrecognised implicit bias. Even when implicit 
bias is actively denied, it will still lead to Weak Racism. In this way differential 
cognition can give rise to some level of racism. It is unlikely that persons subject to 
the present dominant world-culture can be free from implicit bias. People who are 
uncomfortable around people different from themselves, or people who hold racist 
beliefs may seek to avoid them.
Although it is common parlance to speak of characteristics that are, for instance, 
typically French or of the national temperament of Germans, it has long been 
recognised that these are non-thinking political formulae and that all French 
persons are individual actors not subject to a collective will. Therefore, even in the 
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most racially divided society like the antebellum, slave-owning, American South, 
there were Southern abolitionists. Geography, it can be said, is not destiny (McCrae 
& Terracciano, 2005). Having an implicit bias does not necessarily control how an 
individual decides their actions, but does strongly influence them (Eberhardt & 
Randall 1997). 
Figure 2 Race-ideation supporting feelings of Strong Racism
Strong Racism is a conscious racism that is mentally acted upon. It can be Overt 
Racism where the racism is openly displayed and may even be a source of pride, 
as in white supremacist movements. Overt Racism is more common when racism 
is widespread or dominant in the culture and is supported by peer pressure. It is 
strongest when sanctioned by Theological Racism or the mandate of theology, 
as this is an emotional attachment that is unlikely to yield to logic or evidence. 
Covert Racism is strong conscious racism, but one where prejudicial feelings are 
hidden, but still acted upon. Covert Racism is more common now because societal 
opinion has moved away from acceptance of open racism as in the days of the Jim 
Crow South or Apartheid South Africa. People are more reticent to express racist 
thought in public or in private when the audience’s opinion is unknown or possibly 
not supportive of racism. Therefore, Covert Racism can be as subtle as a passive 
acceptance or support for the racism of others or institutions, or it can be the 
personal active promotion of racism, but one that is publicly hidden. Overt and 
Covert Racism are often opposed by Aversive-racist ideology, which still recognises 
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the racism, but does nothing to combat it. Aversive-racist ideology can be avoidance 
of the race concept, people who are deemed different or towards racists. This 
aversion still leaves the racism intact even if it does not actively support it.
Figure 3a & 3b Race-ideation supporting feelings of Weak Racism
Figure 3a
Figure 3b
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Weak Racism is hidden unconscious or unrecognised racism that results from 
unrecognised biases. It can operate through others or through indirect passive 
racism. It might be as subtle as aversive racism, that is, the avoiding of others and 
acts of othering, or it can be manifest as support for such acts. Weak Racism is 
often found in well-meaning reactions, e.g., race paternalism, confounding class, or 
confusing ethnicity for race.
Figure 4 Engaging in Race-ideation
Race-ideation arises from an effort to explain biases and differential cognition. This 
leads to the belief that race has some explanatory value. The first major dichotomy 
is between those indulging in Race-ideation and those seeking to avoid it. Race-
ideation is not racist ideation or racialist thinking, it is rather an effort to justify 
or explain racially biased cognition. It recognises that race as an idea exists and 
that race has an explanatory power for observations made within some social 
sphere. This can be Actualised Race-ideation as in Race-belief and this divides into 
Strong Racism or Weak Racism. On the other side of Actualised Race-ideation 
is Non-Race-ideation. This is expressed as Oppositional Race-ideation, that is, 
the concept that race is not ultimately real, but that the idea has utility (e.g., it is 
useful for combating the effects of past racism). This is not Race-phobia because 
Oppositional Race-ideation is not against the very idea of division into races. 
Instead, Oppositional Race-ideation accepts the fact of race and recognises that 
race existed in some people, circumstances, periods or places and has created harm. 
Oppositional Race-ideation is altruistic in nature, seeking as it does to reverse 
discrimination resulting from past Race-belief. Oppositional Race-ideation is found 
in critical race theory and post-colonial race studies. However, Oppositional Race-
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ideation still reifies the concept of race and has a very indirect effect of supporting 
Weak Racism. 
Race-ideation that accepts race
The acceptance of race can arise from the belief that it is a real kind or that is some 
construction. The latter is more common today, but many theories accept race as 
representing real kinds that can be described not defined. The strongest of these is 
Theological-race.
Figure 5 Development of Race-ideology
Race-ideation when systematically applied gives rise to Race-ideology. Race-
ideation when applied can be used for beneficial or detrimental societal actions.
Race-ideology used in combating effects of race
The first dichotomy of Race-ideology is that race is real at some level versus 
Oppositional-Race-ideology. Oppositional-Race-ideology has it that race was once 
real, or thought to be real by some group and though Race-ideology has caused pain 
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or trouble it should be embraced so that its results can be reversed or ameliorated. 
It recognises that, through spatio-temporal conditions, Race-belief caused damage 
and Oppositional-Race-ideology seeks to undo the harm. This is not the opposite 
of Race-ideology and many race rejectionists recognise that others have Race-
belief but the Oppositionists themselves try to ignore or suppress it. However, the 
Oppositionists still suffer in that they engage in Race-ideation and that far at least, 
they reify the race concept. This is seen most clearly in those that claim colour-
blindness or post-racialism, often in the forlorn utopian hope that racism will go 
away on its own. This is akin to a child’s hope that the monster under their bed will 
go away if they keep their eyes tightly shut. Colour-blindness is not free of Race-
ideology and often not even free of covert or hidden racism. 
Figure 6 Race-ideology, race as real or as socially constructed
Of those who do have Race-ideology, there is first a division between those with 
the belief that race is a Real Kind and, therefore, that race is an objective fact to 
be discovered, recognised and described. On the other side are those with the 
belief that race is a social-intellectual construction without any objective reality. 
People holding these two concepts might or might not be cognisant of the division 
presented here. Many who think race is real are nevertheless relying on arguments 
with both biological and social ideas intermingled. However, here they can be 
usefully separated for further analysis. 
Race-ideology of race as real gives rise to Race-belief
Race-belief is based on the premise that race it is a real kind. This belief recognises 
that there is some objective fact behind race. Theology is the strongest warrant, 
biology is next and then economic models conflating ideas of educability and class. 
Race in Economic-political philosophy
Various efforts have been made to explain enduring racial patterns in the terms 
of economic theories, with most recognising race as a real term. From either a 
Capitalist or a Marxist point of view, race and class are often confounded and so are 
seen as one and the same. Races can be the subject of exploitation as in capitalism 
and racial colonialism. Alternatively, racist class-exploitation needs to be undone 
by Oppositional-Race-ideology, that is, exploitation is to be ameliorated by judicial 
control or affirmative action. If not opposed, a large race-class imbalance may be 
cause for revolution. These approaches still assume that race is a real thing. Marx, 
and particularly Engels, being products of mid-nineteenth century thought, saw 
race as real and at least for Engels hierarchical too (Paul, 1981). However, they 
thought that once class warfare ended, then race would no longer matter. They saw 
that slavery was not a matter inherent to being African, but an appropriation of 
human capital (Lee, 2011). It can be argued that capitalists have a vested interest in 
exploiting or even promoting racist attitudes (Crain & Matheny, 1999; Lee, 2011). 
This is used as a way of preventing the poorest class from presenting a united front 
for wage pressure or working conditions. This is a policy of divide-and-conquer 
using race as a wedge issue within the group of poorest people, seen in the union 
and labour strife of the 1920-1935 period in South African mines and the southern 
US States (Crain & Matheny, 1999; Lee, 2011; Cox, 1970).
Figure 7  Race-ideology: of race as only relatively true gives rise to Race-
construction
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Race is ultimately untrue, but it is a social construction and so depending on how it 
is defined it is true to some people and so race is experienced.
Developed racialist ideology
Figure 8 Race is absolute or relative
Race is seen as either something real that can be identified or is a social construct 
that is itself only relatively real.
Post-racialism and Neo-racist theory’s underpinnings
Post-race theory accepts that races were once real, but that modern social theory 
has moved beyond any ideas of racial categories. Neo-racists believe that a new 
concept of Race-belief can be developed with heuristic and hermeneutic utility to 
overcome current power imbalances and legacies of past racial injustice. Neo-racists 
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are seeking to right past wrongs of racist action and thought. An example of this 
is the appellation ‘People of Colour’ and similar formulations. These assume that 
something unites a disparate group of different ethnicities in the face of apparently 
non-coloured people (the predominant white culture). Skin colour is, again, 
destiny and can be complicated by colourism and inter-ethnic rivalries within the 
‘People of Colour’ group. The effort to rebuild an equitable Race-belief is likely to 
fall back on theological or biological race conceptions and ignores the observations 
of social scientists that race, as a social construction, is always unreal.
Figure 9 Two types of patently real race
Race is an absolute reality because it is or was theologically ordained or because it 
is a biological fact that can be described.
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Theological absolute races
Race-belief from theology was previously widespread, even universally. Still today 
a third of Americans and many South Africans are creationists and presume that 
human variation was created and eternal (Graves, 2015; De Gruchy, 2011). The 
problem with theologically derived races is that there are more theologies than 
there are religions. Therefore, there is no means of deciding the truth objectively. 
Theologically speaking, race is true as it is a revealed truth, but this depends on 
whether the religion allows conversion to this belief that race must endure within 
certain groups. The in-group becomes a biological isolate. Science is unable to 
tackle this faith-based racism. This feeds the Us-Them divide and is almost always 
self-serving.
Biologically real races 
Figure 10 Biology is not determinate, but predictive
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Similar to the Race-belief of hard biology is a soft biological Race-belief. With the 
soft biological Race-belief phenotypic variation is considered to be predictive of 
a series of probabilistically determined genetic traits. That is the likelihood that 
any particular variant is higher in one geographic deme compared to another 
geographic deme. There is a difference in the probability of certain traits between 
differing geographic groupings, e.g., Sickle Cell Anaemia is considered to be a trait 
of Africans rather than being a characteristic of people from malaria zones. Some 
traits are thought to influence one another through gene frequency and weak 
correlation to phenotype and biology. Race was once thought to be indicative of 
intellectual, social or moral predispositions. These soft phenotypic determinants 
have differing probabilities of occurring in differing groupings be they geographic, 
ethnic, social, e.g., or the vicious tropes that Jews are more prone to meanness or 
Africans to crime. 
Figure 11 & 12 Hard race-belief or race as determinate
Figure 11
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Figure 12
Hard Race-belief comes in two warrants; the rarer is that Race-belief is a Hard 
Social Construction. Local geographic groupings give rise to different inherent 
social, intellectual, mental conditions and these are reflected in fixed cultures. 
These are passed on and are substantiated within the culture working through 
inheritance as a meme. This Hard Social Construction is akin to a Positivism of 
Race-belief and it reached its zenith in ideas of cultural-racial superiority with 
European culture taken to be above all other cultures. This met its zenith at the end 
of the nineteenth century when the climatic development theory was promulgated 
as a social-Darwinist answer to European colonial domination. This Hard Social 
Construction of race lives on in subtle undercurrents, but is rarely met in academic 
discourse. 
The other branch of Race-belief is that race is a real, observable biological fact. 
This Race-belief is the most common and frequently interdigitates with soft social 
race constructions. For biological Race-belief the simple observation that variation 
in skin colour and hair type are added to geographic population determination, 
reinforces the belief that humans can be divided into physical races. The races are 
recognised by a series of correlated genetic and phenotypic properties. 
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Figure 13a and 13b Race-belief as social construction
Figure 13a
Race is a social construction, but nevertheless is rendered real because a large 
fraction, or a majority, of the population recognises it as having explanatory 
power or some utility. These conceptions are real only in social contexts and are 
abstractions of identity. Therefore, they are temporally restricted, embedded 
culturally and a cause of implicit bias. These historically-contingent ideas frequently 
contain class assumptions and have biological borrowings. They are also based in a 
place and borrow geographic assumptions about populations. The fact that these 
race constructions can be deconstructed and shown to be false has not done away 
with them. They are endurable identities and become self-fulfilling destinations 
both for the dominant culture and for those it subjugates (Apfelbaum et al., 2008). 
When social Race-belief is added to biological Race-belief, Race-positivism and 
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Race-phobias can arise. Social constructions of race can only be easily recognised 
in the presence of observable differences. Mere clusters of underlying genes do 
not lend themselves to observation. Compare the attitude to sickle cell anaemias 
and thalassemia – these both are similar adaptations to blood cell formation as a 
result of living in a malarial area. However, it is only sickle cell that is considered a 
racial adaptation.
Figure 14a & 14b  Race-ideology supporting personal and institutional forms 
of racism
This chart is presented as an example how Race-ideology is expressed in personal 
and social racism with the development and maintenance of institutional racism. 
Racism can be driven both by racist individuals using overt and covert racist acts, by 
passive racism as a member of a peer group or through stereotyping. Governments 
can promote or restrict racism or just turn a blind eye to it. Institutional racism can 
occur in any type of organised body and ranges in its expression from acceptance 
and approval of overt and covert racism to much more subtle acceptance of 
Weak Racism or an absence of policy to prevent unrecognised and passive 
racism. A lack of reporting measures, lack of support for whistle-blowers, lack of 
investigation or hearings into allegations or patterns of racism, are all evidence of 
institutional racism. This is true even where no racism has been reported because 
when mechanisms for action and receipt of reports of racism are absent it is to be 
Figure 13b
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Figure 14a
Figure 14b
expected that the reports will also be absent. However, this absence is the result of 
institutional racism, conspiring to silence critics rather than true absence. Provided 
there are policies in place and support for actions and hearings or support for 
victims, if there are then still no formal reports of racism, this is indicative of racism 
being suppressed by the institution and shows it is making efforts to prevent racism. 
This alone is lack of institutional racism. It does not mean that the individuals 
within the institution are not racists. These frameworks show that the institution 
does not condone racist attitudes and punishes those members who act on their 
Covert-racist attitudes. 
Figure 15a & 15b  Race-belief influence on racialised medicine. An example of 
Race-ideation and its subtle bias in a medical situation
Figure 15b
Figure 15a
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There are members of the medical community who are actively calling for the 
retention or the expansion of racial categorisation in the medical field, e.g., the 
retention of racial categories by the National Institutes of Health in the USA. 
Racially informed medicine can follow one of three models. The theological model 
of race is rarely if ever invoked despite the creationist beliefs of many doctors. 
These people presumably believe that human types were fixed by some deity in the 
form that they are recognised today. This betrays ignorance of the fact that race is 
a modern construction that has arisen from the time of the Enlightenment in the 
service of chattel slavery ( Jablonski, 2012).
Race as a social construction does not seem so prevalent in the medical field. The 
medical application of race tends to muddle biological definitions with social, 
ethnic, class issues and continues to recognise such groupings long after they 
had social valence. Medical race theory continues to misapply climatic and other 
biologic theories, to self-identified and socially recognised groups of people and 
label these as races, e.g., the U.S. Census categories.
Evolutionary models of Race-belief in medicine are quite pervasive. These follow 
the hard biological model or the soft biological model. The hard biological 
model assumes that traits travel together, that biology is always determinate over 
behaviour, that there were once pure ancestral types, but these are inferior as 
evolutionary change is beneficial, consequently admixture weakens individuals. At 
their strongest, hard biological Race-belief ideals leads to Race-positivism. This in 
turn leads to laws against miscegenation, racial separation and will ultimately lead 
to ideas of racial hygiene, eugenics and even genocide. 
The soft model is more common now since population demes are considered as 
primarily important. However, population ideas still consider that phenotypic 
traits group together and are correlated to genotype and that they are selected by 
the environment and influenced by pleiotropy. This is not by absolute selection, 
but by having higher probabilities of certain things being found together. Much of 
the variation is modelled as neutral or random, in other words having no effect. 
There is little empirical evidence to support the observation that adaptation to 
something like sun strength, has evolved in parallel in many populations and should 
be indicative of any other biology. Neither is there any theory as to why neutral 
variation in non-coding areas of DNA should have any systematic biological effect. 
Yet, non-coding or other non-adaptive DNA like that of the mitochondria, are 
often used in phylogenetic and cladistics reconstructions. The soft model of racially 
informed medicine sees biology as not being so determinate of outcome, but rather 
interacting with social and environment pressures in various ways. This is the basis 
of the nature and nurture argument and some evolutionary developmental theories 
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often called Evo-Devo. Its downfall is that it does not recognise that recombination 
so thoroughly mixes DNA as to obliterate race separation through hybridisation, a 
process that has never stopped in human history. It would be much more medically 
correct to speak of traits rather than define unstable classes of humans. 
There is not one type of African because there is more variation in Africa than there 
is in the rest of the world (Tishkoff et al., 2009; Hsieh et al., 2016). Geographically, 
there is not one evolutionary pressure in Africa, but a multitude of climatic, 
ecological, ethnic, linguistic and geopolitical factors, so that speaking of an African 
has no medical benefit is true of all other admixed genetically diverse mobile 
populations. It is true having dark skin, staying inside and avoiding sun will lead 
to vitamin D deficiency in places with lower solar energy. This is true regardless of 
whether the darker skin is found on a South Asian, Southern Han, a West African, 
a Khoekhoe, a San, a North African, a Melanesian, an Australian Aboriginal, or a 
Southern European if any of them are living in western Scotland. It is the trait that 
matters. Similarly, bodily appearance can tell us very little about the genetic mosaic 
that is a human and is not a reliable guide to disease risk. Race is not shorthand 
to a good medical history. It might be interesting from a health disparity point 
of view, but this is confounding class and poverty. The global South is poor not 
because of its races, but because of the legacy of unfair colonial trade practices and 
the repatriation of profits generated by multi-national corporations (Tlostanova & 
Mignolo, 2012). 
Biologists tend to want to make race synonymous with a geographic deme or even 
a subspecies, which are not real biological individuals (Ghiselin, 1997). A deme 
can only be defined and is not something as real as an Aristotelian Individual 
(Ghiselin, 1997). Similarly, groupings found as clusters of genes (Spencer, 2015), 
depends on which genes are investigated and most studies have been chosen to be 
geographically diverse and hence divergent (Marks, 2013). Admixture from past 
demes of archaic hominins such as Neanderthals, Denisovans and an unknown 
ancient African genetic ancestor, could be used to partition humans into groups, 
such as two groups of Sub-Saharan Africans, versus all non-Africans from an early 
Neanderthal introgression, and then an extra derived group of Denisovan Asio-
Melanesians (Sankararaman et al., 2016; Vernot et al., 2016; Hsieh et al., 2016). 
These groupings have no obvious connection to current conceptions as to race, or 
skin colour, and are only reflective of dispersals of archaic groups in the very distant 
past and are present at very low levels in the genome. Race affirmative suggestions 
of genetic diversity do not reflect whole genomes. Ultimately in genetic studies 
every human individual is a unique case unto themselves and are more closely 
related to siblings than to any other. The answer to this genetic health conundrum 
will be the advent of personalised medicine where an individual’s genes are looked 
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at directly to determine health consequences of their genetic complement, much 
more comprehensively than any race assignment. 
Discussion
The analysis has identified enduring conceptions that provide the warrants for 
race-based thought. Race includes ideas of biology, and social concepts. Race is 
constructed on-the-fly according to historic contingencies, and local imaginings. In 
the predominant world-culture, white is certainly privileged and can be coercive. 
Colourism is found in many cultures and is not limited to those ethnically European 
( Jablonski, 2012). Observation of race is so universal within the predominant 
world-culture that it is seen as normal. This analysis provides a framework for 
recognising which warrants are being used to support any particular manifestation 
of Race-ideation. It is by identifying the underlying basis of racial thought that the 
effects of Race-ideation are exposed. Race can be applied at the individual and the 
social group level, and even illogically, e.g. X is a good person, but I do not like her 
race in general or they are fine individually, but when they get together they are 
different. The person is getting lost in the label.
This analysis presented here provides an analysis of the warrants of Race-ideation 
and how race thinking degenerates into actual racism. This serves the practical 
process of enabling race researchers to unpack race thinking in the complex 
interaction of ideas
Race as biology does not discover a real kind; there is nothing that a logical 
positivistic explanation can discover. Without any ‘facts of nature’, assertions about 
race are just an idol of the market place, a conventional truth embedded in a mass 
of unsubstantiated assumptions. Such facts of common usage are nothing more 
than a report on personal likes and dislikes (“a statement about the condition of 
one’s glands” [Zarefsky, 2001: 10]). Such belief in the reality of an idea hints at 
irrationalism and can be disposed of by argumentation. Although scientific racism 
was an extension of logical positivism, modern science will reject race because 
it has no basis in verifiable facts at the biological level. The individual nature of 
a racial grouping is falsified in that it is never unique. The biology of race is one 
of local adaptation and genetic bottlenecks, nothing more. The biology is never 
predictive of outcome or even predictive of other biological traits traveling in 
some correlated or deterministic biological space. Race as a sociological class is 
also equally unreal. To geographers a place is only a collection of individuals with 
differing probabilities among various propensities (Paniagua, 2016). The class of 
Sub-Saharan Africans, for instance, contains many ethnicities and one wonders 
what unites them in the mind of a Race-affirmer. They are only a unit in that they 
are subject to power imbalances caused by past racism, post-colonial mind-sets, or 
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that they were subject to othering in a white-dominated, world culture (Tlostanova 
& Mignolo, 2012). 
Socially recognised classes are always fluid and ill defined. No matter how specific 
a template is defined it will never be able to fit every individual into a class without 
error. Take old age as an example. It too is historically contingent and unstable. 
Who is old in one culture, compared to another, varies depending on the local 
demographic structure. Attitudes towards the old may vary from veneration to 
denigration depending on the society. In any case, a sociological class has no 
actors as these are always individuals. Any class derived in a sociological setting, 
is contingent upon the assumptions and biases in that social milieu, at one 
point in time and at a specific locality. So while it might be useful to think about 
conceptions of race in Alabama in 1840 as they were held by slave-owning elites, 
those conceptions are not necessarily identical to race concepts held by different 
actors even within the same highly spatiotemporally restricted definition, e.g., the 
slaves themselves or contemporaneous southern abolitionists. These conceptions 
are not amenable to extrapolation to different localities or times. So when claims 
are made that the USA census categories are well understood, that might be 
true with reference to a majority within the USA at one census period (Spencer, 
2015). However, the census categories have changed over time. It also ignores the 
findings of the Plessy v. Ferguson USA Supreme Court case that a person might 
be defined as black by law even if not recognisable as such (Hoffer, 2012). There 
was an enormous state operation within apartheid South Africa that sought to 
adjudicate such cases, which was never successful to anybody’s satisfaction. Such 
unstable formulations are at best not universally true and at worse are little better 
than people’s reports of their own preferences and states of mind. Even such a 
strongly racist person as Adolf Hitler was able to justify to himself the continuing 
exalted position of Luftwaffe Field-Marshal, Erich Milch, who was declared an 
honorary Aryan under Nazi law. In this case, military necessity overrode extreme 
anti-Semitism. Cultural beliefs about a race or an individual are not facts about a 
population, but probabilities drawn mostly from positive ideas about values and 
worth. Anyway, race as a category is not clearly as well defined as age or status, but 
might be more related to attempts to track coalition membership (Cosmides et al., 
2003; Lieberman et al., 2008). Categorical impositions of templates are invariably 
self-serving. Much of the current racial discussion falls into category mistakes 
with regards to education, class, or poverty being mapped to biology. These 
category mistakes are due to the workings of past racism, segregationist policy and 
ubiquitous post-colonial thinking. These informal and illogical preferences are then 
usually decided by force, be it physical or intellectual, or if not by force then at least, 
cause bias. 
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The analysis presented here provides a comparative approach that might lead to 
less miscommunication resulting from discourse that is using non-compatible 
assumptions. However, this analysis does not itself decide whether Race-ideation is 
harmful. The tension between recognising race and denying it, is one that has moved 
on little since Booker T. Washington wrote about it in his 1901 autobiography, Up 
From Slavery (Washington, 1901). It is certain that all derogatory appellations and 
attributions of race need to be curtailed. The past misuse of Race-ideology still 
needs to be recognised, and will not disappear by ignoring it. Equally new forms 
of Race-ideologies need to be avoided. Eventually, Race-ideation will cease to have 
the power to harm. 
Conclusion
Biologically based Race-belief is an excellent example of Charlton’s Zombie theory, 
in that it has long been shown to be wrong, false, and dead, but still it refuses to 
lie down (Charlton, 2009). Socially constructed race has also been long-seen as 
invalid by social scientists, but the fact remains that it too is enduring. For Race-
ideation to be so endurable in society it must be serving some purpose. I believe 
that purpose is an informational one, one that is a shorthand for looking at many 
social problems that can be mapped to Race-ideation, such as class, education, 
post-colonial thought memes, and political empowerment. Race is a historically 
contingent fact that has not yet outlived its own heritage, although it has outlived its 
utility. Race labels are themselves destinations because in the subconscious there is 
no negation. Every time race is invoked in any setting, it reinforces the concept that 
there are races. These concepts are so baggage-laden that they weigh down human 
achievement. 
Glossary
Actualised race-ideation Acting on racial thoughts 
Aversive-race-ideology The active avoidance of racists and racism either individual 
or institutional
Aversive-racism The active avoidance of people who are deemed different
Colour-blindness The negation of colour and colourism as a social factor and 
rejection of affirmative action as a result
Critical Race Theory Is a theory that holds that even without individual racists 
the power structures and institutions hold that race is 
reflected as institutional racism derived from power 
imbalances and white privilege
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Oppositional race-ideation The active combating of racism even when race is thought 
to be unreal by the use of race to counteract previous racist 
attitudes
Post-Colonialism A branch of Critical Race Theory that looks at the residue 
of racism and attitudes in colonised countries even after 
the colonial power has left or looks at the attitude in the 
institutions of past colonial countries like the United 
Kingdom
Race-belief The races are real and divide Homo sapiens into 
subgrouping by some racist-ideology
Race blindness Accepts that race is real either by positivist or 
constructionist definitions, and posits that if race is ignored 
it will cease to have effect. This is in opposition to Critical 
Race and Post-Colonial Race Theories
Race-constructivism The idea that race is constructed by social processes and 
does not hold to any objective external facts
Race-ideation The idea that race has an informative power
Race-phobia The idea that race division is harmful and wrong
Race-positivism The use of positive racial identification to racially divide 
humanity
Racism Prejudicial acts in the name of race on the believe that race 
is hierarchical
Racist One who propounds racism
Racist-ideology A systematic thought program to apply Race-ideation in 
social, biological, theological or some ethnic system
Strong Racism Racism that is acted upon knowingly
Weak Racism Racism that is unconsciously acted upon or is thought not 
to be important
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WHAT DO WORDS REALLY SAY?
Newspaper coverage of the Marikana and Michael 
Brown incidents and an inquiry into media 
reinforcement of templates of group identity
Nina G. Jablonski, Aaron Mauro,  
James O’Sullivan and Theresa Wilson
Introduction
Identity is malleable. Ideas about the nature of people associated with particular 
identities are also malleable. This study is not about identity formation or racial 
templates per se, but about the portrayal of identity and group identity in specific 
contexts, and how portrayals of identity contribute to the reinforcement of 
templates and stereotypes of group identity. Here we sought to examine the 
contexts in which identity words, or nominative case nouns as they are known in 
linguistics, are used in newspaper articles. Identity words such as ‘man’ and ‘police’ 
can occur in the subjective case or objective case, and have different emotional 
connotations depending on their contexts. Our focus was on newspaper stories 
dealing with two relatively recent, high-profile incidents of public violence, one 
in the United States and one in South Africa. Both incidents were of interest 
because they involved people of different so-called races. The rhetorical portrayal 
of such incidents is thought-provoking because they often employ stereotyped 
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descriptions of individuals and groups and emotive descriptions of people and their 
actions, even if the incidents themselves are not ‘racial’. Whether used deliberately 
or unconsciously, stereotyped and emotion-laden verbal portrayals of people and 
situations affect reader attitudes and can, potentially, sway public opinion and 
reinforce or even redefine stereotypes. In this way, the evolution of seemingly 
‘objective’ portrayals of violent incidents in news reports through time can be seen 
as a process of passing through ever-narrowing lexical and semantic funnels created 
by the often subconsciously applied linguistic tools of emotive description. 
This chapter represents the results of a pilot study about methodology, specifically, 
an application of methods of digital textual analysis to the analysis of word frequency 
and the emotional ‘temperature’ of word use. We reasoned that this approach might 
be applicable to the study of racialised terminology and, specifically, to questions 
relevant to the racial templates. We explored specific methods of textual analysis 
to determine the contexts in which certain identity words were used and what 
sentiment was evoked by specific identity words in specific written contexts. We 
chose as our focus of study a small subset of the vocabulary of identity, group 
identity, and conflict, in newspaper accounts of two high-profile incidents involving 
personal violence. Verbal descriptions of such incidents involve interesting 
linguistic constructions because the act of violence presumes a single destructive 
direction of the action predicated by the controlling subject on the object.
The focal events of interest were, in the USA, the shooting of Michael Brown in 
Ferguson, Missouri, on 9 August 2014, and, in South Africa, the shootings of 
miners at Marikana, near Rustenburg, in August and September 2012. We were 
interested specifically in investigating how identity words were used in newspaper 
descriptions of individuals and groups involved in violent incidents and what 
sentiments were evoked by the passages in which these words occurred. 
We employed discourse analysis to explore relatively the large bodies of text from 
newspaper accounts of the Marikana and Brown incidents. We limited the scope 
of our analysis to newspaper articles, rather than transcripts of news broadcasts or 
news blogs, because – as documents – they convey the thoughts, feelings, ideas, 
beliefs and intentions of the social actors who write them. The textual and context/
content analyses that are the foundation of discourse analysis permit observation 
and discovery, from large bodies of text, of attitudes, behaviours, concerns, 
motivations and culture of the text producer from an expert point of view (Bauer et 
al., 2014). 
Newspapers are common sources for content analyses because they provide 
materials that can be examined for trends over time from a daily or weekly source. 
They were considered ideal sources for this study because they were standardised 
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and, at least in theory, rigorously edited. In the original conception of this study, 
we sought to investigate temporal trends in the frequency, context and connoted 
sentiment of words used in the newspaper accounts of the Michael Brown and 
Marikana incidents in order to study changes in frequency in the use of words used 
to describe people and actions and the sentiments they engendered. We changed 
our approach midway in the analysis, however, and sought instead to understand 
the context of divisive terms by placing them in context.1 Our primary goal became 
the understanding of the context of divisive terms and the sentiment connoted by 
key words in context. We also hoped to gain some insight into any differences that 
might exist in key word usage, context and sentiment between American and South 
African newspapers.
Methods
The types of textual analysis employed in this study were drawn from techniques 
of Natural Language Processing (NLP), which make possible the analysis of large 
bodies of text. We performed the analyses using Python’s Natural Language Tool 
Kit version 3 (NLTK) and concentrated on those analyses that would reveal 
information on the contexts in which specific words were used (Bird et al., 2009). 
We selected some methods of analysis because their visual outputs made for easier 
identification of patterns and recognition of meaningful results. 
The corpora for analysis were derived from two daily American newspapers, The 
New York Times and The Wall Street Journal (East Coast print and online versions) 
and from two weekly South African newspapers, The Independent (Saturday and 
Sunday) and The Sunday Times. These were selected because they were national, as 
opposed to regional, newspapers and because they are widely read. The time span 
over which the corpora were sampled was 9 August 2014 to 31 May 2015 for the 
New York Times and The Wall Street Journal and 16 August 2012 to 31 December 
2014 for The Independent and The Sunday Times. Corpora were harvested from 
library databases available from The Pennsylvania State University: LexisNexis 
Academic (The New York Times, The Independent, and The Sunday Times) and 
ProQuest (The Wall Street Journal). Searches using simple keywords restricted to 
the body of the article were conducted in all available editions of the newspapers. 
The corpus dealing with the Michael Brown case from American newspapers 
is referred to hereafter as the ‘Brown corpus’ and that dealing with the Marikana 
incident from South African newspapers as the ‘Marikana corpus’. Texts were 
1 The initial preparation of the corpora was done under the supervision of one co-author 
( J.O.), while most of the analyses were conducted by another author (A.M.). Because the 
corpora were not originally divided according to date when they were being prepared, 
analyses of temporal trends in word use could not be performed. 
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prepared for frequency and trend analyses by removal of stop words, or words 
which have very little meaning, such as ‘and’, ‘the’, ‘a’, ‘an’, and similar words. Both 
corpora comprised 888,030 words with 33,085 unique word types. 
Analyses conducted
We generated concordances for several keywords and cross-referenced these with 
sentiment analysis using both TextBlob and the NLTK. Visualisations were created 
using MatPlotLib (Hunter, 2007).
We conducted the following specific analyses after applying the NLTK’s standard 
stoplist:
1. tabulation of most frequent words in each of the two corpora; 
2. frequency of selected keywords and phrases that described emotions or that 
have emotional connotations in each of the two corpora. These were: ‘anger’, 
‘angry’, ‘black’, ‘man’, ‘male’, ‘black male’, and ‘black man’; 
The location of selected words in each of the two corpora visualised in lexical 
dispersion plots. The words selected comprised some of the previously selected 
keywords listed in item 2 above, as well as some others. Lexical dispersion plots 
permit evaluation of consistence and correlation of concepts and, in our case, 
evaluation of correspondence between words of interest. They are abstract 
representations of usage patterns of a word or phrase in a document (Hoey et al., 
2001).
Analysis of the overall, positive or negative, direction of the combined Brown and 
Marikana corpora used sentiment analysis. Sentiment analyses mainly focuses on 
determining the overall positivity, negativity, or neutrality associated with specific 
text passages or connoted by specific words within texts (Liu, 2012). Positive terms 
tend to be active or prospective in nature in the context of sentiment analyses, while 
negative terms tend to be destructive or restrictive;
1. finding the words associated with the words, ‘police’, ‘shooting’, ‘people’ and 
‘death’ in the combined Brown and Marikana corpora, we used NLTK, the 
distributional similarity function. This analysis finds other words which appear 
in the same contexts as the specified word and lists the most similar words first;
2. to find the contexts where the words, ‘police’ and ‘shooting’, appeared in the 
combined Brown and Marikana corpora, the NLTK common context function 
was used. This function lists the most frequent common contexts associated 
with the keyword first. This analysis draws results from statistically significant 
terms across the frequency distribution.
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Results
Most frequent words
Tabulation of the most frequent words in the Brown and Marikana corpora is 
presented in Table 1. ‘Police’ is one of the most frequently used words in both 
corpora. The most frequent words in the Marikana corpus were those associated 
with politics, namely ‘ANC’ (the political party), ‘Government’, ‘Zuma’ (then South 
African president), and ‘Politics’. The second most commonly occurring words 
were those relating to the Lonmin platinum mine, where the Marikana incident 
took place, to the miners and mining. Place words were the most frequent words 
in the Brown corpus, with the most common of these being ‘Ferguson’, the city 
in which the Brown incident took place. The high rate of occurrence of ‘New’ and 
‘City’ were associated with common references to ‘New York City’ and the high-
profile violent death of the African-American man, Eric Garner, as he was being 
apprehended by police.
In the table below the total size of the Brown corpus is 5,993,132 characters; the 
total size of the Marikana corpus is 4,684,075 characters. Note that the word ‘police’ 
appears twice in the column for the Brown corpus; the first instance denotes the 
number of occurrences of the word when it appeared in lower case letters, the 
second indicates when it appeared with an initial capital ‘P’.
Table 1  The most common words in the Brown corpus and Marikana corpus after 
removal of stop words.
BROWN  
CORPUS




NUMBER OF  
OCCURRENCES
Said 10034 Said 3065
Mr. 8339 ANC 2681
Police 7901 South 2152
Ferguson 3365 Police 2046
Brown 3343 Marikana 1992
Officers 2800 Would 1931
Black 2542 People 1788
Officer 2498 Africa 1570
People 2198 Government 1488
Would 2068 Zuma 1406
New 1833 Workers 1203
City 1729 Political 1171
Shooting 1694 Year 1153
Louis 1641 Country 1058
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BROWN  
CORPUS




NUMBER OF  
OCCURRENCES
St. 1640 Miners 1052
Grand 1502 Mining 1044
York 1500 Party 1036
Michael 1458 Lonmin 1020
Jury 1424 Time 906
Police 1360 Could 875
Department 1355 Years 871
Wilson 1327 Week 865
White 1297 Strike 855
Death 1290 Us 825
Occurrences of specific words and phrases
Searches for occurrences of specific keywords, notably the word ‘black’, revealed 
distinct differences between the Brown and Marikana corpora (Table 2). ‘Black’ 
appeared far more frequently in the Brown corpus than in the Marikana corpus; the 
phrases ‘Black male’ and ‘Black man’ were also common in the Brown corpus, but 
almost absent in the Marikana corpus.
Table 2  Frequency of occurrence of selected keywords in the Brown corpus and 
Marikana corpus.
TOTAL SIZE OF CORPUS  






Total size 5 993 132 
characters







Black male 37 0
Black man 263 8
Lexical dispersion plots
The physical order of appearance of selected keywords is displayed in the lexical 
dispersion plots for the Brown and Marikana corpora (Figure 1a and 1b). In both 
corpora, the word, ‘people’ is very common throughout, but there the similarity 
in the corpora ends. In the Brown corpus, the word ‘police’ is more common 
throughout, as is the word ‘black’. Further, the common association of ‘black’ and 
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‘man’ noted for the Brown corpus in Table 2 is visible here; a similar association is 
uncommon in the Marikana corpus. 
Figure 1  Lexical dispersion plots of the Brown corpus (a) and the Marikana corpus (b), 
showing the physical distribution of selected words in the texts.
a) Brown corpus
b) Marikana corpus
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Sentiment analysis
The results of the sentiment analysis of the combined Brown and Marikana corpora 
are shown in Figure 2. Both of the words associated with race (mostly from the 
Brown corpus), ‘white’ and ‘black’, were common and associated with negativity, 
with ‘black’ being more common and more negative than ‘white’. All of the positive 
words, including ‘question’, ‘peace’, and ‘calm’ were less common. 
Figure 2  Results of the sentiment analysis of the combined Brown and 
Marikana corpora.
Words which appear in the same context as specific nouns 
The results of the search for words from the combined corpora that appear in the 
same contexts as ‘police’, ‘shooting’, ‘people’ and ‘death’ are listed below. The words 
listed after the word of interest occur about the same number of times as the focal 
word and in the same contexts. The most similar words are listed first.
Police: the people officers government ANC protesters workers and city it miner he 
protests country they state officer that shooting law
Shooting: police ANC country case city protests officer government commission world 
time strike community day department people president and decision state
People: officers police protesters workers they we it you miners the them and that men us 
protests time government country leaders
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Death: family case and shooting work police the people that killing it time workers 
protests life government violence this body in
The contexts in which specific nouns appear
The results of the search of the combined corpora for the contexts in which the 
nouns, ‘police’, ‘shooting’, ‘people’, and ‘death’ appear are listed below. The most 
similar contexts are listed first. The underscore character indicates the position of 
the noun of interest.
Police common context: internal_probe hit_held to_no full_division prosecutors_
officials although_recorded previous_shooting received_commissioner night_
confronting york_add of_swat another_force controversial_cases the_narrative 
of_shootings puts_tactics each_station the_brown up_officers chest_said
Shooting common context: the_incited officer_of and_scenes no_from a_at the_
Monday the_on fatal_will brown_have a_shot the_let the_berkeley police_said 
problematic_that ferguson_had year_deaths the_stopped the_probe police_
police police_will
People common context: because_are beyond_who black_resulted palestinian_
although ordinary_just of_shareholder with_an because_mobilise managing_
and with_less with_who ten_were example_were suddenly_were denied_
constitutional black_who chaotic_were beyond_power young_beginning 
helps_record
Death common context: brown_have martin_the brown_still the_on joburgers_
knocked violent_by to_as brown_jeffrey brown_noted gurley_unspeakable 
his_legal to_a than_the authorities_not with_ayanda a_sentence his_richard 
joshua_but brown_at 
Discussion
The Michael Brown and Marikana incidents sparked extensive news coverage 
in traditional newspaper and broadcast media, as well as in social media, in the 
United States and South Africa. Despite the density of media coverage of these 
events, relatively little scholarly attention has been focused on the nature of this 
attention and how it may have affected public attitudes. The Marikana incident has 
been investigated more thoroughly by scholars than the Brown incident (Duncan, 
2013; Rodny-Gumede, 2015), but in only one of these papers, Duncan (2013), is a 
content analysis of the first ten days only of news coverage presented. The scholarly 
papers on Marikana have focused on how the coverage of the incident reflects 
on the nature of the press, but not in detail on how the media coverage affected 
public attitudes. A similar lack of scholarly attention has been focused on the 
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Michael Brown incident, with only one scholarly paper published to date (Bonilla 
& Rosa, 2015) that deals with the nature of the social media (Twitter) coverage 
that developed in the days after the incident. To our knowledge, ours is the first 
detailed discourse analysis of the newspaper coverage of the Brown and Marikana 
incidents, and the only study in which American and South African newspaper 
coverage was compared. 
In this study, we were concerned primarily with methodology and in seeing if 
standard modes of modern textual analysis could shed new light on the nature of 
language used to describe sensitive and high-profile news incidents. We were not 
concerned with deconstructing the nature of the journalism about the two incidents 
for the sake of understanding journalistic philosophy or approaches. Rather, we 
were intent upon comparing the frequency and context of usage of key identity and 
action words in order to investigate how the lexicon of the media affected public 
attitude formation. Our hope was to be able to understand how word choice in 
formal media coverage affected attitude formation. This work is an act in progress 
and we recognise that, in order to better understand the effects of word choice on 
attitude formation, we need to be able to follow the continuing coverage of these 
and related incidents over periods of time longer than one year.
The stylistics of journalism demands at least a veneer of objectivity in the service of 
providing descriptions of facts that are known. Journalists themselves are sometimes 
unaware of the subtle emotional connotations of word choice and word placement 
because of their lack of awareness of the subtle biases that their culture exerts on 
them. Also, because of the intense pressures under which contemporary journalists 
operate, they resort to recycling their own and other’s prose, a practice aptly 
described as ‘churnalism’ (Davies, 2008). This practice increases the likelihood that 
descriptive phrases become common parlance in the mind of the reader. The mind 
of the reader is, of course, not a blank slate. Implications of journalists’ statements 
about facts are often left latent within a reader’s and a community’s own biases and 
presumptions. Thus, anti-police or anti-protester sentiment is largely in the domain 
of readers. Further, the importance and emotional impact of a particular piece by 
a reader will depend on its placement within a newspaper. Is it a cover story with 
a prominent headline, or a minor column amidst other accounts of violence or 
misfortune on an inside page? This is something that we did not account for in this 
analysis. The nature of contemporary reporting means that reader participation and 
sentiment is often tied to the moment, and that the salient message derived from a 
piece of factual reporting is influenced by its placement on a page, the other media 
that a reader may have consumed in the hours or days before and the many implicit 
biases that most readers harbour. The banality of mere reportage means that we 
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have difficulty pulling the larger sentiment-based signal from the grinding churn of 
daily accounts of violence. 
The most important substantive finding to emerge from our study was that, that 
word choice reflected dominant attitudes in the USA and South Africa toward 
people involved in incidents of public violence. The high frequency and consistent 
use of the word ‘black’ in the Brown corpus contrasted with the near absence of 
‘black’ from the Marikana corpus. In the USA, the killing of Michael Brown was 
discussed in the media from the outset as a racial incident, in which the racial 
identities of the victim and his assailant established the central dialectic which 
framed all subsequent discourse. The Brown incident illustrates what Feagin has 
termed ‘the white racial frame’, which dominates American culture through its 
pervasive influence on stereotypes, metaphors, images, emotions and inclinations 
toward discriminatory action (2013). The Marikana incident, by contrast, was not 
framed in South Africa as a racial incident and descriptions of participants in the 
incident as ‘black’, ‘white’ or otherwise were rare. Marikana was framed in South 
Africa as a political incident over the rights of organised labour to determine miners’ 
salaries. For most South African readers, the miners shot at Marikana did not 
need to be described as ‘black’ because they were assumed to be so. The violence 
perpetrated against them was not based or provoked on the basis of deep-seated 
or subconscious enmity toward them as ‘black’. Rather, the incident was examined 
through a political lens as to whether the police action against the miners could be 
justified on the basis that, officially, the miners had been undertaking illegal strike 
actions on corporate property.
Through the preliminary analysis of newspaper treatments of two recent, violent 
incidents in the USA and South Africa we carried out here, we demonstrated 
that our chosen methods had the potential to be effective in uncovering trends 
in keyword frequency and use. The major result of this study with respect to 
methodology was that relatively small newspaper corpora such as those examined 
here were not very useful in the interpretation of attitudes or temporal trends in 
public opinion. These methods could be much more highly illuminating when 
applied to larger bodies of text (e.g., collected social media messages such as Twitter 
feeds) in the future. Even though journalistic text tends to be emotionally flat by 
comparison to other forms of nonfiction and of fiction writing, the tools of text 
analysis can be usefully applied to interrogating large bodies of text for extraction 
of information on attitude formation. We encourage social scientists and humanists 
interested in such matters to pursue similar analyses. Critical examinations of the 
textual framing of facts will become more important in the future as American and 
South African societies continue their long struggles against racialism and racism. 
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TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN?
The rise of neo-nationalism and civic 
integrationism in multi-ethnic Europe1
Maureen A. Eger and Mikael Hjerm
Political philosophers have long argued that it is easier to build a collective identity, 
solidarity and trust in homogeneous societies (Mill, 1975) and social scientists 
have lent empirical support to this claim (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Ziller & 
Schübel, 2015). Globalisation, European Union enlargement and an increase 
in asylum seeking have contributed to unprecedented ethnic and racial diversity 
in European countries (Castles & Miller, 2003); thus a growing concern among 
scholars, politicians and laypeople alike is whether immigration-generated diversity 
may undermine the solidarity required for the functioning of liberal democracies 
(Wolfe & Klausen, 1997; Goodhart, 2004). This question is maybe best articulated 
by Rawls (1996: xvii): “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable 
and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though 
incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?”
1 Funded by Marianne and Marcus Wallenberg foundation (MMW 2014.0019) and 
Riksbanken (P14-0775:1).
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Some argue that institutions, or “prescriptions about which actions are required, 
prohibited, or permitted” (Ostrom, 1986: 5), hold tremendous promise for social 
justice, equality and democracy (e.g., Rothstein, 1998; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008; 
Brady, 2009). Can institutions be formed so that they promote practices that are 
viewed as normatively good or just? Rothstein (1994) claims that this is possible: 
as long as individuals trust that the institutions are substantially just; individuals 
believe burdens are divided fairly; and, importantly, policies are implemented in a 
procedurally fair and transparent way (see also Levi, 1990). To the extent that these 
prerequisites are fulfilled, institutions have the potential to structure social life in 
ways that then reinforce the very norms that inspired their design (Rothstein, 1998). 
Thus, institutions not only ensure individuals certain rights and responsibilities, 
they may also promote civic mindedness, social justice and equality.
Given such potential, it becomes important to understand what kinds of 
institutions promote civic values in ethnically plural societies. Over the past 25 
years, scholars have debated this question, some arguing that recognising cultural 
difference is necessary to ensure the equal treatment of ethnic groups, while others 
claim only a neutral state promotes equity and equality. In this essay, we review this 
philosophical debate between multiculturalism and liberalism and then assess what 
types of policies actually exist in contemporary European societies. We find that, 
in practice, most countries have adopted policies indicative of civic integrationism, 
which is arguably reflective of neither philosophical approach. While these policies 
are often lauded as inclusive and important for immigrant integration, we argue 
that these policies nevertheless promote cultural homogeneity. And, considering 
cultural homogeneity is the nationalistic goal of the so-called radical right in 
Europe, we contend that civic integrationism is a softer version of neo-nationalism, 
the political ideology of these increasingly popular parties. In other words, we 
argue that civic integrationism and neo-nationalism are two sides of the same 
political coin.
Liberal and multicultural approaches to ethnic plurality in 
democratic societies
Up till the early twenty-first century there has been two dominant ways to frame 
the solution to the equality problem phrased by Rawls: the multicultural approach 
(or so called liberal multiculturalism) (Young, 1990; Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995, 
2007); and the liberal approach (Rawls, 1996; Rex, 1996; Modood, 1997; Joppke, 
2004). The former proposes recognition or differentiation of rights between 
individuals belonging to different groups, whereas the latter claims to be blind to 
group differences. There are, of course, large differences within the two approaches. 
Even so, there is a quite clear demarcation line between them. The multicultural 
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approach wants the state to recognise, in a soft version, that there are different 
ethnic and cultural groups in every society; and, in a strong version, to assign 
individuals in such groups differentiated rights to enable people to choose the life 
they want to pursue. The liberal approach claims state neutrality and privatisation 
of culture.
The main critique aimed at liberals is that the position of ethnic and cultural 
group blindness is ultimately homogenising (e.g., Taylor, 1994). It implies that 
the supposed neutrality of the state and equal treatment ultimately will lead to 
oppression of people based on their group belonging. The basic argument is that 
liberalism is not a functional solution to the coexistence of ethnic groups within a 
territory. The state is not and can never be neutral, which suggests that the values 
and norms of the dominant national majority will prevail and continue to influence 
the civic sphere. This in turn will diminish the sphere of action possible for 
individuals not belonging to the national majority. It is also argued on an individual 
level that people from the majority population will apply liberal arguments in 
order to oppose political decisions aimed at diminishing inequalities as they give 
preferential treatments to specific groups (Bonilla-Silva, 2006). For example, that 
the white majority in the USA does not only object to affirmative action, but that 
they do so because such policies are unfair in the name of liberalism.
Liberalism is, in itself, a non-neutral expression of the dominant group, which 
suggests that it can never be the meeting ground that unifies different conceptions 
of the good life. Thus it will, in the end, oppress groups of people not belonging 
to the majority, and will do so in the name of universalistic humanism (McLaren, 
1994). The main critique towards liberalism as not being a functional solution to the 
equality problem in plural societies is also well supported in the empirical literature 
dealing with negative outcomes for ethnic minorities in areas where fundamental 
principles of liberalism, like meritocracy and colour-blindness, are at the forefront. 
For example, situational testing studies repeatedly show that immigrants are more 
likely to be screened out (Carlsson & Rooth, 2007). Another example where the 
liberal policy of colour-blindness is expected to prevail is within the courts, where 
judges in fact evaluate cases of racial harassment differently dependent on the race 
of the judge (Chew & Kelley, 2008).
From the liberal standpoint multiculturalism is under critique from a number 
of different points. It is argued that the politics of recognition in the soft 
version (Loobuyck, 2005) and granting specific rights in the strong version of 
multiculturalism (McLaren, 1994) is in fact preserving the status quo in that 
it manifests boundaries between groups as it builds on the idea of mutually 
exclusive, involuntary, non-changeable groups. This contradicts the very idea 
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of liberal democracy built on voluntary, non-exclusive, associations striving for 
specific rights. 
The idea that preservation of the distinctiveness of national cultures, be they in 
majority or minority, is of importance (Miller, 1995) is in fact a nationalistic 
argument. Miller even claims that nationalism is needed, but not in the sense of 
a congruity between nation and state or the will to achieve a ‘one nation state’. 
Instead, Miller argues for what is commonly referred to as cultural nationalism, 
which is taken to be the promotion of certain national cultures (often by the state) 
over others. The cultural nationalist argument, as well as part of the multicultural 
argument, rests on the assumption that culture provides values and strategies that 
allow individuals to pursue a certain kind of life (Tamir, 1993; Raz, 1994). No 
individual is free if she is deprived of the things that are essential for her having 
a good life. The preservation of ethnic identities is empirically supported. For 
example, the interrelation between a migrant’s ethnic identity and the national 
identity of the country promotes well-being amongst immigrants (Phinney et 
al., 2001); or that general adaptation is better when immigrants both retain their 
cultural identity and connect to the larger society (Berry et al., 2006). 
In practice, however, it is not clear that cultural and political nationalism are ever 
distinct. There are certainly examples from history where a consensus existed that a 
national minority had a just claim to statehood because of maltreatment as a result 
of a hegemonic national culture. This could imply that any minority living within 
any state boundary would be subjected to such unjust treatment and suppression of 
their culture and therefore justified in political nationalism.
A related problem with multiculturalism and the politics of recognition is the 
impossibility to recognise all groups or cultures since norms and values across 
groups are not always compatible (Levy, 2000; Barry, 2001). Different groups of 
people often disagree about norms, values, practices and common understandings 
of what the good life entails. When such issues not only are different, but also 
incompatible across groups of people, it is impossible to assign equal value to those 
groups, especially in cases where incompatible values, norms or practices compete 
for influence in the public sphere.
The rise of multiculturalism as a philosophical idea partly sprung from 
observations of ethnic inequality. It came about as a solution to the problem 
of increasing inequality between ethnic groups, to remedy prior wrongdoings 
towards indigenous groups and to empower new immigrant populations. Colour-
blind liberalism did not seem to be able to provide a solution to these problems. 
However, the tide has turned again where multiculturalism seems to be in decline 
not only as a philosophical project, but more consequentially in actual politics. 
Two sides of the same coin? |      155
The problem with the latter is that multiculturalism is being replaced by something 
that is cloaked as liberalism, but in fact only has weak relationship to the term and 
its meaning. 
Political responses to immigration in contemporary European societies
Scholars of immigrant incorporation have constructed typologies that identify 
whether countries’ policies intend to ‘assimilate’ foreigners or embrace ethnic 
difference in the ‘multicultural’ sense (Brubaker, 1992; Castles & Miller, 1993; 
Soysal, 1994). Yet, today, these typologies have little relevance. In recent years, 
many have claimed that the era of multiculturalism is moribund, especially in 
Europe where countries have shifted from policies that recognise cultural difference 
to policies that effectively ignore the cultural diversity of immigrants (Back et al., 
2002; Joppke, 2004; Meer & Modood, 2011). Although some scholars insist that 
multiculturalism is merely changing (Banting & Kymlicka, 2006; Kymlicka 2010) 
there is general agreement that, at the very least, multiculturalism is threatened.
Indeed, as multiculturalism was a response to the failure of liberalism to address 
social problems such as socio-economic inequality and discrimination, critics of 
multiculturalism also point to its apparent inability to reduce inequality or promote 
social cohesion and trust. Those most critical of multiculturalism have even gone as 
far as to suggest that it promotes terrorism (Phillips, 2006). Given any normative 
theory of justice must be based on what is politically possible to implement (Miller, 
1995; Rawls, 1996). A serious problem with multiculturalism has been the lack of 
public support for multicultural policies (Hjerm, 2000; Citrin et al., 2001).
Essential to this shift away from multiculturalism and group-based rights is the 
notion that liberal democracy and its core values of individual rights and liberties 
need protecting (Triadafilopoulos, 2011). In recent decades, European countries 
have transitioned from countries of emigration to countries of immigration. 
Much of this immigration has been a form of economic and intra-European 
migration due to the enlargement of the European Union. The political unrest 
and wars in North Africa and the Middle East have fuelled large-scale migration 
predominantly from Muslim countries. If ethnic identity is paramount to other 
forms of identity, this suggests that it will be more difficult for immigrants from 
countries with very different cultures to ‘fit in’. Famously described as a ‘clash of 
civilizations’ (Huntington, 1993), many have expressed concerns that non-secular 
or non-Christian immigrants will transfer illiberal or undemocratic values to the 
public sphere. 
The idea that increasing immigration may threaten liberal democracy itself appears 
to be rather widespread, as this concern is articulated not only by liberals, but 
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also, and perhaps most strongly, by the European radical right. Many of these 
parties, especially in Western Europe, have softened their rhetoric from purely 
racist arguments to ones about protecting Western values, an argument that in 
some sense is compatible with liberalism. For example, Geert Wilders, leader of 
the Dutch anti-immigrant party, Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), has argued that 
showing ‘intolerance for the intolerant’ is the only way to ensure the survival of 
liberal values. Therefore, at first glance, it may seem that European societies have 
returned to policies based on liberalism, but we argue this conclusion is premature. 
Instead, we contend that European countries have embraced a more aggressive 
form of immigrant incorporation (Kundnani, 2012) and that this new ‘liberal’ 
approach is in fact an illiberal response to, real or perceived, external threats to core 
values of the modern liberal democracy (Triadafilopoulos, 2011).
We argue that increasing immigration to Europe, and Western Europe in particular, 
is associated with two different political movements: civic integrationism and 
neo-nationalism. The first essentially ignores ethnic diversity and focuses instead 
on participation in civil society. However, in contrast to integration promoted by 
liberalism, the integrationist approach conditions participation in civil society with 
a thick form of collective national identity. Policies consistent with this philosophy 
are considered inclusive, because they make it easier for immigrants to become 
Swedish, Spanish, or Italian. Neo-nationalism, on the other hand, emphasises 
ethnic boundaries, by arguing that ethnic difference and immigrant integration are 
wholly incompatible. Policies consistent with this ideology are exclusive, such as 
ending immigration or limiting foreigners’ ability to access a national welfare state 
or have rights to citizenship.
Considering one approach calls for the inclusion of immigrants and the other 
calls for their exclusion, these approaches may, on the surface, appear opposites. 
However, we argue that civic integrationism and neo-nationalism are, in practice, 
two versions of the same political philosophy, namely that culturally homogeneity is 
preferred to cultural diversity. Indeed, both versions use liberal rhetoric to advocate 
for a culturally homogenous solution to the classical question of the survival of 
liberal democracy. While they differ in regards to the policies they prescribe and 
the extent to which diversity can be tolerated, these political responses are similar 
in that they both imply a move away from multiculturalism. 
Civic integrationism
‘Integration’ is the official policy prescription of government ministries throughout 
Europe. The notion that immigrants should do their best to ‘fit in’ has been 
increasingly institutionalised in the form of national civic integration policies. 
What civic integration actually entails is complicated, as evidenced by tremendous 
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variation in European countries’ integration policies. However, underlying all these 
policies is the philosophy that, to have the same individual rights as citizens of a 
particular country, immigrants are obligated to demonstrate that they have earned 
those rights. 
By emphasising the rights and responsibilities of denizen- and citizenship, civic 
integrationism, at the very least, implicitly calls for immigrants to become part 
of the majority culture by adopting the social, political and economic behaviours 
of native-born citizens. Many view integration as relatively non-controversial, as 
the integration of immigrants holds some promise for both foreign- and native-
born. If immigrants are successful at fitting in, immigrants benefit in that they are 
gainfully employed and able to participate in civic and political life. Moreover, 
the native-born benefit, because integration does not challenge the dominant 
culture. Indeed, through the process of integration, immigrants become more like 
the native citizenry versus the other way around. And, if immigrants pose no real 
threat to the national culture or liberal democracy, natives may become more open 
to immigrants, a plus for social cohesion and social order. Further, natives may 
become more open to immigration, which is associated with long-term economic 
benefits (OECD, 2014) and may provide a partial solution to Europe’s demographic 
challenge (i.e., the combination of aging populations and low birth rates). 
Thus, policymakers have an interest in developing policies that make it easier for 
immigrants to ‘fit in’ into everyday life. Developed cooperatively by the British 
Council, Migration Policy Group, the European Commission and a variety of 
national research partners, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX, 2015) 
assesses and compares the inclusivity of countries’ integration policies in eight key 
dimensions: labour market mobility, permanent residency, access to nationality, 
political participation, family reunification, antidiscrimination, health and 
education. MIPEX also ranks countries on the basis of their inclusivity score, a 
composite measure of policies across all policy dimensions. 
Countries vary in their approach to immigrant integration. Some countries 
provide almost equal access to the labour market and relatively short waiting 
times for permanent residence or citizenship. Some countries explicitly prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or national origin. Other countries are 
arguably more protectionist and nativist, maintaining stricter rules about work 
and residency permits, local voting rights, social welfare and access to citizenship. 
Between 2007 and 2014, most European countries have become more inclusive, 
albeit to varying degrees. However, four Western European countries have become 
more exclusive: Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. 
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Some countries have developed other policies that make it more difficult for 
particular potential immigrants to immigrate in the first place. For example, the 
Netherlands has some of the most restrictive immigration policies in Europe, based 
on the assumption that people from particular countries will have difficulty fitting 
into Dutch society. Therefore, prospective migrants from non-Western countries 
must prove they can and are willing to adapt to Dutch society and policies require 
that much of this process occur prior to arriving in the Netherlands. The Civic 
Integration Abroad Act of 2006 requires certain foreign nationals aged 18-65 to 
complete an examination held at a Dutch consulate or embassy in the migrant’s 
country of origin or residence. Prospective migrants must know 500 Dutch words 
to pass the language portion of the exam. They must also pass a ‘culture test’ that 
asks questions about Dutch society, including its history, institutions, geography, 
as well as social norms about parenting, work, gender and sexuality. Migrants 
must essentially prove that they are able and willing to become Dutch. Yet, these 
requirements exist only for foreign nationals from certain countries; immigrants 
from Europe and other industrialised countries, such as the United States, Canada 
and Japan, are exempt from these policies. In addition, people with work permits, 
who are also more likely to come from an industrialised country, as well as their 
family members are also exempt. Of course, the Netherlands is not the only country 
in the world with different visa requirements for immigrants from different regions 
of the world, but this policy, with its emphasis on integration prior to immigration, 
signals a departure from other models of integration. The Human Rights Watch 
(2008) has described this policy as highly discriminatory. 
Other countries have developed policies that restrict specific cultural, religious, 
or ethnic customs from the public domain. For example, in 2010, France banned 
wearing clothing that covers your face in public places. Although this ban 
theoretically restricts a variety of different forms of clothing, the law was specifically 
designed to stop women from wearing the Islamic burqa and niqab. Belgium passed 
a similar law in 2011. Several towns in Italy and the Spanish city of Barcelona have 
imposed bans on wearing clothing that covers one’s face in public. In 2013, the Swiss 
canton of Ticino also banned the Islamic veil in public places. Critics of these laws 
argue the policies discriminate against religious minorities and are incompatible 
with freedom of religion and expression – both liberal democratic ideals. In 2014, 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) upheld France’s ban, citing civic 
integration and social cohesion as legitimate goals of the French state. 
Neo-nationalism
In recent years, scholars have identified an increase in nationalism among radical 
right parties. The common denominator of radical right parties is opposition 
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to immigration (Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2007; Iversflaten, 2005). However, 
exclusionary attitudes and policy preferences can be viewed increasingly through 
the lens of nationalism. Betz and Johnson (2004: 323) argue that ethno-national 
identity is central to contemporary radical right party platforms and rhetoric: 
“Reduced to its core, radical right-wing populist ideology is a response to the 
erosion of the system of ‘ethno-national dominance’, which characterized much 
of the history of modern nation-states”. Supporters of radical right parties view 
immigration, globalisation and EU integration as threats to the sovereignty of 
European national states (Kriesi et al., 2008). 
Eger and Valdez (2015: 127) define neo-nationalism as a “form of nationalism 
occurring in a context of settled boundaries whereby increased ethnic heterogeneity 
or supranational authority calls into question who has access to or sovereignty over 
an already established nation state”. Thus, they see neo-nationalism as a boundary-
maintenance project rather than one centred on nation building. Similarly, 
Gingrich and Banks (2006: 5) define neo-nationalism “as the nationalism of the 
current phase of transnational and global development”. Importantly, they identify 
nationalist notions of kinship and ‘sameness’ as central to neo-nationalist rhetoric. 
Using election manifesto data, Eger and Valdez (2015) show that contemporary 
radical right parties oppose multiculturalism and increasingly emphasise a 
traditional, national way of life. Using European survey data, they find that citizens 
who believe that immigrants undermine national culture are more likely to vote 
for a radical right party. These voters also oppose the enlargement of the European 
Union and believe either that immigrants should earn social rights over time or that 
they should never receive the same social rights and welfare benefits as native-born.
Radical right parties are increasingly relevant in European politics, although their 
actual impact on policy is difficult to quantify. Akkerman (2012) analyses the 
impact of radical right parties in centre-right governments on policy outcomes in 
nine countries between 1996 and 2010. He finds that radical right parties have 
not directly influenced immigration or integration policies and that centre-right 
parties have been primarily responsible for legislative changes. Mudde (2013: 9) 
also argues that the effect of radical right parties on immigration and integration 
policy has been at most indirect. However, using election manifesto data, Alonso 
and Claro da Fonseca (2012) show that all party families have adopted a more 
negative stance towards immigration since 1990. However, with the presence of 
a relevant radical right party, other party families become more anti-immigrant in 
their rhetoric and policy preferences. 
Some would argue that, considering the impact of the radical right appears limited, 
European countries are somewhat safe from the xenophobic and exclusionist 
sentiments championed by these parties. However, we argue that neo-nationalism 
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is, in reality, a more extreme version of civic integrationism. Given the fact that 
‘immigrant integration’ is widely accepted as necessary for social cohesion and the 
preservation of national cultures, the direct impact of radical right parties may be 
irrelevant. Indeed, there may be disagreements among parties and the native-born 
regarding the value of immigration, which is arguably why radical right parties 
in recent years have been increasingly successful, but there is little disagreement 
regarding the task of immigrants once they arrive. Immigrants throughout Europe 
have an obligation to integrate culturally.
Cross-national trends
If civic integrationism and neo-nationalism were opposites instead of, as we 
argue, two sides of the same coin, we should find evidence of this cross-nationally. 
Therefore, we ask whether the inclusivity of integration policies is inversely related 
to the popularity or relevance of anti-immigrant, radical right parties. Descriptive 
statistics suggest figures 1 and 2 show the relationship between the inclusivity 
of these policies and support for radical right parties. In figure 1, support for the 
radical right is measured as the percentage of votes the party received in the last 
national election. As countries have different electoral thresholds, in figure 2, 
we organise countries by the inclusivity of integration policies and relevance of 
the radical right party. If parties pose an electoral threat to other parties, they are 
classified as relevant. Otherwise they are classified as fringe or non-existent if no 
such party exists. Both figures demonstrate that the inclusivity of these policies 
is not related to the presence or popularity of a radical right party. This suggests 
that national integration policies and support for parties with exclusive policy 
preferences are not mutually exclusive. Further, figure 3 shows that change in the 
inclusivity of integration policies is unrelated to change in support for radical right 
parties. Most countries have adopted more inclusive integration policies, but this is 
unrelated to the change in electoral support for radical right parties. 
We argue that, in many cases, the radical right and mainstream liberal politicians 
have the same goal. By ignoring ethnicity and possibilities for cultural difference, 
civic integrationism arguably promotes cultural homogeneity, the nationalistic goal 
of the radical right. Some claim that this new aggressive approach to immigration-
generated ethnic diversity is actually an illiberal response to threats, real or 
perceived, to the modern liberal democracy (Triadafilopoulos, 2011). Political 
actors in some countries maintain that immigrants should adopt the cultural values 
of their new country. In other words, immigrants should change what they believe. 
According to Joppke (2010), this is an illiberal response to ethnic diversity, and 
obviously, not something that can be implemented in any meaningful way. Policies 
that incentivise or regulate behaviour, on the other hand, may or may not be 
consistent with liberal ideals. 
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Figure 1 Political responses to immigration in Europe
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Conclusion
John Stuart Mill assumed that trust was a prerequisite for a functional society 
(Mill, 1975). A common national identity, the argument goes, helps facilitate 
interpersonal and political trust and may override sub-group interests such as 
class or religion. Indeed, a common nationality is a fundamental prerequisite of a 
demos. The relationship between nationality, identity and political trust appears 
in various theoretical streams, such as the system-building tradition (Hirschman, 
1970; Rokkan, 1974; Rokkan & Urwin, 1983; Rokkan, 1987; Bartolini, 2007), 
democratic theory (Dahl, 1989; Held, 1991) and some elaborations of Easton’s 
system support theory (Easton, 1965, 1975). Beyond recognising the necessity of a 
common national identity, political philosophy has not ascertained whether a civic 
identity is sufficient or whether social cohesion requires some degree of ethnic 
homogeneity.
Multiculturalism was a response to the failure of colour-blind liberalism to create 
equality between various groups in society. In recent years, countries have moved 
away from the politics of recognition and ostensibly returned to a more liberal 
Figure 3 Integration policies and radical right voting over time in Western Europe
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approach to managing diversity. However, we argue that this return to liberalism is 
in fact a move towards something different and fundamentally illiberal. Indeed, the 
new liberal approach cannot be accused of being colour-blind anymore, because 
it actually promotes a thick form of social cohesion based on fuzzy references to 
western liberal democracy, while assuming both whiteness and the preservation of 
national cultures as the only viable solution to the classical problem of equality in 
ethnically diverse societies. 
It is important to emphasise that this notion is not entirely new. Mill argued 
in favour of a liberal solution, but his own version also assumed a thick form of 
national cohesion as he could not imagine a liberal democracy in plural societies. 
Cederman define demos as “... a group of people the vast majority of which feels 
sufficiently attached to each other to be willing to engage in democratic discourse 
and binding decision-making” (2001: 144). However, as most others, he does 
not define the content of such attachment. Some argue in favour of a thick 
version where demos and ethnos needs to coincide (e.g., Lijphart, 1977; Scharpf, 
1999), whereas others argue in favour of a more thin version of attachment (e.g., 
Habermas, 1992; Viroli, 1995). Regardless of the answer to this, not to mention the 
question of how large the ‘vast majority’ need to be, it seems that the current trend 
in Europe is accommodating an approach that would make Mill proud. Namely, an 
approach that is liberal in that it promotes a thin form of identity and attachment 
to civic institutions, while at the same time ensuring that ‘we the people’ consists of 
those alike. 
The neo-nationalism of the radical right differs from civic integrationism in that 
the former explicitly seeks homogeneity in the name of a thick form of cohesion 
whereas the integrationist approach focuses on a thin form of cohesion. Still, the 
latter approach does not embrace liberalism, but comes much closer to the ideas 
of Mill, formulated in a time before the multi-ethnic society, in assuming that the 
‘we the people’ are those that do not only share a willingness for binding decision-
making, but also share some kind of ancestry.
Acknowledging the problems with this shift does not bring us any closer to a solution. 
Rawls’ fundamental question remains hanging in the air. Is there a way to protect 
liberal democratic values without simultaneously making them vulnerable? This 
remains an important challenge for modern democracies, especially considering 
the rise of radical right parties in Europe. We do not have the solution. However, we 
think it is worth acknowledging that while abandoning multiculturalism may not 
have been fundamentally wrong, there are drawbacks, both political and moral, to 
pursuing cultural homogeneity in the name of liberal values.
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